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Estate Planning Issues With Intra-Family Loans
and Notes
Stephen R. Akers and Philip J. Hayes*
Intra-family loans are quite prevalent, and can present significant estate planning opportunities. Loans among family members may seem
simple, but they involve numerous complexities. The article addresses
many of the complexities including estate, gift and income tax consequences of loans to both the lenders and borrowers in a wide variety of
situations — from simple cash loans to sophisticated sale transactions.
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This summary is for general information. The discussion of any estate planning alternatives and other observations herein are not intended as legal or tax advice and do
not take into account the particular estate planning objectives, financial situation or
needs of individual clients. This article is based upon information obtained from various
sources that Bessemer believes to be reliable, but Bessemer makes no representation or
warranty with respect to the accuracy or completeness of such information. Views expressed herein are current only as of the date indicated, and are subject to change without notice. Forecasts may not be realized due to a variety of factors, including changes in
law, regulation, interest rates, and inflation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Wealthy families often run a “family bank” with advances to various family members as they have liquidity needs. Many of the uses of
intra-family loans take advantage of the fact that the applicable federal
rate (“AFR”) is generally lower than the prevailing market interest rate
in commercial transactions. (The AFR is based “on outstanding marketable obligations of the United States.”1 The short-term, mid-term,
and long-term rates under § 1274 of the Internal Revenue Code2 are
determined based on the preceding two months’ average market yield
on marketable Treasury bonds with corresponding maturity.)3 Examples of possible uses of intra-family loans and notes include the
following:
1. Loans to children with significant net worth;
2. Loans to children without significant net worth;
3. Non-recourse loans to children or to trusts
4. Loans to a grantor trust;
5. Sales to children or a grantor trust for a note;
6. Loans between related trusts (e.g., from a bypass trust to a
marital trust, from a marital trust to a GST exempt trust, such
as transactions to freeze the growth of the marital trust and
transfer appreciation to the tax-advantaged trust);
7. Loans to an estate;
8. Loans to trusts involving life insurance (including split dollar
and financed premium plans);4
9. Home mortgages for family members;
10. Loans for consumption rather than for acquiring investment
assets (these may be inefficient from an income tax perspec1

Treas. Reg. § 1.1274-4(b).
References to a “Section ” and to the “Code” in the text will be to sections of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
3 See Michael D. Whitty, Effects of Low Interest Rates on Investment-Driven Estate
Planning Techniques, 30 EST. PLAN. 587, 588 (2003).
4 The split dollar regulations provide that a premium financing arrangement will be
governed by § 7872, unless it provides for the payment or accrual of interest at the AFR.
Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-15(a)(1). Even if the loan provides for adequate interest, if the split
dollar loan is “non-recourse” (e.g., a loan to a trust with no other assets than the life
insurance policy), the loan will be treated as a below-market loan under § 7872 unless the
parties attach statements to their annual income tax returns representing that a reasonable person would expect all payments under the loan to be made. Treas. Reg. § 1.787215(d)(2)(i)-(ii) (“Each party should . . . attach a copy of this representation to its Federal
income tax return for any taxable year in which the lender makes a loan to which the
representation applies.”). Split dollar life insurance plans are outside the scope of this
article and will not be addressed further.
2
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tive because the interest payments will be personal interest
that does not qualify for an interest deduction);
11. Loans as vehicles for gifts over time by forgiveness of payments in some years, including forgiveness of payments in
2012 as a method of utilizing $5.0 million gift exemption available in 2012;
12. Loan from a young family member to client for a note at a
higher interest rate (to afford higher investment returns to
those family members than they might otherwise receive) (In
a different context, the Tax Court has acknowledged the reasonableness of paying an interest rate higher than the AFR);5
and
13. Client borrowing from a trust to which the client had made a
gift in case the client later needs liquidity (and the resulting
interest may be deductible at the client’s death if the note is
still outstanding at that time).6
In addition to more traditional lending relationships, loan situations
can arise inadvertently. For example, assume that a client pays a significant “endowment” for the client’s parent to live in a retirement facility.
The facility will refund a portion of the endowment when the occupant
dies. The maximum refund is 90%. Payment of the “endowment” appears to represent a 10% gift and a 90% interest-free loan.
A. Advantages and Disadvantages of Loans and Notes
If the asset that the family member acquires with the loan proceeds
has combined income and appreciation above the interest rate that is
paid on the note, there will be a wealth transfer without gift tax implications. With the incredibly low current interest rates, there is significant
opportunity for wealth transfer.
Example: Assume a very simple example of a client loaning $1
million to a child in December 2013 with a 9-year balloon note
bearing interest at 1.65% compounded annually (the AFR for
mid-term notes in that month). Assume the child receives a
5 See Estate of Duncan v. Comm’r, 102 T.C.M. (CCH) 421 (2011). In Duncan the
Court’s reasoning is compelling:
Interest rates are generally determined according to the debtor’s rather than the
creditor’s characteristics. . . . The long-term applicable Federal rate is thus inappropriate because it is based on the yield on Government obligations. . . . It
therefore reflects the Government’s cost of borrowing, which is low because
Government obligations are low-risk investments . . . . Using the long-term applicable Federal rate consequently would have been unfair to the Walter Trust.
Id. at 425(citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
6 See infra Part I.B.
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6% combined growth and income, annually (net of income
taxes – the taxes would be borne by the client if the loan were
made to a grantor trust).
Amount child owns at end of nine years
(@6.0%, compounded annually):

$1,689,479

Amount owed by child at end of nine years
(@1.65%, compounded annually):

$1,158,688

Net transfer to child
(with no gift tax)

$ 530,791

There are a number of reasons why intra-family loans are popular.
For example, with an intra-family loan, interest payments remain in the
family rather than being paid to outside banks. Intra-family loans may
be the only source of needed liquidity for family member members with
poor credit histories. Moreover, borrowing from outside lenders may
entail substantial closing costs and other expenses that can be avoided,
or at least minimized, with intra-family loans.
If a client inquires about making a loan to children, one should not
simply just knee-jerk into documenting the loan without considering
whether gifts would be more appropriate.7 Several circumstances suggesting that a gift may be preferable include (i) the lender does not need
the funds to be returned; (ii) the lender does not need cash flow from
the interest on the loan; (iii) how the loan will ever be repaid is not
apparent; and/or (iv) the lender does not plan on collecting the loan.
Remember that the note receivable will be in the client’s estate for
estate tax purposes. In particular, make use of annual exclusion gifts,
which allow asset transfers that are removed from the donor’s estate and
that do not use up any gift or estate exemption. The gift tax rate is
applied to the net amount passing to the donee, whereas the estate tax
rate is applied to the entire state, including the amount that will ultimately be paid in estate taxes. If the donor lives for three years, gift
taxes paid are removed from the gross estate. If the client transfers a
fractional interest or a minority interest in an asset owned by the client,
the transfer may be valued with a fractionalization discount. On the
other hand, if cash is loaned to the child, no fractionalization discounts
are appropriate. In addition, gifts remove assets from the donor’s gross
estate for state estate tax purposes without payment of any federal or
state transfer taxes (assuming the state does not have a state gift tax or
7 See Benjamin N. Pruett, Loans Within the Family—Cautions and Consideration
(Bessemer Trust, Washington, D.C.) (unpublished outline) (on file with author) for an
excellent outline regarding the materials in this section.
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“contemplation of death” recapture of gifts back into the state gross
estate).
If the transfer is structured as a loan, the parent will recognize interest income (typically ordinary income) at least equal to the AFR, either as actual interest or as imputed interest, thus increasing the parent’s
income tax liability. Using loans to fund consumption needs of children
is inefficient in that the interest is taxable income to the lender without
any offsetting deduction to the borrower, thus generating net taxable
income for the family. In addition, someone must keep track of the interest as it accrues to make sure that it is paid regularly or is reported as
income. This can be particularly tedious for a demand loan or variablerate term loan where the interest rate is changing periodically. There
are additional complications for calculating the imputed interest for below-market loans (which means that loans should always bear interest at
least equal to the AFR).
In the case of a loan, if interest is not paid annually, the original
issue discount (OID) rules will probably require that a proportionate
amount of the overall interest due on the note will have to be recognized each year by the seller, even if the seller is a cash basis taxpayer.
Determining the precise amount of income that must be recognized
each year can be complicated, particularly if some but not all interest
payments are made. The amount of OID included in income each year
is generally determined under a “constant yield method” as described in
Treasury Regulation Section 1.1272-1(b)(1).8 (The OID complications
can be avoided if the loan is made to a grantor trust.)
If the borrower does not make payments as they are due, additional
complications arise. The I.R.S. takes the position that if a taxpayer ostensibly makes a loan and, as part of a prearranged plan, intends to forgive or not collect on the note, the note will not be considered valuable
consideration and the donor will have made a gift at the time of the loan
to the full extent of the loan.9 While some cases have rejected this approach,10 and while the lender can attempt to establish that there was no
intention from the outset of forgiving the loan, if the lender ends up
forgiving some or all of the note payments, questions can arise, possibly
giving rise to past-due gift tax liability which could include interest and
penalties.
Even if the loan is not treated as a gift from the outset, forgiven
interest may be treated the same as forgone interest in a below-market
loan, resulting in an imputed gift to the borrower and imputed interest
8 I.R.C. § 1272(b)(i). See infra Part V.B. regarding the OID implications of loans
even if they provide for adequate interest.
9 See Rev. Rul. 77-299, 1977-2 C.B. 343, 344.
10 See infra Part I.C.
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income to the lender. (However, if the forgiveness includes principal
“in substantial part” as well as income, it may be possible for the lender
to avoid having to recognize accrued interest as taxable income.)11 If
the parties agree to a loan modification, such as adding unpaid interest
to the principal of the loan, the modification itself is treated as a new
loan, subject to the AFRs in effect when the loan is made, thus further
compounding the complexity of record keeping and reporting.
One of the advantages of making gifts to a grantor trust is that the
grantor pays income taxes on the grantor trust income without being
treated as making an additional gift. This allows the trust assets to grow
faster (without having to pay taxes) and further reduces the grantor’s
estate for estate tax purposes. This same advantage is available if the
loan is made to a grantor trust. In addition, making the loan to a grantor trust avoids having interest income taxed to the lender-grantor, and
avoids having to deal with the complexity of the OID rules.
B. Loans vs. Equity
The I.R.S. may treat the transfer as a gift, despite the fact that a
note was given in return for the transfer, if the loan is not bona fide or
(at least according to the I.R.S.) if there appears to be an intention that
the loan would never be repaid. (If the I.R.S. were to be successful in
that argument, the note should not be treated as an asset in the lender’s
estate.) A similar issue arises with sales to grantor trust transactions in
return for notes. The I.R.S. has made the argument in some audits that
the “economic realities” do not support a part sale and that a gift occurred equal to the full amount transferred unreduced by the promissory note received in return.12 Another possible argument is that the
seller has made a transfer and retained an equity interest in the actual
transferred property (thus triggering the application of § 2036 of the
Code) rather than just receiving a debt instrument.
A transfer of property in an intra-family situation will be presumed
to be a gift unless the transferor can prove the receipt of “an adequate
and full consideration in money or money’s worth.”13 In the context of
a transfer in return for a promissory note, the gift presumption can be
overcome by an affirmative showing of a bona fide loan with a “real
expectation of repayment and intent to enforce the collection of indebt11

Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-11(a); See infra Part IX.B.
See infra note 461 and discussion infra Part XII.H.
13 Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(g)(1) (“The gift tax is not applicable to a transfer for a full
and adequate consideration in money or money’s worth, or to ordinary business transactions . . . .”); Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8; see Harwood v. Comm’r, 82 T.C. 239, 258 (1984),
aff’d, 786 F.2d 1174 (9th Cir. 1986).
12
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edness.”14 The bona fide loan issue has been addressed in various income tax cases, including cases involving bad debt deductions, and
whether transfers constituted gross income even though they were made
in return for promissory notes.15 A recent case addresses the bona fide
loan factors in the context of whether $400,000 transferred to an employee was taxable income or merely the proceeds of a loan from the
employer.16 The court applied seven factors in determining that there
was not a bona fide loan: (1) existence of a note comporting with the
substance of the transaction, (2) payment of reasonable interest, (3)
fixed schedule of repayment, (4) adequate security, (5) repayment, (6)
reasonable expectation of repayment in light of the economic realities,
and (7) conduct of the parties indicating a debtor-creditor relationship.
The bona fide loan requirement has also been addressed in various
gift tax cases. The issue was explored at length in Miller v. Commissioner,17 a case in which the taxpayer made various transfers to her son
in return for a non-interest-bearing unsecured demand note. The court
stated that
[t]he mere promise to pay a sum of money in the future accompanied by an implied understanding that such promise will not
be enforced is not afforded significance for Federal tax purposes, is not deemed to have value, and does not represent adequate and full consideration in money or money’s worth.18
The court concluded that the transfer was a gift and not a bona fide
loan, on the basis of a rather detailed analysis of nine factors:
The determination of whether a transfer was made with a real
expectation of repayment and an intention to enforce the debt
depends on all the facts and circumstances, including whether:
(1) There was a promissory note or other evidence of indebtedness, (2) interest was charged, (3) there was any security or
collateral, (4) there was a fixed maturity date, (5) a demand for
repayment was made, (6) any actual repayment was made, (7)
the transferee had the ability to repay, (8) any records maintained by the transferor and/or the transferee reflected the
14 Estate of Van Anda v. Comm’r, 12 T.C. 1158, 1162 (1949), aff’d, 192 F.2d 391 (2d
Cir. 1951).
15 E.g., Santa Monica Pictures, LLC v. Comm’r, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1157 (2005) (no
basis was established for assumption of debt that was not a bona fide indebtedness).
16 Todd v. Comm’r, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1603 (2011), aff’d, 110 A.F.T.R.2d 2012-5606
(5th Cir. 2012) (unpublished opinion) (appellate decision emphasized post hoc note execution and that the loan was never repaid as supporting that the note was merely a formalized attempt to achieve a desired tax result despite a lack of substance).
17 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 1674 (1996), aff’d, 113 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. 1997).
18 Id. at 1679.
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transaction as a loan, and (9) the manner in which the transaction was reported for Federal tax purposes is consistent with a
loan.19
Miller cites a number of cases in which those same factors have been
noted to determine the existence of a bona fide loan in various contexts,
and those nine factors have been listed in various subsequent cases.20
The risks of treating a note in a sale transaction as retained equity
rather than debt were highlighted in Karmazin v. Commissioner,21 in
which the I.R.S. made a number of arguments to avoid respecting a sale
of limited partnership units to a grantor trust, including §§ 2701 and
2702. In that case, the taxpayer created a limited partnership owning
marketable securities. Taxpayer made a gift of 10% and sold 90% of the
limited partnership interests to two family trusts. The sales agreements
contained “defined value clauses.” The sales to each of the trusts were
made in exchange for secured promissory notes bearing interest equal to
the AFR at the time of the sale, and providing for a balloon payment in
20 years. The I.R.S. sent a 75-page Agent’s Determination Letter in
which the entire transaction was disallowed. The I.R.S. agent determined the partnership to be a sham, with no substantial economic effect,
and reclassified the note attributable to the sale as equity and not
debt.22 The result was a determination that a gift had been made of the
entire undiscounted amount of assets subject to the sale.23 The agent’s
argument included: (1) the partnership was a sham; (2) § 2703 applies to
disregard the partnership; (3) the defined value adjustment clause is invalid; (4) the note is treated as equity and not debt because (i) the only
assets owned by the trust are the limited partnership interests, (ii) the
debt is non-recourse, (iii) commercial lenders would not enter this sale
transaction without personal guaranties or a larger down payment, (iv) a
nine-to-one debt equity ratio is too high, (v) insufficient partnership income exists to support the debt, and (vi) PLR 9535026 left open the
question of whether the note was a valid debt; and (5) because the debt
is re-characterized as equity, § 2701 of the Code applies24 and § 2702 of
the Code applies.25 That case was ultimately settled (favorably to the
taxpayer), but the wide ranging tax effects of having the note treated as
equity rather than debt were highlighted.
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Id.
E.g., Estate of Lockett v. Comm’r, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1671 (2012).
Karmazin v. Comm’r, No. 2127-03 (T.C. Oct. 15, 2003) (stipulated decision).
Id.
Id.
Thus, the note is treated as a retention of non-periodic payments.
Thus, rights to payments under the note do not constitute a qualified interest.
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In Dallas v. Commissioner,26 the I.R.S. agent made arguments
under §§ 2701 and 2702 of the Code in the audit negotiations to disregard a sale to grantor trust transaction by treating the note as retained
equity rather than debt, but the I.R.S. dropped that argument before
trial and tried the case as a valuation dispute.
The bona fide loan issue has also arisen in various estate tax situations. For example, in Estate of Maxwell v. Commissioner,27 a sale of
property to the decedent’s sons for a note secured by a mortgage, with a
retained use of the property under a lease, triggered inclusion under
§ 2036. The court held that the sale-leaseback was not a bona fide sale
where the decedent continued to live in the house and the purported
annual rent payments were very close to the amount of the annual interest payments the son owed to the decedent on the note.28 The court
observed that the rent payments effectively just cancelled the son’s
mortgage payments. The son never occupied the house or tried to sell it
during the decedent’s lifetime. The son never made any principal payments on the mortgage (the decedent forgave $20,000 per year, and forgave the remaining indebtedness at her death under her will). The court
concluded that the alleged sale was not supported by adequate consideration even though the mortgage note was fully secured; the note was a
“façade” and not a “bona fide instrument of indebtedness” because of
the implied agreement (which the court characterized as an “understanding”) that the son would not be asked to make payments.29 The
Second Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s conclusion that
notwithstanding its form, the substance of the transaction calls
for the conclusion that decedent made a transfer to her son and
daughter-in-law with the understanding, at least implied, that
she would continue to reside in her home until her death, that
the transfer was not a bona fide sale for an adequate and full
consideration in money or money’s worth, and that the lease
represented nothing more than an attempt to add color to the
characterization of the transaction as a bona fide sale.
In Estate of Musgrove v. United States,30 the decedent transferred
$251,540 to his son less than a month before his death (at a time that he
had a serious illness) in exchange for an interest-free, unsecured demand note, which by its terms was canceled upon the decedent’s death.
The court determined that the property transferred was included in the
26
27
28
29
30

92 T.C.M (CCH) 313 (2006).
3 F.3d 591 (2d Cir. 1993).
Id. at 594.
Id. at 597.
33 Fed. Cl. 657 (1995).
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decedent’s estate under any of §§ 2033, 2035, or 2038.31 The court reasoned that the promissory note did not constitute fair consideration
where there was an implied agreement that the grantor would not make
a demand on the obligation and the notes were not intended to be
enforced.32
Assets of a family limited partnership (FLP) created by the decedent were included in the estate under § 2036 in Estate of Rosen v. Commissioner.33 Part of the court’s reasoning was that advances to the
decedent from the partnership evidenced “retained enjoyment” of the
assets transferred to the FLP even though the decedent gave an unsecured demand note for the advances.34 The purported “loans” to the
decedent were instead treated by the court as distributions from the
FLP to the decedent. There was an extended discussion of actions required to establish bona fide loans.
Among the factors mentioned by the court are that the decedent
never intended to repay the advances and the FLP never intended to
enforce the note, the FLP never demanded repayment, there was no
fixed maturity date or payment schedule, no interest (or principal) payments were made, the decedent had no ability to honor a demand for
payment, repayment of the note depended solely on the FLP’s success,
transfers were made to meet the decedent’s daily needs, and there was
no collateral. The court also questioned the adequacy of interest on the
note. The specific factors analyzed in detail by the court were summarized as follows:
The relevant factors used to distinguish debt from equity include: (1) The name given to an instrument underlying the
transfer of funds; (2) the presence or absence of a fixed maturity date and a schedule of payments; (3) the presence or absence of a fixed interest rate and actual interest payments; (4)
the source of repayment; (5) the adequacy or inadequacy of
capitalization; (6) the identity of interest between creditors and
equity holders; (7) the security for repayment; (8) the transferee’s ability to obtain financing from outside lending institutions; (9) the extent to which repayment was subordinated to
the claims of outside creditors; (10) the extent to which transferred funds were used to acquire capital assets; and (11) the
presence or absence of a sinking fund to provide repayment.35
31

Id. at 669.
Id. at 664.
33 89 T.C.M. (RIA) 2006-115, 842 (2006).
34 Id. at 862-63.
35 Id. at 863. See Jonathan G. Blattmachr & Diana S.C. Zeydel, Comparing GRATs
and Installment Sales, 41 U. MIAMI HECKERLING INST. ON EST. PLAN. ch. 2, ¶ 202.3
32
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The nine factors listed above from the Miller cases were mentioned
in Estate of Holland v. Commissioner,36 to support the finding that the
decedent’s estate did not owe bona fide indebtedness that could be deducted under § 2053.37 Various cases have mentioned one or more of
these factors in analyzing the deductibility of a debt as a claim under
§ 2053(a)(3) of the Code38 or of post-death interest paid on a loan as an
administrative expense under § 2053(a)(2).39
One of the requirements for being able to deduct a debt as a claim
or interest on a loan as an administrative expense under § 2053 is that
the debt is bona fide in nature and not essentially donative in character.40 A variety of factors applies in determining whether or not an obligation to certain family members or related entities is bona fide.41
Factors that are indicative (but not necessarily determinative) of a bona
fide claim or expense include, but are not limited to, (1) the transaction
occurs in the ordinary course of business, is negotiated at arm’s length,
and is free from donative intent; (2) the nature of the debt is not related
to an expectation or claim of inheritance; (3) there is an agreement between the parties which is substantiated with contemporaneous evidence; (4) performance is pursuant to an agreement which can be
(2007), for an excellent discussion of the impact of the Rosen case on potential estate
inclusion.
36 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 3236 (1997).
37 Id. at 3237. Section 2053 allows a deduction for any indebtedness, but only “to
the extent that [it was] contracted bona fide and for an adequate and full consideration in
money or money’s worth.” I.R.C. § 2053(c)(1)(A).
38 E.g., Estate of Labombarde v. Comm’r, 58 T.C. 745, 753 (1972), aff’d, 502 F.2d
1158 (1st Cir. 1973) (children’s support payments to their mother were not a loan because
there was no note evidencing the supposed debt and no interest was ever paid); Estate of
Hicks v. Comm’r, 94 T.C.M. (CCH) 43 (2007) (loan from father to trust for daughter
funded by proceeds of tort settlement, where loan arrangement was planned in part to
keep from disqualifying the daughter for Medicaid assistance, was bona fide; court observed in particular that a note was executed, interest was paid every month on the loan,
and the loan resulted in the creation of real interest income on which the father really
paid income tax); Estate of Ribblesdale v. Comm’r, 23 T.C.M. (CCH) 1041 (1964)
(wealthy son who was annoyed with constant requests from his mother for assistance
made loans to mother for her support; “bona fides of a loan are primarily established by
the intention of the parties that repayment will be made pursuant to the terms of the
agreement;” factors mentioned by court were that the mother signed notes requiring repayment, her executor actually repaid the principal [but not the interest], and she had
substantial assets for repaying the loans even though they were not secured.).
39 E.g., Estate of Duncan v. Comm’r, 102 T.C.M. (CCH) 421, 426 (2011); Estate of
Kahanic v. Comm’r, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1434 (2012); Estate of Graegin v. Comm’r, 56
T.C.M. (CCH) 387 (1988).
40 Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-1(b)(2)(i).
41 See Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-1(b)(2)(iii) for a detailed description of the family
members, related entities, and beneficiaries to whom such debts are given special
scrutiny.
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substantiated; and (5) all amounts paid are reported by each party for
federal income and employment tax purposes.42
Based on the factors listed in the cases discussed above, the following is a brief 10-point checklist of “best practices” in structuring intrafamily loans.
1. Have the borrower sign a promissory note.
2. Establish a fixed repayment schedule.
3. Charge interest at or above the minimum “safe harbor” rate.
4. Request collateral from the borrower.
5. Demand repayment.
6. Have records from both parties reflecting the debt.
7. Show evidence that payments have been made.
8. Make sure that the borrower has the wherewithal to repay the
loan.
9. Do not establish any plan to forgive payments as they come
due.
10. Refinance with caution.43
C. Upfront Gift If Intent to Forgive Loan?
Revenue Ruling 77-29944 announced the I.R.S. position that if a
taxpayer ostensibly makes a loan and, as part of a prearranged plan,
intends to forgive or not collect on the note, the note will not be considered valuable consideration and the donor will have made a gift at the
time of the loan to the full extent of the loan.45 However, if there is no
prearranged plan and the intent to forgive the debt arises at a later time,
the donor will have made a gift only at the time of the forgiveness.46
The I.R.S. relied on the reasoning of Deal v. Commissioner,47 for its
conclusion in Revenue Ruling 77-299. In Deal, an individual transferred
a remainder interest in unimproved non-income-producing property to
children, and the children gave the individual noninterest-bearing, unsecured demand notes. The Tax Court held that the notes executed by
the children were not intended as consideration for the transfer and,
rather than a bona fide sale, the taxpayer made a gift of the remainder
42

Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-1(b)(2)(ii).
Philip J. Hayes, Intra-Family Loans: Common Hazards and 10 Steps to Avoid
Them, BESSEMER TRUST PERSPECTIVES ON WEALTH MANAGEMENT, Issue IV at 3-4
(2011).
44 Rev. Rul. 77-299, 1977-2 C.B. 343.
45 Id.
46 Rev. Rul. 81-264, 1981-2 C.B. 186.
47 29 T.C. 730 (1958).
43
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interest to the children.48 The I.R.S. has subsequently reiterated its
position.49
The Tax Court reached a contrary result in several cases that were
decided before the issuance of Revenue Ruling 77-299 (and the I.R.S.
non-acquiesced to those cases in Revenue Ruling 77-299). Those cases
reasoned that there would be no gift at the time of the initial loan as
long as the notes had substance.50 The issue is not whether the donor
intended to forgive the note, but whether the note was legally
enforceable.
In Haygood v. Commissioner,51 a mother deeded two properties,
one to each of her two sons, and in return took vendor’s lien notes from
each of the sons for the full value of the property, payable $3000 per
year. In accordance with her intention when she transferred the properties, the mother canceled the $3,000 annual payments as they became
due. The I.R.S. cited the Deal case in support of its position that a gift
was made at the outset without regard to the value of the notes received.52 The Tax Court distinguished the Deal decision: (1) Deal involved the transfer of property to a trust and on the same date the
daughters (rather than the trust) gave notes to the transferor; and (2)
the daughters gave non-interest-bearing unsecured notes at the time of
the transfer to the trust as compared to secured notes that were used in
Haygood. The court in Haygood held that the amount of the gift that
occurred at the time of the initial transfer was reduced by the full face
amount of the secured notes even though the taxpayer had no intention
of enforcing payment of the notes and the taxpayer in fact forgave
$3,000 per year on the notes from each of the transferees.53
The Tax Court reached the same result 10 years later in Estate of
Kelley v. Commissioner.54 Parents transferred real estate to their three
children in return for valid notes, secured by vendor’s liens on the real
properties. The parents extinguished the notes without payment as they
became due. The I.R.S. argued that the notes “lacked economic sub48

Id. at 736.
See, e.g. I.R.S. Field Service Advice 1999-837 (donor makes gift of full amount of
loan initially if donor intends to forgive the loan as part of a prearranged plan); PLR
200603002 (Jan. 20, 2006) (transfer of life insurance policies to trust in return for note in
the amount of the difference between the combined value of the policies and the amount
sheltered by gift tax annual exclusions; several months later the donors canceled the note
and forgave the debt; taxpayer did not request a ruling on this issue, but the I.R.S. stated
that it viewed the donors as having made a gift at the outset in the amount of the note
where there was a prearranged plan that it would be canceled).
50 Estate of Maxwell v. Comm’r., 3 F.3d 591, 600 (2d Cir. 1993).
51 42 T.C. 936 (1964).
52 See Minnie E. Deal v. Comm’r, 39 T.C. 730 (1958).
53 Haygood, 42 T.C at 946.
54 63 T.C. 321 (1974).
49
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stance and were a mere ‘façade for the principal purpose of tax avoidance.’”55 The court gave two answers to this argument. First, the notes
and vendor’s liens, without evidence showing they were a “façade,” are
prima facie what they purport to be. The parents reserved all rights
given to them under the liens and notes until they actually forgave the
notes and nothing in the record suggests that the notes were not collectible. Second, “since the notes and liens were enforceable, petitioners’
gifts in 1954 were limited to the value of the transferred interests in
excess of the face amount of the notes.”56
The court in Estate of Maxwell v. Commissioner57 distinguished
Haygood and Kelley in a § 2036 case involving a transfer of property
subject to a mortgage accompanied with a leaseback of the property.
The court reasoned that in Haygood and Kelley, the donor intended to
forgive the note payments,58 but under the facts of Maxwell, the court
found that, at the time the note was executed, there was “an understanding” between the parties to the transaction that the note would be
forgiven.59 Other cases have criticized the approach taken in Haygood
and Kelley (though in a different context), observing that a mere promise to pay in the future that is accompanied by an implied understanding
that the promise will not be enforced should not be given value and is
not adequate and full consideration in money or money’s worth.60
One commentator gives various reasons in concluding that taxpayer
position is the more reasoned position on this issue.
The IRS has not done well with this approach, and there are
reasons for this. Even if the lender actually intends to gradually forgive the entire loan, (1) he is free to change his mind at
any time, (2) his interest in the note can be seized by a creditor
or bankruptcy trustee, who will surely enforce it, and (3) if the
lender dies, his executor will be under a duty to collect the
note. Therefore, if the loan is documented and administered
properly, this technique should work, even if there is a periodic
forgiveness plan, since the intent to make a gift in the future is
not the same as making a gift in the present. However, if the
conduct of the parties negates the existence of an actual bona
55
56
57
58

Id. at 324.
Id. at 325.
3 F.3d 591 (2d Cir. 1993).
Id. at 601; See also Haygood v. Comm’r, 42 T.C. 936, 946 (1964); Kelley, 63 T.C. at

325.
59

Maxwell, 3 F.3d at 595.
E.g., Miller v. Comm’r, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 1674 (1996); Estate of Musgrove v.
United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 657, 664 (1995); Estate of Lockett v. Comm’r, 103 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1671 (2012).
60
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fide debtor-creditor relationship at all, the entire loan may be
recharacterized as a gift at the time the loan was made or the
property lent may be included in the lender’s estate, depending
on whether the lender or the borrower is considered to “really” own the property.
...
If the borrower is insolvent (or otherwise clearly will not be
able to pay the debt) when the loan is made, the lender may be
treated as making a gift at the outset.61
Other commentators agree that the Tax court analysis in Haygood and
Kelley is the preferable approach.62
While the cases go both ways on this issue, taxpayers can clearly
expect the I.R.S. to take the position that a loan is not bona fide and will
not be recognized as an offset to the amount of the gift at the time of the
initial transfer if the lender intends to forgive the note payments as they
become due. Where the donor intends to forgive the note payments, it
is especially important to structure the loan transaction to satisfy as
many of the elements as possible in distinguishing debt from equity. In
particular, there should be written loan documents, preferably the notes
will be secured, and the borrower should have the ability to repay the
notes. If palatable, do not forgive all payments, but have the borrowers
make some of the annual payments.
II. HISTORY

AND

CONTEXT

OF

SECTIONS 7872

AND

1274

A. Brief History
Once upon a time, life was good. Gas was 20 cents a gallon, Get
Smart reruns ran daily, hard-core speed death-metal music had not been
invented, personal interest was deductible, and even the most unsophisticated tax advisors knew enough to use interest-free loans to help clients drive large semi-trailers through gaping holes in the income and gift
tax systems. During this tax utopia, taxpayers used interest-free loans in
a variety of ways to exploit the failure of the I.R.S. to at first assert, then
later convince the courts, that interest-free loans should be income- and/
or gift- taxable transfers. This exploitation included interest-free loans:
(i) by C corporations (usually closely-held) to shareholders (to avoid
double taxation); (ii) by wealthy persons to family members in lower tax
brackets to permit them to invest and receive returns taxed at lower
rates; (iii) by employers to employees as a substitute for taxable com61 KATHRYN G. HENKEL, ESTATE PLANNING AND WEALTH PRESERVATION ¶
28.05[2][a] ( 1997).
62 E.g., HOWARD ZARITSKY & RONALD D. AUCUTT, STRUCTURING ESTATE
FREEZES: ANALYSIS WITH FORMS § 12.03 (1997).

\\jciprod01\productn\A\ACT\38-2-3\ACT2301.txt

68

unknown

ACTEC LAW JOURNAL

Seq: 18

7-FEB-14

13:19

[Vol. 38:51

pensation (and payroll taxes); and (iv) by sellers using installment sales
to convert interest income to capital gain. This tax Shangri-La lasted,
for the most part, from 1913 to 1984.63
The I.R.S. was slow to catch on to the potential for tax avoidance,
failing to strongly assert that interest-free loans should have tax consequences until 1960, when, in Dean v. Commissioner,64 it made its first
coherent argument. In Dean, the Commissioner argued that since an
interest-free loan did not require an interest payment, the borrower received the free use of the principal as an economic benefit that should
be included in gross income. At first the courts were not moved by the
I.R.S.’s position.65 Eventually, however, the United States Court of
Claims adopted the theory, although that decision was reversed.66 Finally, in 1984, the I.R.S. scored its breakthrough victory in this arena
(albeit in the gift tax context), in Dickman v. Commissioner,67 in which
the U.S. Supreme Court held that the lender’s right to receive interest is
a “valuable property right,”68 and that the transfer of such a right
through an interest free loan is a taxable gift. Dickman quickly touched
off comprehensive below-market loan reform. Later in 1984, Congress
enacted Internal Revenue Code § 7872 to govern certain below-market
loans. With § 7872, Congress created artificial transfers of deemed interest between the borrower and the lender, to ensure that income was
recognized by each party.69 Although Dickman concerned only gift tax,
§ 7872 went beyond mere codification of the Dickman holding, and beyond the intra-family context, to reach loans to shareholders, employees
and a variety of other below-market loans, for both income tax and gift
tax application. By enacting § 7872, Congress indicated that virtually all
gifts involving the transfer of money or property would be valued using
the currently applicable AFR,70 thereby replacing the traditional fair63

See I.R.C. § 483 (in 1963 Congress enacted this section to address installment sale

abuse).
64

35 T.C. 1083 (1961).
Generally, in this era the Government was not concerned with benefits arising
from the interest-free use of money. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 64-328, 1964-2 C.B. 11 (split
dollar regime blessed).
66 Hardee v. United States, 50 A.F.T.R. 2d 82-5252 (Cl. Ct. 1982), rev’d, 708 F.2d
661 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
67 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 620 (1980), rev’d, 690 F.2d 812, (11th Cir. 1982), aff’d, 465 U.S.
330 (1984).
68 465 U.S. at 336.
69 At the time, the personal interest deduction made the statute essentially revenue
neutral. The loss of the personal interest deduction through the enactment of I.R.C.
§ 163(h) under the 1986 Tax Act, however, caused income tax pain for the borrower
when interest-free loans are compensatory.
70 I.R.C. § 7872(f)(2)(B).
65
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market-value method71 of valuing below-market loans with a discounting method. Proposed Treasury Regulations interpreting § 7872 were
issued in August 1985,72 a portion of which were also adopted as temporary regulations.73 Unfortunately, the statute was amended after the
promulgation of the Proposed Regulations, leading to the confusing
misalignment of the statute and the Proposed Regulations discussed
below.
Section 7872 governs below-market loans in several circumstances,
including loans between family members.74 Section 7872 applies to any
transaction that 1) is a bona-fide loan, 2) is below market, 3) falls within
one of four categories of below-market loans, and 4) is not within any of
several exceptions. The four categories are loans 1) from donor to a
donee, 2) from an employer to an employee, 3) from a corporation to a
shareholder, and 4) with interest arrangements made for tax avoidance
purposes.75 As we are concerned solely with intra-family transactions,
in this article we shall be concerned only with “gift loans.”76
Generally, § 7872 will not impute gift or income tax consequences
to a loan providing “sufficient” stated interest, which means interest at a
rate no lower than the appropriate AFR, based on the appropriate compounding period.77 Any gift loan subject to § 7872 which bears interest
below the AFR may have adverse tax consequences to the lender.78
Section 7872 treats a bona fide below-market (i.e., below-AFR) gift loan
as economically equivalent to a loan bearing interest at the AFR coupled with a payment by the lender to the borrower of funds to pay the
imputed interest to the lender. This “forgone interest” is treated as retransferred by the borrower to the lender as interest. Thus, the forgone
interest is treated as a gift by the lender to the borrower and then
treated as income to the lender from the borrower. Although income
71

As exemplified in Blackburn v. Comm’r, 20 T.C. 204 (1953).
All references to “Proposed Regulations” hereafter shall be to these proposed
regulations issued in 1985 for I.R.C. § 7872, unless otherwise noted.
73 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-1-14.
74 See generally I.R.C. § 7872. There is no I.R.C. provision, however, that specifically applies to intra-family loans.
75 I.R.C. § 7872(c)(1)(A)-(D).
76 I.R.C. § 7872(c)(1)(A). Although intra-family loans certainly occur in other contexts (employer-employee and corporation-stockholder), the majority of intra-family
loans will be gift loans.
77 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-3(c)(1).
78 Compare I.R.C. § 7872 with other categories of below-market loans, such as
compensation related loans, which have adverse tax consequences for the borrower and
the lender, in which case the amount of interest imputed constitutes wages to the
employee.
72

\\jciprod01\productn\A\ACT\38-2-3\ACT2301.txt

70

unknown

Seq: 20

ACTEC LAW JOURNAL

7-FEB-14

13:19

[Vol. 38:51

and gift taxes are implicated, the amount of the gift and income do not
always align.79
Section 7872 is complicated, therefore not well understood, and, in
practice, often ignored. The problem is exacerbated in sales transactions, which implicate both the income and gift-tax safe harbor of § 7872
and the overlapping income tax (and gift tax?) safe harbors of §§ 483
and 1274 governing intra-family sales. Even if the correct safe harbor is
used, the Code Section80 may impute phantom income annually if the
loan does not call for “qualified stated interest” (e.g., a loan that does
not call for annual payment of interest will be subject to annual imputation of income under the OID rules even if the interest rate satisfies the
applicable safe harbor).
B. The Gift Loan: One Type of Loan Under Section 7872
As a reminder, an important assumption of this article is that, unless indicated otherwise, we are discussing intra-family “gift loans”
under § 7872(c)(1)(A) of the Code, as opposed to other loans also covered by § 7872, namely compensation related loans,81 corporationshareholder loans,82 or tax-avoidance loans.83 A below market loan is a
“gift loan” if the forgoing of interest “is in the nature of a gift”84 as
defined under the gift tax.85 The I.R.S. assumes that a transfer of money
from one family member to another is a gift.86 A loan can be a gift loan
whether the lender is a natural person or an entity and whether, apart
from the loan, the parties are related or unrelated,87 or whether the loan
is direct or indirect.88

79 I.R.C. § 7872. For example, under I.R.C. § 7872, in the case of term gift loans, the
amount treated as transferred from the lender to the borrower, which is subject to gift
tax, and the amount of imputed interest payable by the borrower to the lender, which is
subject to income tax, are computed differently.
80 Treas. Reg. § 1.1273-1(c).
81 I.R.C. § 7872(c)(1)(B).
82 I.R.C. § 7872(c)(1)(C).
83 I.R.C. § 7872(c)(1)(D).
84 I.R.C. § 7872(f)(3).
85 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-4(b)(1).
86 See Harwood v. Comm’r, 82 T.C. 239, 258 (1984), aff’d without published opinion,
786 F.2d 1174 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. den., 479 U.S. 1007 (1986).
87 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS ¶ 55.2.3, at 55-13 (3d ed. 2012); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-4(b)(1)-(2).
88 I.R.C. § 2511(a).
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C. Avoiding Below-Market Gift Loan Status Under Section 7872
The level of many practitioners’89 mastery of this area often begins
and ends with one concern: keeping a loan from being characterized as
below-market under § 7872 – and, therefore, in the context of this article, free from imputed taxable gift and taxable income consequences to
the lender. The coping mechanism many have developed to blunt the
awful truth about the complexity of § 7872 is a cursory knowledge of
§ 1274(d) of the Code, i.e., that “a 0-3 year note is subject to the shortterm AFR, a 3-9 year note is subject to the mid-term AFR, and a 9+
year note is subject to the long-term AFR.”90 This level of mastery is
not a springboard to intra-family loan bliss, so we will dig deeper and try
to avoid confusion along the way.
A (bona fide) gift loan is “below market” if the lender does not
charge at least the rate of interest required under § 7872.91 The rate
required under § 7872 is tied to the AFR, the lynchpin of the I.R.S.
below-market loan scheme. The AFR, set forth in § 1274(d) of the
Code, is published monthly by the I.R.S., usually around the 20th day of
the preceding month,92 based on the average yield for treasuries with
the applicable remaining maturity periods for the one-month period
ending on the 14th of the month. There are three federal rates, a shortterm rate that is the AFR for obligations maturing three years or less
from the issue date, a mid-term rate for the range three to nine years,
and a long-term rate for obligations maturing more than nine years from
issue.
The AFRs are based on annual, semiannual, quarterly, and monthly
compounding of interest. The more often a loan is compounded, the
more valuable it is to the lender; therefore, interest rates required by the
statutes correspond to the length of the compounding period – the
shorter the period, the lower the required rate. For example, 9% compounded annually is equivalent to 8.62% compounded daily. The appropriate AFR depends on the loan’s terms. The shorter of the
compounding period or the payment interval determines the appropri89

The authors include themselves in this group.
See I.R.C. § 1274(d).
91 See I.R.C. § 7872(e)(1)(A)-(B). Technically, a below market loan is a demand
loan with an interest rate lower than the AFR or a term loan for which the amount
loaned exceeds the present value of all payments due under the loan). Id. Because the
present value of a term loan is determined using the AFR, a demand or term loan with an
interest rate at least equal to the AFR is not a below market loan. See Prop. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.7872-3(c)(1).
92 One way of locating the AFR for a particular month is to search for “AFR” on
the I.R.S. website (www.irs.gov). In addition, planners can register on the IRS website to
receive a monthly notification of the AFR from the IRS.
90
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ate rate.93 If interest payments or compoundings are at intervals other
than those for which rates are published, the rate for the next longest
interval for which rates are published may be used. For example, the
monthly rate can be used for a note providing for daily compounding,
and the quarterly rate can be used for bi-monthly interest payments.94
Those sections deal with valuing gifts from below market loans.
Section 7872 seems to contemplate cash loans, and the objective method
for valuing the gift element under § 7872 appears not to apply to loans
of property other than cash.95 However, the gift element of notes given
in exchange for property is also determined under § 7872 and as long as
the loan bears interest at a rate equal to the AFR for the month in
question, there should not be a deemed gift attributable to the note (although there is no assurance the IRS may not argue in the future that a
market rate should be used).96 Section 7872 is not limited to loans between individuals, and the concepts of § 7872 appear to apply to loans to
or from trusts, although there is no explicit authority confirming that
conclusion.97
93

Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-3(b)(1).
See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 87, ¶ 55.2.3, at 55-9. Alternatively, a rate
precisely appropriate for the note’s payment or compounding interval can be computed.
95 See Jonathan Blattmachr, Elisabeth Madden, & Bridget Crawford, How Low Can
You Go? Some Consequences of Substituting a Lower AFR Note for a Higher AFR Note,
109 J. TAX’N 21 (July 2008).
96 See Frazee v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 554, 588 (1992) (“Nowhere does the text of
section 7872 specify that section 7872 is limited to loans of money. If it was implicit that it
was so limited, it would be unnecessary to specify that section 7872 does not apply to any
loan to which sections 483 or 1274 apply. The presence of section 7872(f)(8) signaled
Congress’ belief that section 7872 could properly be applicable to some seller financing.
We are not here to judge the wisdom of section 7872, but rather, to apply the provision as
drafted.”); Estate of True v. Comm’r, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 27 (2001) (“We concluded in
Frazee v. Commissioner, supra at 588-589, that section 7872 does not apply solely to loans
of money; it also applies to seller-provided financing for the sale of property. In our view,
the fact that the deferred payment arrangement in the case at hand was contained in the
buy-sell agreements, rather than in a separate note as in Frazee, does not require a different result.”), aff’d on other grounds, 390 F.3d 1210 (10th Cir. 2004). Private Letter Rulings 9535026 and 9408018 also used the AFR for notes in sale and redemption
transactions, respectively. See infra Part XI.A.
97 See Letter Ruling 9418013 (series of loans from QTIP trust would not be treated
as a disposition of the spouse’s qualifying income interest for life under § 2519 when the
loans bore interest at the AFR). Section 7872 governs the effects of loans with belowmarket interest rates in a variety of contexts beyond just individuals, specifically including loans between employers and employees, corporation-shareholder loans, and loans to
qualified continuing care facilities among others. I.R.C. § 7872(c)(1)(B-C, F). There are
special exceptions that apply only to loans between individuals. I.R.C. § 7872(c)(2-3); see
infra Part V.B.2. Having exceptions that apply only to individual loans confirms that the
section applies beyond just loans between individuals. The application of the principles
of § 7872 to trusts is important, for example to know that a loan or sale of assets from a
94

\\jciprod01\productn\A\ACT\38-2-3\ACT2301.txt

Fall/Winter 2012]

unknown

Seq: 23

INTRA-FAMILY LOANS

7-FEB-14

13:19

73

D. Demand Loans
A loan is a demand loan if it is “payable in full at any time on
demand of the lender” or “within a reasonable time after the lender’s
demand.”98 As we will see, the rules of § 7872 are fairly straightforward
in the context of term loans. Demand loans are different story.
Usually, the AFR for a demand loan is the federal short term rate
in effect for the period the amount imputed by § 7872 (referred to as
“forgone interest”) is being determined. This is because, by the nature
of an arm’s length demand loan, the lender is effectively protected
against rate fluctuations. Section 7872 provides that interest on the hypothetical arm’s length loan outstanding for any period during the calendar year is deemed paid annually on December 31.99 Thus, with a
loan outstanding from April 4 to November 12, the lender is deemed to
require payment of interest on December 31.
For the semiannual period in which the loan is made, the short term
AFR in effect on the day the loan is made is used. For each subsequent
semiannual period (January-June and July-December), the short term
AFR for the first month of that semiannual period (i.e., January or July)
is used.100 (However, “Example 5” in the regulations suggests that the
lowest short term rate in the semiannual period [from and after the
month in which the loan is made] may be used.)101
Where the principal amount of a demand loan is outstanding for a
full calendar year, the Proposed Regulations provide that a “blended
rate” shall compute the amount of sufficient interest for the year.102
GST non-exempt trust in return for an AFR note from a GST exempt trust will not cause
a change in the inclusion ratio of the exempt trust.
98 I.R.C. § 7872(f)(5); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-10(a)(1). What if a loan is payable
at the earlier of a specified term or on demand? The statute and regulations do not
address whether that is treated as a demand or term loan under §7872. The statute literally suggests that is a demand loan. Section 7872(f)(5) says that a demand loan “means
any loan which is payable in full at any time on the demand of the lender,” and
§ 7872(f)(6) says a term loan is any loan that is not a demand loan. The loan described is
“payable in full on the demand of the lender”; therefore, the statute literally says it is a
demand loan not a term loan. Indeed, the term may have no relationship to the economic reality; for example, what if it is a 15-year loan to lock in the benefit of the current
low interest rates but the parties contemplate treating as a demand loan for which the
rates will never have to fluctuate upward? A counterargument is that a loan with a fixed
maturity but that can be called earlier sets a known outside limited on the term of the
loan and arguably should be more akin to a term loan.
99 I.R.C. § 7872(a)(2).
100 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-3(b)(3)(i)(A).
101 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-3(b)(3)(i)(B), 1.7872-3(b)(3)(iii) ex.5(iii).
102 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-13(a). The blended rate is available that effectively
applies the January rate for the first half of the year and the July rate for the second half
of the year. Id.
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The blended rate is applied to the principal balance outstanding as of
January 1, and reflects semiannual compounding. The blended rate is
announced in the July AFR ruling each year (that is published approximately June 20 of each year.)103 Accrued interest (not forgiven) is
treated as a new loan and payments are applied to accrued interest first,
then principal.
Since the AFR is recomputed monthly, a demand note might technically be below-market for any month during which it bears interest at
a rate lower than that month’s AFR. However, forgone interest (the
measure of the gift once the loan fails the below-market test) is computed under the Proposed Regulations with rates determined once or
twice a year.104 Unfortunately, the Proposed Regulations on the testing
procedures were issued before the most recent amendment to § 7872,
which changed the statutory period for AFR adjustment from semi-annually to monthly.105 Therefore, there is no definite method for testing
demand loans.
One reputable authority infers the following procedure for testing
whether a demand loan is below-market: A demand loan is not belowmarket for a particular semiannual period (January to June, or July to
December) if it bears interest at a rate at least equal to the lesser of 1) a
blended rate published annually by the I.R.S., or 2) the federal shortterm rate for the first month of the semiannual period (January or July).
For the semiannual period during which the loan is made, the loan is not
below market if the rate equals or exceeds the Federal short-term rate
for the month in which the loan is made, even if this rate is lower than
103 See Rev. Rul. 2013-15, 2013-28 I.R.B. 1, tbl.6 for the 2013 blended rate. The
blended rates for the last five years have been as follows: 2009-0.82%; 2010-0.59%; 20110.40%; 2012-0.22%; 2013- 0.22%.
104 Nomenclature alert: At the time the Proposed Regulations were drafted, the
AFR was determined twice a year and was effective for the six-month period following
the announcement. The Proposed Regulations refer to this as the “federal statutory
rate.” Soon after the Proposed Regulations were issued, the I.R.S. decided to determine
the AFR monthly. What the Proposed Regulations refer to as the “alternate rate” is this
monthly AFR; the “alternative rate” became the statutory rate under § 1274(d) through
an amendment to the statute in 1985 (P.L. 99-121). Thus, what the Proposed Regulations
refer to as the “alternate” rate is actually the federal statutory rate. However, the (former) federal statutory rate set forth in the Proposed Regulations is still used to determine
forgone interest under the Proposed Regulations. Effectively, since the semiannual rate is
no longer determined, the I.R.S. has adopted the January and July AFRs as substitutes
for the former semiannual AFRs. And you wondered why it was so hard to understand
the proposed regulations? Philip J. Hayes, Intra-Family Loans: Adventures in Forgiveness
and Forgetfulness, ABA REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. L. SECTION 10-11 n.56 (Spring 2007),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/real_property_trust_estate/symposia/2007/hayes_final.authcheckdam.pdf.
105 I.R.C. § 7872(f)(2)(A);

\\jciprod01\productn\A\ACT\38-2-3\ACT2301.txt

Fall/Winter 2012]

unknown

Seq: 25

7-FEB-14

INTRA-FAMILY LOANS

13:19

75

both the annual blended rate and the rate for the first month of the semiannual period.106
As outlined above, for a demand loan, no fixed rate can be certain
to be sufficient under § 7872 for as long as the loan is outstanding; a
loan that is above the market rate can quickly become below-market if
interest rates rise and the note does not provide for periodic interestrate adjustments. This problem may be solved by using a variable rate
demand loan that calls for periodic revisions of the interest rate, which
might be automatic.107 Such a note may provide that 1) for each semiannual period (January to June, or July to December), the interest rate
is the Federal short-term rate for the first month of the period (January
or July), or 2) that the interest rate for a year is the blended rate for the
year. Either determination provides, by definition, sufficient stated interest, and therefore will never be below-market.
The Proposed Regulations provide that variable rate demand loans
will provide for sufficient interest if the rate fixed by the index used is
no lower than the AFR for each semiannual period or the short term
AFR in effect at the beginning of the payment period (or, if the agreement so provides, at the end) of the payment or compounding period,
whichever is shorter.108 This rule applies, for example, if interest on a
demand loan is compounded monthly, with the rate for each month being the federal short-term rate for the month.
The simplest demand note would be one with a variable rate equal
to the AFR in effect on the loan date with interest rate adjustments on
the first day of each month. Alternatively, for simplicity, the final regulations could adopt a rule providing that there is sufficient interest when
the variable rate changes at least in six-month intervals and, at the beginning of each interval, the rate is at least equal to the AFR in effect on
that date.
Sample Language – Drafting Interest Rate for Demand Note:
[A]t an initial rate per annum equal to the Federal short-term
rate, as published by the Internal Revenue Service pursuant to
§ 1274(d) of the Internal Revenue Code (hereafter the “Federal short-term rate”), in effect for the month first above written. The interest rate on the unpaid principal amount of this
Promissory Note shall be adjusted as of January 1 and July 1 of
each year to the Federal short-term rate in effect for such January and July, as the case may be.109
106
107
108
109

See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 87, ¶ 55.2.3, at 55-10.
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-3(c)(2).
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-3(e)(2)(i).
Hayes, supra note 104, at 52, Exhibit A.
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Drafting Interest Rate for Demand Note, More Aggressive Approach Under Proposed Regulations Example 5: The interest
rate . . . shall be adjusted as of January 1 and July 1 of each
year to the Federal short term rate in effect for such January
and July, as the case may be. During each semiannual period
(Jan. 1 – June 30 and July 1 – Dec. 31; each a Period) the interest rate shall be adjusted to the lowest Federal short-term rate
during the applicable Period. (By way of example only, if the
lowest Federal short-term rate for January is 4.2%, February is
4.0% and the rest of the Period (March – June) is 4.4%, the
rate charged for January shall be 4.2% and for February
through June shall be 4.0%.)110
If the note provides that the interest rate will be the relevant AFR
for each particular period, the appropriate AFR will have to be determined over relevant periods (as described below) to calculate the
amount of interest due under the note. If the demand note does not call
for interest to be paid at the ever-changing relevant short term AFR,
such AFR will have to be determined in any event to determine the
amount of imputed income and gift from the below-market loan.
Example: Below-Market Demand Loan. Your client, Adam,
calls you to tell you that on February 1, 2011, he loaned
$200,000 to his son, Chris, for the purchase of an investment
property. There were no formal loan documents drafted for
this loan. Adam tells you that he received full repayment from
Chris on June 30, 2012 of $200,000. Adam also gave his son a
$13,000 holiday gift on December 15, 2011. The AFRs were as
follows: Jan 2011 – 0.43%; Feb 2011 – 0.51%; July 2011 0.37%; Jan 2012 – 0.19%; 2011 Blended 0.4%
1. What is the imputed interest for 2011 & 2012?
Imputed Interest for 2011 = $728
Jan 2011 ST AFR = 0.43% and July 2011 ST AFR = 0.37%
[$200,000 x (0.43% x 5/12)] + [200,000 x (0.37% x 6/
12)] = $728
Imputed Interest for 2012 = $190
Jan 2012 ST AFR = 0.19%
$200,000 x (0.19% x 6/12) = $190
Observe: Blended Rate Does Not Apply
The loan was not outstanding for all of 2011 or all of 2012.
Therefore the blended rate for a calendar year does not apply
for either 2011 or 2012.
110

Hayes, supra note 104, at 53, Exhibit B.
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2. How much does Adam show on his gift tax return as gifts
to Chris 2011? 2012?
Total reportable gift by Adam =
2011 = $13,728 ($13,000 Cash gift + $728 Imputed
Interest)
2012 = $190 (Imputed Interest; assuming no other
cash gifts)
E. Term Loans
A term loan is a loan that is not a demand loan.111 Under the Proposed Regulations, a term loan is a loan made under an agreement that
“specifies an ascertainable period of time for which the loan is to be
outstanding.”112 A term loan is below-market if “the amount loaned
exceeds the present value of all payments due under the loan.”113 The
present value of the payments is determined as of the date of the loan
using the AFR as the discount rate. The AFR is the Federal short-term
(three years or less), mid-term (over three and up to nine years), or
long-term (over nine years) rate, depending on the term of the loan, in
effect on the date the loan is made.114 The test is simplified in the Proposed Regulations, which provide that a loan is not below market if it
bears “sufficient interest,” which means interest computed “on the outstanding loan balance at a rate no lower than the applicable federal rate
based on a compounding period appropriate for that loan.”115 Interest
may be variable, so long as the rate is at or above the AFR at the time
the loan is made and is based on an objective index.116 As opposed to a
demand gift loan, which may fall in and out of below-market status (if
not properly drafted), a term loan need only qualify (for gift tax purposes) as a market loan at the time the loan is made (or when the
$10,000 de minimis ceiling is exceeded). For sale transactions, the interest rate on the note can be the lowest AFR for the three-month period
ending with the month there was a “binding contract in writing for such
sale or exchange.”117 For sale transactions the appropriate AFR is
111

I.R.C. § 7872(f)(6).
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-10(a)(2). A period is considered ascertainable if it can
be “determined actuarially.” Id. For example, a loan payable only on the borrower’s
death is a term loan because the borrower’s life expectancy is actuarially determinable.
Id.
113 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-3(a)(2).
114 I.R.C. § 7872(f)(10); see Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-8(b)(1).
115 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-3(c)(1).
116 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-3(e)(1).
117 I.R.C. § 1274(d)(2)(B).
112
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based not on the term of the note, but on its weighted average
maturity.118
Structuring loans as term loans rather than demand loans is generally preferable. In light of the ability to use the AFR at the time of a
term loan for its full term, rather than having to adjust the AFR every
six months with a demand loan, using term loans has two distinct advantages. First, there is no complexity of repeatedly determining the appropriate AFR for any particular period. The AFR at the origination of the
loan controls throughout the term of the loan for determining the income and gift tax effects of whether the below-market rules of §7872
apply. Second, during low interest rate environments, there will be no
gift tax consequences for the entire term of the note as long as the interest rate of the term note is at least equal to the AFR when the note is
originated.
Example: Below-Market Term Loan. Your client, Adam, calls
you again to tell you that on March 1, 2011 he loaned his
daughter, Stacey, $200,000 to purchase a new home. The loan
has a stated rate of 2% payable annually. It also calls for a
balloon repayment of the principal due in 10 Years. Stacey
makes annual interest payments of $4,000 each year. The
March 2011 AFR rates were as follows: Short-term = 0.54%;
Mid-term = 2.44%; Long-term = 4.30%.
1. What is the total interest income reportable by Adam for
2011?
2. What is the 2011 & 2012 gift reportable by Adam?
Step 1: Determine if this loan is a below-market loan
(GIFT AMOUNT)
Calculate difference between PV of all loan payments and
loan amount
March 2011 Annual Long-Term Rate = 4.30%
Present value of all payment due under the loan:
PV of 10 annual $4,000 Interest payments and
$200,000 balloon payment in 10 Years discounted using 4.3%
PV = $163,241 – Since the loan amount is greater, this is a
below-market loan
Total Forgone Interest = $200,000 – 163,241 = $36,759
Step 2: Calculate the forgone interest for each year (INCOME AMOUNT)
March 2011 Annual Long-Term Rate = 4.30%
118 I.R.C. § 1274(d)(2) (3-month provision); Treas. Reg. § 1.1274-4(c) (weighted average maturity description, referring to Treas. Reg. § 1.1273-1(e)(3)). See infra Part
XI.A.
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Forgone Interest = Interest using AFR – Interest Payment
Made
Annual Interest with AFR = ($200,000 x 4.30%) = $8,600
Annual Forgone Interest = $8,600 - $4,000 = $4,600
2011 Forgone Interest: $4,600 x 10/12 = 3,833
Answers:
1. What is the total interest income reportable by Adam for
2011?
2011 Forgone Interest = $3,833
Total interest reported in 2011 for this loan is $7,833
(Interest Paid $4,000 + Imputed Interest $3,833)
2. What is the 2011 & 2012 gift reportable by Adam?
2011 Gift is total forgone interest = $36,759
2012 Gift = None, because all forgone interest is reported
as a gift in the year the loan is made
F. Exemptions From Section 7872
1. $10,000 De Minimis Exception (Gift and Income Tax)
A gift loan is exempt from § 7872 of the Code if it is made “directly
between [individual] persons” and “the aggregate outstanding amount
of the loans between [such individuals] does not exceed $10,000.”119 All
loans between the lender and borrower are aggregated regardless of
their character (market or below-market), the date made, or the rate of
interest (if any).120 This de minimis exemption does not apply to any
gift loan “directly attributable to the purchase or carrying of incomeproducing assets,” which are defined in the Proposed Regulations as 1)
an asset of a type that generates ordinary income, or 2) a market discount bond issued prior to June 19, 1984.121 This exception applies on a
day-to-day basis for gift loans. Even if the aggregate amount of loans
between the two individuals exceeds $10,000 for some days, there will be
no imputed transfers for income or gift purposes (except as described
below for term loans) on any days during which the aggregate standing
amount of loans between the individuals does not exceed $10,000. For
119 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-8(b)(1). A loan to a custodian under the Uniform
Transfers to Minors Act is deemed to be to a natural person, but a loan to a trust does
NOT qualify, even though the beneficiaries are natural persons. Prop. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.7872-8(a)(2).
120 See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-8(a)(2)(ii). In determining the aggregate outstanding amount of loans between individuals, loans by a husband and wife to an individual
borrower are treated as made by one person. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 98TH
CONG., REP. ON REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984 256
(Comm. Print 1984) [hereinafter REP. ON DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT].
121 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-8(b)(3)-(4).
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gift term loans, § 7872 continues to apply for gift purposes even after the
aggregate loss amount is reduced back to $10,000 or less.122 (For nongift loans, if the amount of loans between the individuals ever exceeds
$10,000, the exception does not apply to outstanding loans between the
individuals after that date even if the outstanding balance of the loans is
later reduced below $10,000.)
For purposes of this exception (and all of § 7872), husband and wife
are treated as one person.123 Therefore a loan from daughter to father,
from father to daughter, from mother to daughter and from daughter to
mother will all be counted for purposes of determining if aggregate outstanding loans between daughter and either father or mother exceed
$10,000.
2. $100,000 Exception (Income Exception Only)
The second exception applies if the aggregate outstanding amount
of gift loans between individuals does not exceed $100,000. The imputed interest amount (i.e., the amount treated as retransferred from
the borrower to the lender at the end of the year) for income tax purposes is limited to the borrower’s net investment income for the year.124
However, there is a de minimis rule: if the borrower has less than $1,000
of net investment income for the year, the net investment income for
purposes of this exception is deemed to be zero (so there would be no
imputed income from the loan during that year).125
This exception can be helpful for below market loans to borrowers
who have little net investment income. However, the amount of forgone interest (the amount of interest that is below the interest that
would have been incurred if the loan had used the AFR) will be treated
as a taxable gift. (If the lender is not making other taxable gifts to the
borrower during the year, the amount of the gift from the below-market
loan may be covered by the gift tax annual exclusion.)
This exception applies on a day-to-day basis.126 As with the $10,000
exception, husband and wife are treated as one person. The exception
does not apply if a principal purpose of the transaction is to avoid “any
Federal tax.”127 The limitation applies to both the borrower’s interest
122

I.R.C. § 7872(f)(10).
I.R.C. § 7872(f)(7).
124 I.R.C. § 7872(d)(1)(A), (E). The amount of net investment income is determined
under I.R.C. § 163(d)(3). If a borrower has more than one gift loan outstanding, the
borrower’s net investment income is allocated among the loans in proportion to the respective amounts that would be treated as retransferred by the borrower without regard
to this exception. See I.R.C. § 7872(d)(1)(C).
125 I.R.C. § 7872(d)(1)(E)(ii).
126 I.R.C. § 7872(d).
127 I.R.C. § 7872(d)(1)(B).
123
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deduction and the lender’s interest income, except that it applies to the
lender only if “the borrower notifies the lender, in a signed statement, of
the amount of the borrower’s net investment income properly allocable
to the loan.”128
3. Sections 483 and 1274
According to § 7872(f)(8) of the Code, § 7872 does not apply to any
loan to which §§ 483 or 1274 (pertaining to loans in connection with
sales or exchanges) apply. This exception is not nearly as straightforward as the clear language of the statute implies, and there is considerable room for interpretation (and confusion).129
G. Gift vs. Term Loans
In most settings, clients will be well advised to use a term loan instead of a demand loan. For a demand loan, the stated interest rate is
compared to the AFR throughout the loan, and gifts will result for any
period during which the stated interest rate is less than the AFR for that
period. For term loans, however, the state interest rate is compared to
the AFR at the time the loan is originated to determine if the loan results in a gift. In light of this treatment, using term loans has two distinct
advantages.
First, there is no complexity of repeatedly determining the appropriate AFR for any particular period. The AFR at the origination of the
loan controls throughout the term of the loan for determining the income and gift tax effects of whether the below-market rules of § 7872
apply. Second, during the current incredibly low interest rate environment, there will be no gift tax consequences for the entire term of the
note as long as the interest rate of the term note is at least equal to the
AFR when the note is originated.
III. INCOME TAX CONSEQUENCES

OF

BELOW-MARKET GIFT LOANS

If a below-market gift loan is made directly between individuals,
and if the outstanding balance of all loans (of any kind) between them is
not greater than $100,000, § 7872(d)(1) limits the amount of deemed interest paid by the borrower to the lender under § 7872 to the borrower’s
“net investment income” for the year (as defined under § 163(d)(4)).130
Note that this limitation only applies for income tax purposes (thus, the
lender is deemed to have made a gift of the full amount of the forgone
interest regardless of the borrower’s net investment income). The limi128
129
130

Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-11(g)(3).
See infra Part XI.A.
I.R.C. §§ 163(d)(4), 7872(d)(1)(E).
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tation applies to both the borrower’s interest deduction and the lender’s
interest income, except that it applies to the lender only if “the borrower
notifies the lender, in a signed statement, of the amount of the borrower’s net investment income properly allocable to the loan.”131
A. Demand Loans
With a below-market demand loan, the amount of the “forgone interest” is deemed transferred from the lender to the borrower in the
form of a gift, and then retransferred by the borrower to the lender as
payment of interest on December 31 (or on the date the loan is repaid).
The imputed interest income is in addition to any actual interest income
received from the borrower. The amount of forgone interest for any
calendar year (i.e., the amount of the additional payment/interest
treated as a loan paid to lender) is the excess of (i) the amount of interest that would have been payable in that year if interest had accrued at
the AFR, over (ii) any interest actually payable on the loan allocable to
that year.132
To calculate the amount of forgone interest for a demand loan with
a constant principal amount outstanding for an entire year, the forgone
interest is equal to the sum of (1) The product of one-half of the January
short-term rate based on semi-annual compounding times the principal
amount of the loan; and (2) The product of one-half of the July shortterm rate based on the semiannual compounding times the sum of the
principal amount of the loan and the amount described in (1).133 From
this amount, the amount of interest actually paid during the calendar
year, if any, is subtracted.
For easier computation, the I.R.S. also publishes a “blended annual
rate” that is multiplied by the principal amount of the loan outstanding
to arrive at the amount from which the actual interest paid, if any, is to
be subtracted.134 This blended annual rate is published annually in July
in the Revenue Procedure that announces the applicable federal rates
for that month. The excess amount over the interest actually paid is the
forgone interest.
131

Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-11(g)(3).
I.R.C. § 7872(e)(2)(A)-(B); Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.7872-6, 25.7872-1.
133 Rev. Rul. 86-17, 1986-1 C.B. 377.
134 Id. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-13(a). In the case of term gift loans, the taxpayer is
to use the AFR based on annual compounding in effect the day the loan is made, appropriate to the term to maturity, in lieu of the blended annual rate. Prop. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.7872-13(e)(1)(i). The blended rates for the last five years have been as follows: 2009 –
0.82%; 2010 – 0.59%; 2011 – 0.40%; 2012 – 0.22%; 2013 – 0.22%. See Rev. Rul. 2013-15,
2013-28 I.R.B. 1, tbl.6 for the 2013 blended rate.
132
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If a portion of the loan principal is repaid or an additional amount
is loaned during the calendar year, the calculation of the forgone interest is complicated. The amount of this interest is calculated by using the
“exact method” or the “approximate method.” The exact method is
based upon a daily compounding of interest and calculates the interest
as
the principal amount multiplied by: (1 + I ÷ k)f -1 where:
I = the Federal short-term rate expressed as a decimal135
k = the number of accrual periods in a year; and
f = a fraction consisting of the number of days in the period for which interest is being computed divided by the
number of days in a complete accrual period.136
This amount should be computed separately for each month at the
short-term rate for that month.137 The exact method must be used in
this situation (when the loan balance is not constant throughout the
year) if either of the parties is not an individual or the aggregate of loans
between them exceeds $250,000.
The approximate method is available to individual lenders and borrowers when the aggregate amount of loans between them is $250,000 or
less. Under this method, interest is determined by calculating the interest for a semiannual period and then prorating that amount on a daily
basis to determine the amount of interest for the portion of the semiannual period the loan was outstanding.138 The amount imputed will always be slightly larger under the approximate method. The Proposed
Regulations include examples contrasting the exact method and the approximate method.139
What if borrower-child pays as the spirit moves her? This situation
presents a practical issue for most practitioners in administering a note.
According to the Proposed Regulations
[i]f a demand loan does not have a constant outstanding principal amount during a period, the amount of forgone interest
shall be computed according to the principles [applying to
loans outstanding less than the entire year], with each increase
in the outstanding loan balance being treated as a new loan
135 Note, however, that for gift term loans, the amount of interest that would have
been payable in that year if interest had accrued at the AFR is computed using the AFR
based on semi-annual compounding in effect the day the loan is made, appropriate to the
term to maturity, in lieu of the Federal short-term rate. Prop. Reg. § 1.7872-13(e)(1)(ii).
136 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 87, ¶ 55.3.2, at 55-41; see Prop. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.7872-13(b)-(d).
137 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 87, ¶55.3.2, at 55-41.
138 See id. at 55-42; Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-13(b)(1).
139 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-13(b)(3).
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and each decrease being treated as first a repayment of accrued but unpaid interest (if any), and then a repayment of
principal.140
The Proposed Regulations contain examples calculating the imputed income from a loan with a fluctuating balance.141
B. Term Loans
Although § 7872(b) provides that a term loan with a below-market
interest rate will be treated as having original issue discount (OID) at
the time the loan is made,142 the Proposed Regulations143 provide that
for gift term loans the forgone interest demand loan rules apply.144 The
OID rules rest on the premise that the present value of the borrower’s
promise to repay is less than the amount loaned; the OID rules are appropriate only if the borrower is assured the use of the lender’s money
for a fixed term.
Under the demand loan rules applied to term gift loans, as opposed
to the OID scheme, forgone interest accrues on the full amount loaned,
and none of the original principal is recharacterized as a non-loan payment.145 Congress decided that demand loan rules should also determine the income tax consequences of gift term loans “because, in light
of the familial or other personal relationship that is likely to exist between the borrower and the lender, the technical provisions of the loan,
such as the maturity of the loan, may not be viewed as binding by the
parties.”146 This regime relieves donors and donees of the burden of
coping with the OID rules that apply to non-gift term loans.147
Each year, a lender must report the interest income imputed to him
under § 7872 on his income tax return, attaching a statement containing
five items. First, the statement must set forth that the interest income
relates to an amount includible in his income by reason of § 7872. Second, the statement must provide the name, address and taxpayer identification number of each borrower. Third, it must specify the amount of
imputed interest income attributable to each borrower. Fourth, it must
140

Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-13(c).
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-13(d).
142 I.R.C. § 7872(b)(2). The lender is treated as having transferred to the borrower
the excess of the amount of the loan over the present value of the payments required to
be made under the terms of the loan. I.R.C. § 7872(b)(1).
143 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-6(a).
144 Id. (except for minor calculation adjustments as provided in Prop. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.7872-13(e)(1)).
145 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 87, ¶ 55.3.2, at 55-35.
146 Id. (quoting REP. ON DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT, supra note 120, at 533).
147 Id.
141
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specify the mathematical assumptions used (e.g., 360 day calendar year,
the exact method or the approximate method for computing interest for
a short period) for computing the amounts imputed under § 7872. Finally, it must include any other information required by the return or
the instructions thereto.148 The borrower must attach a similar statement to her income tax return for a taxable year in which the borrower
claims a deduction for an amount of interest expense imputed under
§ 7872.
IV. GIFT TAX CONSEQUENCES

OF

BELOW-MARKET GIFT LOANS

A. Demand Gift Loans
For a below-market demand gift loan, the amount of the gift is
equal to the “forgone interest” treated as transferred from the lender to
the borrower and retransferred from the borrower to the lender as payment of interest, calculated as provided in Part III.A, supra. The gift is
deemed to be made on the last day of the calendar year for each year
that the loan is outstanding, or the day the loan is repaid if it is repaid
during the year.149
B. Term Gift Loans
For income tax purposes, below-market term and demand gift loans
are, for the most part, treated the same. For gift tax purposes, however,
demand gift loans and term gift loans are treated differently:150 The
amount of a deemed gift is calculated using a different methodology,
and the gift is recognized at a different time than the income.151
For gift tax purposes, with a term gift loan, the OID rules apply152
and the lender is treated as making a gift to the borrower in an amount
equal to the excess of the principal amount of the loan over the present
value of all payments that are required to be made under the terms of
the loan. Present value is as determined under Treasury Regulation
Section 1.7872-14 of the Proposed Regulations. The discount rate for
the present value computation is the AFR in effect on the day the loan
is made.

148

Id.; Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-11(g).
I.R.C. § 7872(a)(2); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-6(b)(5).
150 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-7(a)(2).
151 This also means that below market term loans are treated differently under the
income tax and gift tax regimes.
152 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-7(a)(2).
149
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The above calculates what present value (PV) would be needed to
produce a certain future value (FV) if interest of i% accrues for n periods. The simplest present value example given in the Proposed Regulations is as follows:153
Example (1)
(i) On July 1, 1984, corporation A makes a $200,000 interestfree three-year term loan to shareholder B. The applicable
federal rate is 10%, compounded semiannually.
(ii) The present value of this payment is $149,243.08, determined as follows: $149,243.08 = $200,000.00 ÷ (1 + (.10/2))6.
The excess of the amount loaned over the present value of all
payments on the loan ($200,000.00 - $149,243.08), or
$50,756.92, is treated as a distribution of property (characterized according to § 301of the Code) paid to B on July 1, 1984.
The gift is treated as being made on the first day on which § 7872
applies to the term loan.154 Thus, while with a below-market demand
loan the lender makes a gift each year the loan is outstanding, with a
below-market term loan the lender makes the total gift in the first year
of the loan. This can make a significant difference if the lender plans on
using her gift tax annual exclusion to shelter the gift to the borrower.
While the imputed gift with respect to a demand loan may be less than
the annual exclusion amount, the imputed gift with respect to a term
loan in the first year of the loan could exceed that amount.
V. TIMING

OF

RECOGNITION OF INTEREST INCOME
INTEREST DEDUCTIONS

AND

A. Below-Market Gift Loans
For below-market gift loans, the § 7872 rules apply to determine
how much “forgone interest” is treated as transferred to the lender each
year, rather than applying the OID rules. The regulations under § 1274
of the Code—which addresses seller financed transactions—say that
§ 1274 does not apply to below-market loans.155 For below-market
loans, the forgone interest demand loan rules apply. (Although § 7872
says that a term loan with a below-market interest rate will be treated as
having original issue discount [“OID”] at the time the loan is made, the
proposed regulations say that for gift term loans the forgone interest
153 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-14. Although the calculation is for a below-market
loan to an employee, the concepts are the same for calculating the amount of a gift for a
below-market intra-family gift loan. Id.
154 I.R.C. § 7872(b)(1); Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.7872-7(a) and 25.7872-1.
155 Treas. Reg. § 1.1274-1(b)(3).
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demand loan rules apply.)156 Each year, a lender must report the interest income imputed to the lender under § 7872, with a statement explaining various details.157 This regime relieves donors and donees of
the burden of coping with the OID rules that apply to non-gift term
loans.158
B. Loans With Adequate Interest
1. Overview
What if the loan provides adequate interest so that it is not a belowmarket loan? There is no forgone interest to report under § 7872. Nevertheless, if interest accrues but is not actually payable, the OID rules
will generally apply, which generally require ratable reporting of interest accruals, even for cash basis taxpayers159 The OID rules of §§ 12711275 of the Code are extremely complex with many exceptions and technical details. Only a simplified overview of the most relevant provisions
is included within the scope of this article.
An I.R.S. response from an I.R.S. Regional Coordinator to a practitioner comment observed that the OID rules will generally apply to
loans with accrued interest, even if the loans bear interest at the
AFR.160
That response interestingly points out that this issue may not receive rigorous scrutiny in audits of cash basis taxpayers. Practitioners
may have planned numerous loans or notes in sale transactions in the
past without advising that accrued interest must be recognized each year
under the OID rules, and the issue may not have been raised in any
audits.161
156

Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-6(a).
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-11(g).
158 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 87, ¶ 55.3.2, at 55-35; See also REP. ON DEFICIT
REDUCTION ACT, supra note 120, at 533.
159 I.R.C. §§ 1271-1275.
160 . . . the holder of a debt instrument that accrues interest at a fixed rate of
interest [at or above the AFR], where such interest is not payable until maturity,
must include in income portions of such interest under the OID provisions. See
§ 1.1272-1(f)3)(ii) of the proposed regulations. Therefore, in the above example, the cash basis shareholder must include the deferred interest in income currently. (We recognize that a cash basis taxpayer may be less likely to be
scrutinized than an accrual basis taxpayer due to less restrictive accounting requirements. This problem pervades the Code and is not peculiar to § 7872).
I.R.S. Field Service Advice 087777 (June 24, 1991) (response of I.R.S. Regional Technical
Coordinator to submission from practitioner requesting amendment or clarification of
§ 7872).
161 One commentator gives the following example:
Example: Mom lends Junior $1,000,000. The note provides that interest at the
AFR accrues during the term of the loan and a balloon payment of principal
157
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If the loan/seller financed transaction is with a grantor trust, the
lender/seller does not have to recognize interest income because he or
she is treated as the owner of the trust income and assets for income tax
purposes.162
2. Exceptions
There are exceptions for various types of financial instruments, including tax-exempt obligations, United States savings bonds, debts of
not more than one year, and obligations issued before March 2, 1984.163
There are a number of additional exceptions. For example, The OID
rules do not apply to a loan if all outstanding loans between the lender
and borrower do not exceed $10,000, if the loan is between natural persons, if the loan is not made in the course of a trade or business, and if a
principal purpose of the loan is not the avoidance of any federal tax.164
(For purposes of this exception, a husband and wife living together are
treated as one person.)165 Second, in the case of loans for acquiring
personal use property, the OID rules restrict when the OID can be deducted by the obligor, but do not relieve the lender’s recognition of OID
income on an annual basis.166 (For purposes of this exception, personal
use property is all property other than trade or business property or
property used for the production of income.)167 A third exception applies to loans with “qualified stated interest.”168 Having “qualified
stated interest” is not really an exception to the OID rules, but effectively avoids having OID under the operation of the rules. As a practical matter, interest that is accrued beyond the taxable year is probably
not “qualified stated interest” that is subtracted in determining the
amount of OID for that year because there must be specified strict penplus all accrued interest is due at the end of the term. If this arrangement is
bona fide, it should successfully avoid the application of the gift tax. However,
for income tax purposes, the interest which is accrued but not paid will constitute OID [citing I.R.C. § 1272(a)]. Assuming that no exception to the general
rules applies, Mom will have to report interest income during the term of the
loan, even though she is not getting paid. Junior will get to deduct the imputed
interest paid, even if he is not actually paying it, if the interest is of a character
that would otherwise be deductible by him.
HENKEL, supra note 61, ¶ 28.9.
162 I.R.C. § 671; see Rev. Rul. 85-13, 1985-1 C.B. 184.
163 I.R.C. § 1272(a)(2)(A)-(D).
164 I.R.C. § 1272(a)(2)(E)(ii).
165 I.R.C. § 1272(a)(2)(E)(iii).
166 I.R.C. § 1275(b)(2).
167 I.R.C. § 1275(b)(3).
168 Treas. Reg. § 1.1273-1(c).
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alties for failing to pay the interest during a year (so strict that the interest in all likelihood will be paid each year).169
There is also a de minimis exception.170 The OID is treated as zero
if the total OID (i.e., the stated redemption price at maturity less the
issue price, as discussed below) is less than 1/4 of 1% of the stated redemption price at maturity multiplied by the number of complete years
to maturity.171
There are various exceptions that apply for seller-financed sale
transactions. If a note is given in consideration for the transfer of property (i.e., not a loan for cash), § 1274 of the Code applies to determine
the “issue price,” which is subtracted from the “stated redemption price
at maturity” to determine the amount of OID.172 There are a variety of
exceptions under § 1274(c)(3), in which event there generally would be
no OID.173 These exceptions include sales of farms for $1 million or less
by individuals or by small businesses, sales of principal residences, and
sales involving total payments of $250,000 or less.174 Finally, for certain
seller-financed debt instruments that do not exceed $2 million, indexed
from 1989 (the 2013 test amount is $3,905,900),175 a cash-method seller
who is not a dealer can agree with the buyer to treat the note as a “cash
method debt instrument.” In that event, the interest is taken into account by both buyer and seller under the cash receipts and disbursements method (i.e., as actually paid).176
Another exception applies in connection with § 483. In the limited
situations in which § 483 applies, there is imputed interest under § 483
rather than OID under § 1274, and the taxpayer’s accounting method
(i.e., cash or accrual) controls the timing for reporting unstated interest;
interest is not included or deducted until a payment is made or due.177
3. Ratable Reporting and Determination of OID
If the OID rules apply, the aggregate OID over the life of the loan
is reported under a daily proration approach.178 The OID is included in
169

See discussion infra Part V.B.3.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1273-1(d).
171 I.R.C. § 1273(a)(3).
172 I.R.C. § 1273(a)(1).
173 I.R.C. § 1273(b)(4) (issue price is equal to the state redemption price at maturity
so there would be no OID).
174 I.R.C. § 1274(c)(3); see infra Part V.B.3.
175 Rev. Rul. 2012-33, 2012-51 I.R.B. 710. The 2012 test amount is $3,813,800, Rev.
Rul. 2011-27, 2011-48 I.R.B. 805.
176 I.R.C. § 1274A(c)(1).
177 See infra Part XI.B.
178 I.R.C. § 1272(a) (“[S]um of the daily portions of the original issue discount for
each day during the taxable year on which such holder held such debt instrument.”).
170
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income each year under the OID rules even for cash basis taxpayers.
However, any “qualified stated interest” is included based on the taxpayer’s normal method of accounting.179 The amount of OID included
in income each year is generally determined under the “constant yield
method” as described in Treasury Regulation Section 1.1272-1(b)(1).180
The amount of original issue discount is the excess (if any) of the
“stated redemption price at maturity” over the “issue price.”181 Each of
these terms has very specific technical definitions.
The stated redemption price at maturity is the sum of all payments
provided for by the debt instrument except for qualified stated interest
payments.182 (Qualified stated interest is excluded from the OID calculation because it is reported separately based on the taxpayers’ accounting methods.) To the extent that stated interest exceeds qualified stated
interest (discussed immediately below), the excess is included in the
stated redemption price at maturity.183
Qualified stated interest is interest stated in the debt instrument
that meets various significant restrictions, including that the note calls
for interest at a fixed rate payable unconditionally at fixed periodic intervals of 1 year or less during the entire term of the instrument.184 The
Treasury Regulations clarify that the “unconditionally” requirement
means that there must be reasonable legal remedies to compel timely
payment of the interest or conditions are imposed that make the likelihood of late payment (other than a late payment within a reasonable
grace period) of nonpayment a remote contingency.185 Remedies or
other terms and conditions are not taken into account if the lending
transaction does not reflect arm’s length dealing and the holder does not
intend to enforce the remedies or other terms and conditions. According to a Senate Finance Committee Report, interest will be considered
payable unconditionally only if the failure to pay the interest will result
in consequences to the borrower that are typical in normal commercial
lending transactions.186 Thus, in general, interest will be considered
payable unconditionally only if the failure to timely pay interest results
in acceleration of all amounts under the debt obligation or similar consequences.187 Revenue Ruling 95-70, 1995-2 C.B. 124 states that if the
debt instrument’s terms do not provide the holder with the right to com179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187

Treas. Reg. § 1.1272-1(a)(1).
I.R.C. § 1272(a).
I.R.C. § 1273(a)(1).
Treas. Reg. § 1.1273-1(b).
Treas. Reg. § 1.1273-1(c)(4).
I.R.C. § 1273(a)(2).
Treas. Reg. § 1.1273-1(c)(1)(iii).
See generally REP. ON DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT, supra note 120, at 121 n.40.
REP. ON DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT, supra note 120, at 121 n.40.
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pel payment, they must provide for a penalty that is large enough to
ensure that, at the time the debt instrument is issued, it is reasonably
certain that the issuer will make interest payments when due.
Example: Parent loans $100,000 cash to Child for a 4-year note
that pays stated interest of 1% for the first two years and 6%
for the last two years. Assuming there are sufficient restrictions to assure that the interest will be paid currently, the
“qualified stated interest” is the 1% amount that is paid
throughout the life of the loan. The stated redemption price at
maturity includes the full amount of interest payments over the
four years less the 1% payments that constitute qualified stated
interest. As a result, the stated redemption price at maturity
exceeds the issue price (which equals the amount of the cash
loan, as discussed below), and the excess amount is OID. A
note that has stated interest that does not constitute qualified
stated interest will generally have the effect of creating or increasing OID.
Section 1273 describes the definition of “issue price” for various
types of debt instruments, including notes received for cash loans.
(There are separate special rules under § 1274 that apply to seller-financed transactions, as discussed below.) For cash loans, the “issue
price” is the amount loaned.188
Example: Parent loans $1,000,000 cash to Child in return for a
4-year note with stated interest equal to the mid-term AFR on
the date of the cash loan. However, the interest is not paid
annually (or if the note does call for annual interest payments,
there are not sufficient penalties and restrictions on non-payment of interest for the interest to constitute qualified stated
interest). Because the interest is not qualified payment interest, the full amount of interest payments under the note will
constitute OID, calculated as follows:
Stated redemption price at maturity: $1,000,000 + all interest payments required
Less Issue price: $1,000,000
OID is the amount of aggregate interest payments required under the note.
Section 1274 generally applies to debt instruments given in a sale or
exchange for property that is not regularly traded on an established
market (other than for cash, services, or the right to use property). It
applies special rules for determining the issue price. The general con188

I.R.C. § 1273(b)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.1273-2(a)(1).
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cept of § 1274 of the Code is that all payments due on seller financed
sales or exchanges of property are discounted at a minimum interest
rate (the relevant AFR) to compute an imputed principal amount. The
issue price is the lesser of the stated principal amount or this imputed
principal amount. (If the note has stated interest equal to the AFR, the
imputed principal amount will generally be the same as the stated principal amount.)189 The difference between the total payments due under
the note (excluding qualified stated interest) and this issue price is the
OID that is taxable as ordinary income to the holder of the debt instrument over his holding period.
There are several exceptions in determining the “issue price” for
debt instruments given for sales or exchanges of property where § 1274
does not apply and in those situations, there will be no OID—the issue
price of the debt instrument is its stated redemption price at maturity.190
These exceptions include sales of farms for $1 million or less by individuals or by small businesses, sales of principal residences, and sales involving total payments of $250,000 or less.191
If the debt instrument has adequate stated interest, the issue price
is the stated principal amount under the note (including all payments
due under the note other than stated interest). There will be adequate
stated interest if the debt instrument has a single stated interest rate,
paid or compounded at least annually, that is equal to or greater than
the test rate under § 1274(d).192 The test rate is generally the lowest of
the AFRs for the 3-month period ending with the month in which there
is a binding contract of sale.193 However, there are several exceptions in
which the test rate is different than the AFR. For sale-leaseback transactions, the test rate is 110% of the AFR.194 For “qualified debt instruments” under § 1274A(b) (notes under $2.8 million, indexed since 1989
—- $5,339,300 in 2012, for the sale or exchange of property other than
new § 38 property), the test rate is no greater than 9%, compounded
semiannually.195
Example: Parent sells property worth $1.0 million to Child in
February 2012 in return for a 4-year note. The note bears interest at 1.12% (the mid-term AFR for February 2012), with all
189

I.R.C. § 1274(a)(1).
I.R.C. § 1273(b)(4); Prop. Treas. Reg. 1.1273-2(e).
191 I.R.C. § 1274(c)(3). See Harrison McCawley, Time Value of Money: OID and
Imputed Interest, 535 TAX MGMT. PORT. ¶ III.C.2 (2012), for a detailed discussion of
these exceptions.
192 See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1274-2(c)(1), 1274-2(d).
193 I.R.C. § 1274(d)(2).
194 I.R.C. § 1274(e).
195 I.R.C. § 1274A(a).
190
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interest and principal being due at the end of 4 years (i.e.,
$1,045,558). The note has adequate interest. The issue price is
the stated principal amount of the note, or $1,000,000. The
OID calculation is as follows:
Stated redemption price at maturity

$1,045,558

Less issue price (stated principal amount)
OID

$1,000,000
$ 45,558

If the debt instrument does not have adequate stated interest, its
issue price is the sum of the present values of all payments, including
interest, due under the instrument, using a discount rate equal to the
relevant test rate under § 1274(d) (as described immediately above).196
The sum of such present values is the imputed principal amount of the
note.197
If the loan/seller financed transaction is with a grantor trust, the
lender/seller does not have to recognize interest income because he or
she is treated as the owner of the trust income and assets for income tax
purposes.198
VI. DEDUCTION OF INTEREST PAID

UNDER

LOANS

Under both § 7872 and the OID rules of § 1274 of the Code, the
interest element that is recognized as interest or OID taxable income in
a particular year by the lender may be deducted in that same year by the
borrower if the interest is of a type that is deductible under the Code.199
In general, interest that is not explicitly deductible under specified provisions in § 163 (including, among other things, investment interest and
qualified residence interest) is treated as personal interest that is not
deductible.200
A. Investment Interest
A noncorporate taxpayer may deduct “investment interest” to the
extent of “net investment income” for the taxable year.201 An unlimited
196

I.R.C. § 1274(b).
Treas. Reg. § 1.1274-2(c)(1).
198 I.R.C. § 671; see Rev. Rul. 85-13, 1985-1 C.B. 184.
199 E.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.1273(g)(2)(ii) (referring to interest deduction under § 163);
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-11(g)(3) (limitation for deemed interest by the borrow to the
borrower’s net investment income under exception for loans not exceeding $100,000 also
applies for determining the borrower’s interest deduction under § 163); Prop. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.7872-11(g)(2) (statement required by borrower who is deducting deemed transfer
under § 7872 as an interest deduction).
200 I.R.C. § 163(h).
201 I.R.C. § 163(d)(1).
197
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carryforward is allowed for investment interest so that it can be deducted in a succeeding taxable year to the extent the taxpayer has investment income in that succeeding year.202 (If the taxpayer never has
such an excess, the carryover dies with the taxpayer.) Both “investment
interest” and “net investment income” relate to interest expense or income related to “property held for investment,” which is generally property that “produces income” in the form of interest, dividends, annuities,
or royalties or is “of a type” that produces such income.203 For example,
stock is held for investment even if dividends are not received in a year
because stock is a type of property that produces dividend income.204 In
addition, “property held for investment” includes an interest in a trade
or business if the business is not a passive activity for purposes of § 469
(such as working interests in oil and gas properties) and if the taxpayer
does not materially participate in the business.205
“Investment interest” is interest expense that generally is deductible (e.g., an expense that is not required to be capitalized) that is “properly allocable to property held for investment” other than qualified
residence interest or interest expense included in computing income or
loss from a passive activity subject to § 469.206 “In general, interest expense on a debt is allocated in the same manner as the debt to which
such interest expense relates is allocated. Debt is allocated by tracing
disbursements of the debt proceeds to specific expenditures.”207 Specific rules for tracing debt proceeds to specific expenditures are described in that temporary regulation.208
“Net investment income” is the excess of investment income over
investment expense.209 Investment income generally is gross income
from property held for investment and generally includes net gain on
dispositions of such property.210 Investment expenses that must be deducted in determining net investment income include all deductions
“(other than for interest) which are directly connected with the production of investment income.”211 Gross income or expenses of a passive
activity are not included in the calculation of net investment income.
Net capital gain and qualified dividend income are included in invest202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211

I.R.C. § 163(d)(2).
I.R.C. §§ 163(d)(5)(A)(i), 469(e)(1).
Rev. Rul. 93-68, 1993-2 C.B. 72.
I.R.C. § 163(d)(5)(A)(ii).
I.R.C. § 163(d)(3)(A)-(B).
Treas. Reg. § 1.163-8T(a)(3).
See, e.g., Armacost v. Comm’r, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 2177 (1998).
I.R.C. § 163(d)(4)(A).
I.R.C. § 163(d)(4)(B).
I.R.C. § 163(d)(4)(C).
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ment income only to the extent the taxpayer so elects.212 (Making this
election causes such net capital gain or qualified dividend income to be
treated as ordinary income,213 but making the election is often advantageous because the effect is that the net capital gain or qualified dividend
ordinary income can be offset by the investment interest deduction. A
taxpayer may choose not to make the election if the taxpayer anticipates
having ordinary investment income in excess of investment expense in
an upcoming year, so that the investment interest expense offsets what
would otherwise be recognized as ordinary income in the near future.)
B. Original Issue Discount
Section 163(e) provides that the issuer of a debt instrument (i.e.,
the borrower who gives a note) may deduct the daily portions of OID
during the taxable year as determined under § 1272(a) to the extent the
deduction is not disallowed by some other Code provision (for example,
if the proceeds of the debt instrument were used to acquire personal use
property.) As with all of the OID rules, the provisions of § 163(e) are
quite complex.
C. Qualified Residence Interest
Parents are increasingly making loans to children to finance their
acquisition of personal residences, or even second homes. In December
2013, the AFR for mid-term loans (3-9 years) was 1.65% and the AFR
for long-term loans (over 9 years) was 3.32%.214 These incredibly low
rates are significantly lower than rates that the children can get from
commercial lenders for home mortgage loans. More significantly, as
lenders have adopted much stricter down payment and qualification
standards for home mortgage loans, loans from parents may be the only
alternative for the child to be able to acquire a residence desired by the
child (and that the child’s parents want the child to be able to purchase).
Interest on loans secured by personal residences (or second homes)
may be deducted only if the loan meets various requirements so that the
interest is “qualified personal interest.”215 The main requirement is that
the loan must be secured by the personal residence. Even though the
parent may be willing to make an unsecured loan, the loan should be
documented with a legally binding mortgage in order for the child to be
able to deduct the interest on the loan as qualified residence interest.
212
213
214
215

I.R.C. § 163(d)(4)(B).
I.R.C. § 1(h).
Rev. Rul. 2013-26, 2013-50 I.R.B. 628.
I.R.C. § 163(h)(3).
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There are a number of other requirements for the loan to qualify so
that interest on the loan is treated as qualified interest. First, the borrower must be legally liable for the loan; there must be a true debtorcreditor relationship. Second, as noted above, the mortgage must be
secured by the borrower’s principal residence (as described in § 121) or
a second home in which the borrower has an ownership interest.216
Debt is secured by a qualified residence only if (1) the residence is specific security for the loan, (2) the residence can be foreclosed on in the
event of default, and (3) the security interest is recorded or otherwise
perfected under state law, whether or not the deed is recorded.217
While the debt must be secured by the residence, the loan can still qualify even if the security interest is ineffective or the enforceability of the
security interest is restricted under any applicable state or local homestead or other debtor protection law.218 The debt can be secured by
other assets in addition to the residence without violating the security
requirement.219 (Observe that a non-tax advantage of having the loan
secured by the residence is that if the residence is awarded to the borrower’s spouse in a divorce action, the residence continues to serve as
collateral for the outstanding loan.) A qualified residence includes a
house, condominium, mobile home, boat, house trailer, or other property that under all the facts and circumstances can be considered a residence.220 A residence currently under construction can be treated as a
qualified residence for a period of up to 24 months if it becomes a qualified residence when it is ready for occupancy.221 If the residence is
rented during the year, it is treated as a qualified residence only if the
taxpayer uses it for personal purposes for a number of days that exceeds
the greater of (i) 14 days, or (ii) 10% of the number of days the unit was
rented at a fair rental rate.222 If a second residence is not rented or held
out for rent during the year, it qualifies as a qualified residence even if
the taxpayer does not use the residence personally during the year.223
In addition to the foregoing requirements regarding a legally binding note and mortgage, the loan must constitute acquisition indebtedness (i.e., debt incurred in acquiring, constructing, or substantially
216 I.R.C. § 163(h)(4)(A)(i); Treas. Reg. § 1.163-1(b) (taxpayer must be legal or equitable owner of the property).
217 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-10T(o)(1).
218 I.R.C. § 163(h)(4)(C); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-10T(o)(2).
219 See Ellington v. Comm’r,102 T.C.M. (CCH) 158 (2011).
220 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-10T(p)(3)(ii).
221 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-10T(p)(5).
222 I.R.C. §§ 163(h)(4)(A)(i)(II), 280A(d)(1); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.16310T(p)(3)(iii).
223 I.R.C. § 163(h)(4)(A)(iii).
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improving the residence,224 or a refinancing of acquisition indebtedness,
or home equity indebtedness.225 For acquisition indebtedness, the aggregate amount treated as acquisition indebtedness does not exceed $1.0
million ($500,000 for a married individual filing a separate return).226
(The $1 million acquisition indebtedness limit is a “per residence” limitation, not a “per taxpayer” limitation where the residence is owned
jointly by two individuals.)227 For home equity indebtedness, the aggregate amount treated as home equity indebtedness does not exceed the
fair market value of the residence reduced by acquisition indebtedness,
and does not exceed $100,000 ($50,000 for a married individual filing a
separate return).228
The combined acquisition indebtedness and home equity indebtedness that can qualify is up to $1,100,000, or $550,000 for married individuals filing separate returns.229 A taxpayer who borrows more than $1
million to purchase a principal residence may deduct the interest on up
to $1.1 million of the loan: $1 million as acquisition indebtedness and
$100,000 as home equity indebtedness.230 If the debt secured by the
residence exceeds the $1.1 million amount, there must be an allocation
of interest that is attributable to the amount of debt that qualifies. Various allocation methods are provided in temporary regulations (that
were issued before the $1.1 million limit was imposed under OBRA in
1987), and in an I.R.S. Notice and Publication.231 The I.R.S. has confirmed that, based on the legislative history of § 163(h), until further
regulations are issued, taxpayers may use any reasonable method in allocating debt in excess of the acquisition and home equity debt limitation, including the exact and simplified methods in the temporary
regulations, the method in Publication 936, or a reasonable approximation of these methods.232 For a residence held by an estate or trust, the
interest can be a qualified interest if the residence is a qualified residence of a beneficiary who has a present interest in such estate or trust
or an interest in the residuary of such estate or trust.233
If qualified residential interest is paid to an individual (such as a
parent), the name, address, and TIN of the person to whom the interest
224

I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(B)(i).
I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(A)-(C).
226 I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(B)(ii).
227 I.R.S. Chief Couns. Mem. 200911007 (Nov. 24, 2008).
228 I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(C).
229 I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(B)(ii).
230 Rev. Rul. 2010-25, 2010-44 I.R.B. 571.
231 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-10T(d)-(e); I.R.S. Notice 88-74, 1988-27 I.R.B. 27 ;
I.R.S. Publication 936.
232 I.R.S. Chief Couns. Mem. 201201017 (Nov. 1, 2011).
233 I.R.C. § 163(h)(4)(D).
225
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is paid must be disclosed on Form 1040, Schedule A, and a $50 penalty
can be assed for the failure to do so.234
VII. REFINANCING NOTES

AT

LOWER CURRENT AFR

There are no cases, regulations or rulings that address the gift tax
effects of refinancing notes. Proposed regulations under § 7872 include
a section entitled “Treatment of Renegotiations,” but the section merely
reserves the subject for later guidance, which has never been issued.235
One commentator concludes that refinancings at lower AFRS should be
possible without gift consequences:
Although there is no case, ruling, or Code section that explicitly provides that promissory notes may be restated without gift
tax effects, economic analysis of the transaction and Regulations strongly support the conclusion that it is possible to do so
without a taxable gift being deemed to occur.236
If the borrower can prepay the note with a penalty at any time, and
if prevailing interest rates decline, the borrower would likely pay off the
original note and borrow the amount on a new note at current rates.
That happens daily with thousands of homeowners refinancing their
mortgages as interest rates have declined. The borrower could either (i)
pay off the original loan (with the higher interest rate) and borrow again
at the lower rate, or (ii) give a new note (at the current AFR) in substitution for the original note (with the higher interest rate). This phenomenon is supported by the prices at which marketable callable notes are
traded. For callable bonds, the bond prices do not increase proportionally as interest rate decrease (because investors know that the issuer
may likely call (i.e., prepay) the bonds that bear higher than current
market rates).237 While it is possible that the I.R.S. might argue that a
gift results by re-characterizing the transaction as merely having the
lender accept a lower AFR note in place of a higher AFR note, there is
no case law or rulings addressing the issue. One commentator reasons
that, logically, there should be no gift tax consequences:
Many of the promissory notes used in the intrafamilial context
are term (rather than demand) notes that provide that the bor234

Id.
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-11(e).
236 See Blattmachr, Madden, & Crawford, supra note 95, at 26.
Other commentators have agreed, for example, concluding that “there is no gift consequence when such a
loan is refinanced at a lower AFR.” Robert Schweihs, The AFR and the Value of Debt,
WILLAMETTE MNGT. ASSOCIATES INSIGHTS 12, 17 (Summer 2012)(discussing how to
value notes).
237 See Blattmachr, Madden, & Crawford, supra note 95, at 27.
235

\\jciprod01\productn\A\ACT\38-2-3\ACT2301.txt

Fall/Winter 2012]

unknown

Seq: 49

7-FEB-14

INTRA-FAMILY LOANS

13:19

99

rower may, at the borrower’s option, prepay all or any portion
of the principal of the promissory note at any time with premium or penalty of any kind. Whether or not this right to prepay is restricted, if the borrower has the funds available, it
seems that the borrower, without negative gift or income tax
consequences, may repay the lender in advance of the maturity
date, thereby decreasing the amount of total interest that
would accrue on the borrower’s debt (and, as a result, the total
payment the lender expected to receive under the note in the
absence of repayment).238
Commentators have provided cogent analysis of regulations suggesting that there should be no gift tax consequences to substituting a
lower AFR note for a high rate note.239 Specifically, they note that Proposed Regulation Section 25.7872-1 provides a rule for valuing a term
loan note, and it seems to contemplate addressing the value of the note
just at the time the loan is made.240 According to its heading, that proposed regulation applies only to “Certain Below-Market Loans,” which
would not include loans having stated interest equal to the AFR (or
higher). In any event, there is no proposed regulation addressing the
valuation of notes for gift tax purposes after they have been issued. In
addition, § 7872(h) of the Code (now § 7872(i)) may authorize gift tax
regulations regarding the valuation of intra-family notes that bear interest at the AFR in light of § 7872, but none have been promulgated. The
gift tax regulation that generally applies for valuing notes says that the
value is “the amount of unpaid principal, plus accrued interest to the
date of the gift, unless the donor establishes a lower value.”241 A lower
value may be established by satisfactory evidence “that the note is worth
less than the unpaid amount (because of the interest rate, or date of
maturity, or other cause), or that the note is uncollectible . . . and that
the property, if any, pledged or mortgaged as security is insufficient to
satisfy it.”242 Proposed Regulations under § 7872 regarding the estate
tax value of notes says that the value is the lesser of
a) the unpaid stated principal, plus accrued interest, or b) the
sum of the present value of all payment due under the note
(including accrual interest), using the applicable Federal rate
238

Id. at 26-27.
Id. at 27-29.
240 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 25.7872-1 (“[S]hall be treated as a gift from the lender to the
borrower on the date the loan is made.”).
241 Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-4.
242 Id.
239
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for loans of a term equal to the remaining term of the loan in
effect at the date of death.243
Thus, the only applicable gift tax regulation, and the proposed estate tax
regulation, both indicate that the value of a note as of the relevant date
will not be greater than the amount of unpaid principal plus accrued
interest. As a result, “a family note issued at the AFR which is higher
than the current AFR has an FMV for gift tax purposes not greater than
its face amount.”244 Therefore, there should be no gift if a lower AFR
note is substituted for a pre-existing note with a higher interest rate.
The “old” note has a value presumed to equal its face amount and the
new note has a gift tax value under § 7872 equal to its face amount (as
long as the interest rate is at least equal to the AFR). Therefore, the
exchanged notes have equal values for gift tax purposes, and no gift results from the exchange.
A possible concern is that consistent refinancing of the note may be
a factor in determining that the loan transaction does not result in bona
fide debt, but should be treated as an equity transfer.245 In light of the
lack of any case law or direct discussion of refinancings at lower AFRs
in regulations or in any rulings, most planners suggest caution in this
area, and not merely refinancing notes every time the AFR decreases.246
If the planner is concerned about the treatment of a refinancing (perhaps because there have been refinancing in the past), consider having
the borrower borrow money from a bank to repay the loan and several
months later approaching the original lender about the possibility of
borrowing money under a new note (at the lower AFR) to be able to
pay off the bank. Repeated refinancings every time the AFR goes down
would seem to fall clearly under the “Pigs get fat and hogs get slaughtered” proverb. Lenders in arm’s length transactions are not willing to
simply reduce interest rates on existing debt, at least not without getting
something in return.
Some planners advise renegotiating the terms of notes not only to
adopt the lower, more current AFR, but also to compensate the lender
in some way for accepting the lower rate, “perhaps by paying down the
principal amount, shortening the maturity date, or adding more attractive collateral.”247 Another possibility is to change the interest rate to a
243
244
245
246

Prop. Treas. Reg. § 20.7872-1.
Blattmachr, Madden, & Crawford, supra note 95, at 28-29.
See discussion supra Part I.B.
E.g., Benjamin Feder, The Promissory Note Problem, 142 TR. & EST., Jan. 2003 at

10.
247 Philip J. Hayes, Adventures in Forgiveness and Forgetfulness: Intra-Family Loans
for Beginners, 13 CALIF. TR. & EST. Q. 5, 7 (Summer 2007). While the lender is permitted to use his or her normal method of accounting in reporting the interest if the note
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rate that is higher than the minimum required rate, but lower than the
interest rate stated in the original loan. The rationale for this suggestion
is that borrowers in the commercial context will not continue paying
higher interest rates if they can refinance a debt at a significantly lower
interest rate without a prepayment penalty. Refinancing, however, may
incur some closing costs, but those costs may be minimal compared to
the interest savings over the remaining term of the note. If the borrower refinances the note, the original lender will then lend the funds to
some other borrower, but at the current lower interest rate. A refinancing at a lower rate, but not quite down to market rates, may result in a
win/win for both the borrower and lender.248
VIII. DISCOUNTING NOTES FOR GIFT

AND

ESTATE TAX PURPOSES

A. Valuation of Notes in General
The gift and estate tax regulations for valuing notes generally (discussed below) provide that notes can be valued at less than face value
plus accrued interest if the donor or estate demonstrates by “satisfactory
evidence” that the value is lower. The I.R.S. has conceded in Technical
Advice Memoranda that notes need not necessarily be valued at their
face amounts. Technical Advice Memorandum 8229001 identified eight
specific considerations for valuing mortgages and promissory notes:249
(1) Presence or lack of protective covenants (the more onerous the restrictions on the borrower, the lower the risk for the lender and the
lower the required discount); (2) the nature of the default provisions
and the default risk (the default risk is lower [and the discount is lower]
if the borrower has better coverage for making payments, evidenced by
factors such as interest coverage ratios, fixed-charge coverage ratios,
and debt-equity ratios; the more stringent the default provisions under
the note, the lower the risk to the lender [and the discount is lower]); (3)
the financial strength of the issuer (the key financial ratios mentioned
above and current economic conditions, including financial strength of
any parties giving guarantees are important, strong financials indicate
contains an adequate rate of interest that is payable at least annually, see Treas. Reg.
1.1272-1(a), this rule does not apply if it is established that there was no intent to enforce
the note according to its terms, see Treas. Reg. 1.1273-1(c). Thus, if the note requires that
an adequate rate of interest be paid annually, the lender is permitted to use the normal
method of accounting in reporting the interest rather than the OID rules. But if in fact
interest is not paid in accordance with the note’s terms, the I.R.S. may be able to invoke
the OID rules.
248 Pruett, supra note 7.
249 The impact of these factors, as summarized in the text, are addressed in Carsten
Hoffmann, The Evolution of Note Valuations, 100 TAX NOTES 1143, 1144-45 (Sept. 1,
2003).
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lower risk and lower discounts); (4) the value of the security (the higher
the value of the security, the lower the risk for the lender and the lower
the discount); (5) the interest rate and term of the note (the analysis
goes beyond just determining if the interest rate on the note equals the
current market rate, an increase in market interest rates during the term
of the note will decrease the value of the note, the longer the term of the
note, the more exposed the holder is to interest rate increases and the
greater the discount on the note [or the higher the required interest rate
to offset this risk]); (6) comparable market yields (the yields from various types of financial instruments may be considered, the most comparable debt instrument is used and adjustments are made for specific risk
differences from the comparable instrument, there may be few comparables for private transaction notes); (7) payment history (if payments
are current and are made timely, especially if there is a lengthy history
of timely payments, the risk for the lender is lower [and the discount is
lower]); and (8) the size of the note (there are conflicting impacts, on
one hand the borrower may have more ability to repay smaller notes, on
the other hand small notes are note as likely to be from larger companies with excellent financials and the universe of potential buyers of
small notes is very limited; smaller notes may call for higher discounts).
Technical Advice Memorandum 9240003250 valued a note for estate
tax purposes. The note from the decedent’s nephew had a face amount
of $215,000 and was cancelled in the decedent’s will. The TAM concluded that the note was worth significantly less than face value because
of its uncollectability (and also determined that the cancellation did not
result in taxable income to the nephew because the cancellation was in
the nature of a gift). Upon a showing of appropriate circumstances, it is
clear that notes can be discounted for gift and estate tax purposes.251
Cases in various contexts have addressed factors that should be
considered in valuing notes. Courts have applied substantial discounts
to notes in a variety of estate tax cases.252 For gift tax purposes, if gifts
250

TAM 9240003 (Oct. 2, 1992).
Id. See Hoffmann, supra note 249, at1144-45 for general discussions of the valuation of promissory notes; M. Read Moore & D. Alan Hungate, Valuation Discounts for
Private Debt in Estate Administration, 25 EST. PLAN. 195 (June 1998).
252 Estate of Smith v. Comm’r, 923 F. Supp. 896 (S.D. Miss. 1996) (note from Fortune
500 company; 6% interest, annual principal payments of about 10% of face amount of
note at date of death, court accepted estate appraiser’s methodology which determined
value of payments on discounted cash flow basis, starting with discount rate of 10.09%
but adjusted to 16% rate to account for specific risk factors, and also applied 20% lack of
marketability discount factor); Scher v. United States, 39 A.F.T.R 2d 77-1580 (D. N.J.
1976) (corporate notes were valued at face value at date of death although corporation
may have been insolvent at that time; notes were not worthless merely because corporation was insolvent because corporation at that time had good credit reputation, was paying notes when presented, and potential lenders would not have checked the
251
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are made of notes themselves, the I.R.S. has an incentive to reduce the
amount of discount-to-face of the gift tax value of the notes. On the
other hand, if assets are transferred in return for notes, the I.R.S. has an
incentive to increase the discount-to-face of the notes and to treat the
excess value transferred over the value of the notes as gifts. Discounts
have been allowed in gift tax cases.253 Note valuations can arise in a
corporation’s actual financial status); Estate of Hoffman v. Comm’r, 81 T.C.M. (CCH)
1588 (2001) (unsecured 7.61% promissory notes with balloon payment of all principal
and interest 18 years after the date of death; I.R.S. and estate appraiser both used discounted cash flow approach to value the notes; difference was appropriate fair market
value discount rate; court adopted I.R.S .appraiser’s approach of using a 12.5% discount
rate after considering interest rates associated with various debt instruments [the prime
rate was 6% and Treasury yields ranged from 3 to 6%] and that borrower had enough
assets to pay off notes at maturity, and that the 12.5% discount rate incorporated the
nonmarketable nature of the notes); Estate of Luton v. Comm’r, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 1044
(1994) (court valued decedent’s 41.9% interest in a liquidating trust, the primary asset of
which was an unsecured 10% promissory note payable over about 11 years from a company in good financial condition [having Roy Disney as one of its principal shareholders];
court rejected estate’s argument for discounts due to comparison of bond yields of similar
grade and for lack of control [because decedent could sue to compel trustee to sell the
note its retention was impudent under state law]; court allowed 10% discount in valuing
41.9% interest in liquidating trust for lack of marketability); Estate of Friedberg v.
Comm’r, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 3080 (1992) (corporation redeemed shares of Rule 144 restricted stock from estate for a down payment and 5-year note bearing interest at the
short-term rate under § 6621(b); I.R.S. willing to allow only 1% discount on note; court
allowed 32% discount from face considering the rate of interest, payment schedule, financial covenants, reporting requirements, restriction that payments could not exceed
15% of the corporation’s cash flow in any year, noteholder’s possible remedies, corporation financial condition, yields on comparable securities, and nature of the secondary
market for private notes); Estate of Berkman v. Comm’r, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 183 (1979)
(gift and estate tax valuation; unsecured 6% notes from family members had 20-year
term, with balloon principal payment at end of 20-year term, borrowers made timely
interest payments and were good credit risks; I.R.S. disallowed any discount from face;
court allowed discount-to-face for estate tax purposes of 50-60% of various notes focusing on low rate of interest because prime rate was 9.75% at death and long term of notes;
discount for gift tax purposes was lower [15%-25%] because prime rate was only 7% at
the date of the gift); Sam Broadhead Trust v. Comm’r, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 975 (1972) (no
discount from face plus accrued interest because estate offered no evidence of lower
value).
253 Estate of Reynolds v. Comm’r, 55 T.C. 172 (1970) (units in voting trust sold to
two of decedent’s children for three separate $50,000 secured notes with terms of 10-15
years, interest-free except that 4% interest rate applied to late payments, $30,000 of payments were made on each of two of the notes and $27,000 of payments were made on the
third note; court agreed with I.R.S. that the value of each of the notes was only $30,000
and the excess values of the voting trust units over $30,000 constituted gifts; factors included interest-free nature of the note (until a payment default), large note amounts,
ability of children to repay, fact of default on payments and that no interest was ever
paid, prevailing interest rates in the years of the transfers, and no showing that any additional payments were ever made on the notes); Estate of Berkman v. Comm’r, 38 T.C.M.
(CCH) 183 (1979) (gift and estate tax valuation; unsecured 6% notes from family mem-
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wide variety of contexts for income tax purposes, and various income
tax cases have allowed substantial discounts.254
A recurring situation is of a taxpayer who makes a transfer in return for a note, claiming that the note equals the value of the asset transferred so that there is no gift. At the taxpayer’s death, the estate takes
the position that a discount-to-face should be applied in valuing the note
for estate tax purposes. There can certainly be situations where interest
rate changes or changes in the borrower’s ability to repay may justify
valuation differences, but the estate should expect the I.R.S. agent to be
wary that the I.R.S. is being whipsawed in such situations. Indeed, the
I.R.S. Estate Tax Examiner’s Handbook advises agents that reporting a
note from a related party at less than its face amount raises strong evidence that a gift was made at the date of the issuance of the note.255
B. Gift Tax Regulations and Section 7872
The general regulation for valuing notes for gift tax purposes states
that the value is the unpaid principal plus accrued interest, unless the
evidence shows that the note is worth less (e.g., because of the interest
rate or date or maturity) or is uncollectible in whole or in part. The
regulation provides,
The fair market value of notes, secured or unsecured, is presumed to be the amount of unpaid principal, plus accrued interest to the date of the gift, unless the donor establishes a
lower value. Unless returned at face value, plus accrued interbers had 20-year term, with balloon principal payment at end of 20-year term, borrowers
made timely interest payments and were good credit risks; I.R.S. disallowed any discount
from face; court concluded that discount-to-face for gift tax purposes in three separate
years was 15%-25%, lower than discounts of 50%-60% allowed for estate tax purposes,
because prime rate was only 7% at the date of the gift and increased to 9.75% at the date
of death).
254 Olster v. Comm’r, 79 T.C. 456 (1982) (court determined that the notes were
worthless when the I.R.S. attempted to value notes at face); Kronenberg v. Comm’r, 64
T.C. 428 (1967) (income tax case valuing note issued by a company in liquidation; note
was interest-free, nonnegotiable, with no set date for repayment, and debtor had limited
financial resources; court allowed 37.5% discount from face); Clayton v. Comm’r, 42
T.C.M. (CCH) 670 (1981) (80% discount on notes issued as low-interest second mortgages with terms of up to 30 years to facilitate purchase of homes by high-risk individuals
who could not pay down payments and who had a history of being delinquent on payments; small balances on the notes meant that foreclosure proceedings were not economically feasible); Scott v. Comm’r, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 115 (1979) (taxpayer valued note at
70% discount based on sale of similar note in arm’s length transaction; court concluded
taxpayer did not show sufficient similarity to the prior transaction and allowed 30% discount based on nonrecourse nature of note, subordinated status of lien, limited nature of
security, subsequent default of maker, and timely receipt of interest payments).
255 INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL ch. 800, § 842.
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est, it must be shown by satisfactory evidence that the note is
worth less than the unpaid amount (because of the interest
rate, or date of maturity, or other cause), or that the note is
uncollectible in part (by reason of the insolvency of the party
or parties liable, or for other cause), and that the property, if
any, pledged or mortgaged as security is insufficient to satisfy
it.256
Section 7872 provides rules for determining the amount of gifts incurred by making below-market loans. The gift amount is the amount
of the forgone interest.257 The statute does not address other factors
that may impact the value of the notes—it just addresses how much gift
results as a result of using an interest rate that is lower than the appropriate AFR. The statute does not address the gift tax implications of a
note that has an interest rate that is equal to or greater than the AFR.
However, the clear implication of § 7872 is that a note that bears interest that is equal to or greater than the AFR will not be treated as a gift,
merely because of the interest rate that is used on the note. Indeed, the
I.R.S. took that position in Frazee v. Commissioner,258 and has consistently applied that same position in subsequent private letter rulings.259
Even following the adoption of § 7872, the value of notes apparently can be discounted because of factors stated in the general estate
tax regulations other than the interest rate used in the notes. There are
no proposed regulations issued in conjunction with § 7872 that purport
to override the general gift tax valuation principles for notes under Treasury Regulation Section 25.2512-4. Proposed Regulation Section
25.7872-1, which addresses the gift tax implications of below market
loans under § 7872, makes no reference to discounting the value of loans
for reasons other than comparison of the interest rate on the note to the
AFR.260 Proposed regulations under § 2512, issued in conjunction with
proposed regulations issued under § 7872, simply make reference to
§ 7872: “See Section 25.7872-1 for special rules in the case of gift loans
(within the meaning of Section 1.7872-4(b)) made after June 6, 1984.”261
256

Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-4.
I.R.C. § 7872(e)(2).
258 98 T.C. 554 (1992). See also Estate of True v. Comm’r, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 27
(2001) (§ 7872 applied to determine gift tax consequences of purchase under a buy-sell
agreement providing for a deferred payment), aff’d on other grounds, 390 F.3d 1210 (10th
Cir. 2004).
259 E.g., PLR 9535026 (Sept. 1, 1995); PLR 9408018 (Feb. 25, 1994). See also Estate
of True v. Comm’r, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 27 (2001), aff’d on other grounds, 390 F.3d 1210
(10th Cir. 2004). See infra Part XI.A for a more detailed discussion of Frazee, Estate of
True, and those letter rulings.
260 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 25-7871-1.
261 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-4.
257
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The preamble to those proposed gift tax regulations simply states
that “Proposed Section 25.7872-1 implements section 7872(a) by providing that the amount transferred by the lender to the borrower and characterized as a gift is subject to the gift tax provisions.” Keep in mind
that a “gift loan” is a below-market loan where the forgone interest is in
the nature of a gift.262 Therefore, a loan that bears adequate interest
and that is therefore not a below-market loan, by definition is not a “gift
loan.” Therefore, even the brief reference in gift tax proposed regulations issued in conjunction with the proposed regulations under § 7872
would not apply to loans that bear interest at a rate equal to the applicable AFR or greater.
C. Estate Tax Regulations and Section 7872
The general estate tax regulation regarding the valuation of notes is
very similar to the gift tax regulation quoted above, and provides that
the estate tax value is the amount of unpaid principal plus interest accrued to the date of death, unless the executor establishes that the value
is lower by satisfactory evidence that the note is worth less than the
unpaid amount (e.g., because of the interest rate or the date of maturity)
or that the note is uncollectible by reason of insolvency of the maker
and because property pledged as security is insufficient to satisfy the
obligation.263
If economic conditions change from the time the note was given
and interest rates generally rise by the time of the holder’s death, the
value of the note may be discounted—based on the changed conditions—as provided in the estate tax regulations. A particularly interesting issue is whether a note providing for interest at the AFR can be
discounted for estate tax purposes merely because interest at the AFR is
below what the market would charge for a similar note, even if interest
rates have not generally increased from the time the note was given to
the date of the holder’s death. We know that § 7872 provides an artificially low interest rate—the rate at which the United States government
can borrow. Stated differently, if the estate were to try to sell the note,
with an interest rate at the AFR, a hypothetical willing buyer would not
pay full face value because the AFR is based on the safest of debt instruments—one from the U.S. government. Can the estate tax valuation
reflect that reality?264 The Tax Court in Estate of Duncan v. Commis262

See I.R.C. § 7872(c)(1)(A).
Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-4.
264 See Michael D. Mulligan, Sale to an Intentionally Defective Irrevocable Trust for a
Balloon Note—An End Run Around Chapter 14? 32 U. MIAMI HECKERLING INST. ON
EST. PLAN. ¶ 1507.1 (1998).
263
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sioner265 observed that under fiduciary principles, an irrevocable trust
would be questioned for loaning money to another trust (even having
the same trustee and beneficiaries) if the interest rate were not greater
than the AFR, because the AFR is based on the yield on U.S. government obligations.266
While § 7872 addresses gift issues, and subsequent authority recognizes that notes with interest at the AFR will not be discounted merely
for gift tax purposes because of the interest rate, there is no such similar
certainty for estate tax purposes. As discussed below, however, a proposed regulation under § 7872 suggests that such discounting, merely
because the AFR is an artificially low interest rate, would not be allowed.267 However, that regulation has never been finalized.
Does that mean that the note can be discounted for estate tax purposes because there are no regulations on point for estate tax purposes?
Because there is no coordinating regulation some attorneys take the position that general valuation principles should be applicable, and it may
be possible to discount the note for estate tax purposes if the note uses
the AFR as the interest rate. Be aware, however, the I.R.S. estate tax
agent may feel that taking a discount for this reason alone is abusive
(because the note was not similarly discounted for gift tax valuation purposes at the time of the sale) and may closely scrutinize every aspect of
the sale or loan transaction. One appraiser reports an example of having appraised a note for estate tax purposes at about half the outstanding balance of the note—and having the value accepted in the estate tax
audit.268
265

102 T.C.M. (CCH) 421 (2011).
Duncan involved whether interest paid on a “Graegin loan” could be deducted as
an administrative expense for estate tax purposes. An irrevocable trust created by the
decedent’s father loaned $6.5 million to the decedent’s revocable trust in order to pay
estate taxes. The $10.7 million of interest that was due on the loan at the end of 15 years
was deducted. Among other things, the I.R.S. argued that the 6.7% interest rate under
the note exceeded the long-term AFR of 5.02% and was unreasonable. The court disagreed, stating that a note from the revocable trust is obviously a riskier investment than
a government obligation and therefore a higher interest rate than the AFR is justified.
Indeed, the court said that using the AFR “would have been unfair to the Walter Trust.”
Id. at 425.
267 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 20.7872-1.
268 Lance S. Hall, The FMV Solution, FMV OPINIONS, INC. (Sept. 15, 2009), http://
www.fmv.com. In the situation described, FMV Opinions, Inc. applied a discount rate
based upon required rates of return for highly rated publicly traded debt issued by
REITs, adjusted for the substantial differences between the note and the public debt.
Specifically, while the trust was well capitalized as of the date of death, the note was
unsecured and lacked protective covenants. Additionally, both the note and the underlying assets of the trust were not readily marketable.
266
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Section 7872 specifically authorizes the issuance of regulations addressing the valuation of notes in light of § 7872. Section 7872(i)(2)
states that “[u]nder regulations prescribed by the Secretary, any loan
which is made with donative intent and which is a term loan shall be
taken into account for purposes of chapter 11 [the estate tax chapter] in
a manner consistent with the provisions of subsection (b) [providing for
the income and gift tax treatment of below-market loans.]” Commentators observe that regardless of what Congress meant, it merely authorized regulations (final regulations have never been issued) “and did not
write a self-executing rule.”269
The I.R.S. has issued a proposed regulation for estate tax purposes
that directly addresses the estate tax value of a “gift term loan” following the issuance of § 7872 and that may even address the value of notes
having adequate interest. The proposed regulation conceivably purports to say that the value of the note could not be discounted for estate
tax purposes except to make adjustments where the stated interest rate
under the note is lower than the AFR in effect at the date of death or
where the facts impacting the collectability of the note have changed
“significantly since the time the loan was made.”270 In this regard, the
proposed regulation may impose a stricter standard for discounting
notes for estate tax purposes because of uncollectability issues than the
standards described in the general estate tax regulation for valuing
notes, which do not impose the requirement of a “significant” change.
Proposed Regulation Section 20.7872-1 provides,
For purposes of chapter 11 of the Internal Revenue Code, relating to estate tax, a gift term loan (within the meaning of Section 1.7872-4(b)) that is made after June 6, 1984, shall be
valued at the lesser of:
(a) The unpaid stated principal, plus accrued interest; or
(b) The sum of the present value of all payments due
under the note (including accrual interest), using the applicable Federal rate for loans of a term equal to the remaining term of the loan in effect at the date of death.
No discount is allowed based on evidence that the loan is uncollectible unless the facts concerning collectability of the loan
have changed significantly since the time the loan was made.
This section applies with respect to any term loan made with
donative intent after June 6, 1984, regardless of the interest
rate under the loan agreement, and regardless of whether that
269 RONALD D. AUCUTT, Installment Sales to Grantor Trusts, ALI CLE PLANNING
TECHNIQUES FOR LARGE ESTATES 615, 677 (2013).
270 Michael D. Mulligan, Fifteen Years of Sales to IDITs – Where are We Now? 35
ACTEC J. 227 (2009).
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interest rate exceeds the applicable Federal rate in effect on the
day on which the loan was made.271
The proposed regulation says that it applies to valuing a “gift term
loan,” which would be a below market loan (with interest less than the
relevant AFR). However, the last sentence says that it applies to any
term loan made with donative intent even if the interest rate exceeds the
AFR on the day the loan was made. Query, does the “with donative
intent” phrase simply mean that the loan was not a compensation related loan or corporation-shareholder loan as referenced in § 7872(c)(1)
(B-C), or does it refer to a loan that was intended as a gift even though
it had an interest rate higher than the relevant AFR? Arguably, the
note given in a sale transaction does not reflect a loan “with donative
intent.” In any event, this regulation has never been finalized.
What is the effect of proposed regulations? The I.R.S. may support
a position by reference to proposed regulations but insists that they cannot be relied on to support a position that contradicts a position being
taken by the I.R.S.272 Courts view proposed regulations as merely a
source of “informed judgment” and accord them “no more weight than
a litigant’s position.”273 However, courts may follow proposed regulations if neither the taxpayer nor the I.R.S. challenges their validity.274
D. Valuation of Notes in Entity
If the note is in an entity that is valued on an asset-value basis, the
note may be discounted, and the decedent’s interest in the entity may
subsequently be discounted as well for lack of control or lack of marketability. However, the I.R.S. may raise objections if a note is contributed
to an LLC or partnership for the sole purpose of achieving an additional
“wrapper” discount. For example, if an asset is sold to a grantor trust in
return for an installment note, and the if the note is contributed to an
LLC and the LLC interest is given to another grantor trust with the
same beneficiaries, the I.R.S. may raise objections if a substantial valuation discount is claimed on the value of the LLC interest that contains
the note as its sole asset.

271

Prop. Treas. Reg. § 20.7872-1 (emphasis added).
See Sheldon I. Banoff & Burton W. Kanter, What is the Legal Effect of Proposed
Regs.? 69 J. TAX’N 279 (Oct. 1988).
273 KTA-Tator Inc. v. Comm’r, 108 T.C. 100 (1997).
274 Gary Rozenshteyn, Below-Market Loans Offer Tax Arbitrage Potential, 64 PRAC.
TAX. STRAT. 260, 261 (May 2000); See Arens v. Comm’r, 59 T.C.M. (CCH) 589 (1990).
272
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E. Income Tax Impact of Discounting Note Values
In deciding whether to take the position that a note is discounted
for income tax purposes, the planner must realize that while the discount may result in estate tax savings, there may be adverse income tax
implications attributable to that discount as payments are later received
on the note. If an individual inherits a note (other than an installment
sale note) that is valued below face, and if the individual receives payments on the note exceeding the discounted value of the note, the excess
is treated as ordinary income.275 Sections 1271-1275 deal with OID by
requiring the debt holder to take the discount into income as ordinary
income, not as capital gain.276 In addition, the debt holder may be required to accrue the discount over his holding period without regard to
his usual method of accounting. If there is no sale or exchange of the
note, there would be no capital gain element of the income recognition.
An example in a respected treatise illustrates this phenomenon:

EXAMPLE: Mom lends Son $1,000,000 at the then AFR of 7%.
When she dies, the value of the note is $750,000, for whatever
reason, even though $1,000,000 is still outstanding. If the note’s
value for estate tax purposes is $750,000, then when the
$1,000,000 is paid, the recipient will have ordinary income of
$250,000. If the note is distributed to Son, he will have cancellation of indebtedness income of $250,000 on the distribution.277
The result should be different if an individual receives the note by
gift. Under the dual basis rules of § 1015, the donee’s basis in the note
would be the donor’s basis for purposes of determining the amount of
any gain. Therefore, the reduction in value of the note up to the time of
the gift would not result in a decreased basis for purposes of determining later gain on the note. If the note is an installment sale note, special
rules apply if the note is satisfied at less than face value, if there is a
disposition or cancellation of the note, or if related parties dispose of
property purchased with the installment note within two years of the
sale.278
275 I.R.C. §§ 1271(a)(1)(retirement of debt instrument treated as exchange),
1276(a)(1)(gain on disposition treated as ordinary income up to the accrued market discount), 1276(a)(2)(partial principal payments treated as ordinary income to the extent
the payment does not exceed accrued market discount).
276 E.g., Treas. Reg. §1.1275-1(b)(3) (treatment of market discount for calculating
OID accruals).
277 HENKEL, supra note 61, ¶ 28.06[2].
278 I.R.C. §§ 453(e)(1), 453B(a). See generally HENKEL, supra note 61, at Ch.30. See
infra Part XI.C.3.
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A. No Discharge of Indebtedness Income for Promissory Notes
If the forgiveness or cancellation of the loan (other than an installment sale note) is in the nature of a gift, there is no discharge of indebtedness income, because § 102 excludes from the definition of gross
income any amount received as a gift or bequest, and this overrides
§ 61(a).279 The forgiveness of a family loan is typically intended as a
gift. Section 108 contains special rules regarding discharge of indebtedness income. The Senate Finance Report accompanying the passage of
§ 108 specifically states that “debt discharge that is only a medium for
some other form of payment, such as gift or salary, is treated as that
form of payment rather than under the debt discharge rules.”280
If the borrower is insolvent when the loan is forgiven with no further prospect of being able to repay the loan, the forgiveness may not be
a gift but just a reflection of economic reality. There should be no discharge of indebtedness income if the forgiveness occurs in a bankruptcy
case or when the obligor is insolvent.281 In that circumstance, the lender
may be able to take a bad debt deduction for the year in which the loan
becomes worthless.282 If the loan was made in the ordinary course of
the lender’s trade or business, it may result in a business bad debt deduction, which results in ordinary losses.283 Much more common, in the
intra-family loan context, is that the loan is a non-business debt, which
results in short term capital loss.284 However, special scrutiny applies to
279 I.R.C. § 102(a). See Helvering v. Am. Dental, 318 U.S. 322 (1943) (interpreting
predecessors to §§ 61 and 102); Bosse v. Comm’r, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 1772 (1970) (deciding that § 102 applied because forgiveness was gratuitous).
280 Warren J. Rohrbach, The Disposition of Property Secured by Recourse and Nonrecourse Debt, 41 BAYLOR L. REV. 231, 253 (1989).
281 I.R.C. § 108(a)(1). Section 108( a)(1)(B) provides various exceptions in which
discharge of indebtedness does not result in taxable income, including if the discharge
occurs in a Title 11 bankruptcy case or when the taxpayer is insolvent. See Cancelled
Debts, Foreclosures, Repossessions, and Abandonments (for Individuals), I.R.S. Pub.
4681 (Jan. 15, 2013) for a general discussion of the tax effects of canceled debts for
individuals.
282 HENKEL, supra note 61, ¶ 28.05[2][b]. Courts have interpreted the wholly worthless requirement strictly in the intra-family context. See, e.g., Buchanan v. United States,
87 F.3d 197 (7th Cir. 1996).
283 I.R.C. § 166(d).
284 I.R.C. § 166(d)(1) (providing the deduction can be taken only in the year the debt
becomes totally worthless and suggesting that the lender will need to establish the worthlessness of the debt, perhaps by proving that the borrower is insolvent or that the lender
attempted to collect on the debt with demand for repayment which was not forthcoming);
see also I.R.C. § 6511(d)(1) (providing that there is a special 7 year statute of limitations
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intra-family loans, and unless the lender can overcome the presumption
that the loan was a gift when made,285 no bad debt deduction is allowed.
Another exception is that discharge of indebtedness income up to
$2 million of mortgage debt on the taxpayer’s principal residence before
2014 is excluded from gross income. This applies to the restructuring of
debt, foreclosure of a principal residence, or short sale of a principal
residence in which the sales proceeds are insufficient to pay off the
mortgage and the lender cancels the balance.286
If a parent loaned cash to a non-grantor trust for the parent’s children and the trust becomes insolvent, the parent should be able to cancel the note and avoid discharge of indebtedness income by the trust
under § 108(a)(1)(B) even without taking the position that the cancellation is a gift. Indeed, arguably the cancellation is not a gift because the
note is worthless in any event. (However, if the note arose as a result of
an installment sale, there are special rules that apply when installment
sale notes are cancelled,287 as discussed in Part XI.C.2, infra.)
Through 2012, a homeowner may exclude from income up to $2
million ($1 million if married filing separately) of debt incurred to buy,
build or substantially improve his or her principal residence, which debt
is reduced by mortgage restructuring or by forgiveness in connection
with a foreclosure.288 However, if the home mortgage arose by a loan
from a family member, it is likely that the forgiveness results from a gift,
in which event the full amount of debt forgiveness (even exceeding $2
million) would be excluded from income. However, a family member
may in the appropriate situation take the position that the restructuring
is not a gift but is in light of economic realities, and that even though the
borrower may not qualify for the insolvency exception, the debt relief
does not result in taxable income to the borrower.
For a grantor trust, a note from the grantor trust to the grantor (in
return for a cash loan of a sale of assets) can be forgiven by the grantor
for refunds due to non-business bad debt losses because of the difficulty in pinpointing
the year in which the debt becomes totally worthless).
285 See supra Part I.B.
286 This exception was added in the Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007,
and was extended for one year (2013) by the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012.
I.R.C. §§ 108(a)(1)(E), 108(h)(2). The debt must have been used to buy, build or substantially improve the principal residence and be secured by that residence. There is no
suggestion that the exception cannot apply to home mortgage loans between related
parties.
287 I.R.C. § 453B(a).
288 Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-142, 121 Stat.
1803 (2007) (amending I.R.C. § 108 to include I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(E) allowing relief for
cancellation of “‘qualified principal residence indebtedness’ [that] is discharged before
January 1, 2013.”).
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without causing discharge of taxable income because the debt is treated
as owned by the grantor for income tax purposes (i.e., a loan from the
grantor to the grantor).289 That is most helpful because the exception
for insolvent taxpayers under § 108(a)(1)(B) would not apply even if the
grantor trust is insolvent unless the grantor was also insolvent under
proposed regulations. Proposed regulations provide that grantor trusts
and disregarded entities will not be considered the “taxpayer” under
§ 108, but the grantor trust or entity owner is treated as the taxpayer.290
Therefore, the § 108 exceptions are available for grantor trusts and disregarded entities only to the extent that the owner is insolvent or undergoing bankruptcy.
There are special rules governing the cancellation or forgiveness of
an installment sales note, designed to prevent a seller from being able to
avoid income recognition from the initial sale.291
B. Possibility of Avoiding Having to Recognize Unpaid Interest
Income Upon Loan Forgiveness
Even though there is not discharge of indebtedness income on the
forgiveness of a loan, that does not necessarily address whether the
lender must recognize accrued but unpaid interest as taxable income.
Section 7872 addresses the income and gift tax implications of belowmarket loans, but § 7872(i)(1)(A) specifically authorizes the issuance of
regulations to provide that adjustments will be made to the extent necessary to carry out the purposes of § 7872 if there are waivers of interest.
The proposed regulations to § 7872 discuss the effect of forgiving
interest payments.292 While § 7872 generally applies to below-market
loans, the proposed regulation appears to apply to loans with adequate
interest and that are not below-market loans. (The regulation states
that it applies to loans with stated interest that initially would have been
subject to § 7872 had they been made without interest.)293 The somewhat strangely worded regulation operates by negative implication. It
says that a waiver of interest payments will be treated as if interest had
been paid to the lender (requiring the lender to realize interest income)
and then retransferred by the lender to the borrower (as a gift where the
forgiveness is in the nature of a gift) but only if three conditions are
satisfied:
289
290
291
292
293

Rev. Rul. 85-13, 1985-1 C.B. 184.
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.108-9.
I.R.C. § 453B(a). See also infra Part XI.C.2.
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-11(a).
Id.
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(1) the loan initially would have been subject to section7872
had if been made without interest;
(2) the waiver, cancellation or forgiveness does not include in
substantial part the loan principal; and
(3) a principal purpose of the waiver, cancellation, or forgiveness is to confer a benefit on the borrower, such as to pay
compensation or make a gift, a capital contribution, a distribution of money under section 301, or a similar payment to the
borrower.294
If a family loan is forgiven as a gift, the first and third requirements
are satisfied. Therefore all three requirements will be satisfied (and the
waived interest will have to be recognized as income by the lender) only
if “the waiver, cancellation or forgiveness does not include in substantial
part the loan principal.” Stated a different way, this proposed regulation indicates that the lender will not be treated as having received interest that is forgiven if the forgiveness includes not only interest on the
loan but also “in substantial part the loan principal.” One respected
commentator reasons that forgiveness of principal and accrued interest
will be treated the same as if the principal had been forgiven before the
interest accrued, so that no interest income will be recognized by the
lender:
Forgiveness of all principal and accrued interest has an economic consequence similar to an outright payment or forgiveness made before the interest accrued, and the authors of the
proposed regulations apparently decided that taxpayers should
neither be penalized nor given the opportunity to increase interest deductions when they execute a forgiveness later rather
than sooner.295
There are various limitations and uncertainties regarding the ability
to avoid having to recognize accrued but unpaid interest by forgiving the
interest. (1) Because stated interest that is not paid in a year generally
must be recognized each year under the OID rules,296 it may be only the
current year’s accrued interest that can avoid recognition under this forgiveness approach, because accrued interest from prior years may have
already been recognized as taxable income. (2) There is inherent ambiguity over how much of the principal must be forgiven when the accrued
interest is forgiven. The regulation uses the nebulous phrasing that the
294

Id. (emphasis added).
BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS ¶ 55.2.3, at 58-49 (2d ed. 2006). Interestingly, the third edition of this
treatise does not include that helpful discussion.
296 See supra Part V.B.
295
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forgiveness includes “in substantial part the loan principal.”297 For example, if the accrued interest for the year is $30,000 on a $1 million
outstanding loan, can the forgiveness be for $60,000, forgiving $30,000 of
principal and the $30,000 of accrued interest? Does “substantial part”
mean that the forgiveness of principal is only about 25% or more of the
total forgiveness? Many would say that 25% of something is a “substantial part” of that thing. Or is 50% or more required for this purpose?
Or does the forgiveness have to include a substantial part of the outstanding principal on the loan (such as 25% of the full $1 million loan
amount)? The language of the proposed regulation seems to refer to
the principal forgiveness being a substantial part of the forgiveness and
not a substantial part of the loan principal. (3) This position is based
merely on a proposed regulation that has never been finalized. But the
fact that the proposed regulation has stood unchanged for decades and
that there has been no case law rejecting this analysis over those decades appears to provide comfort in taking the position that the forgiveness of accrued interest in that manner can avoid ever having to
recognize that accrued interest as income. Proposed regulations are
considered in determining whether there is “substantial authority” for
purposes of avoiding taxpayer or preparer penalties.298 (4) If the accrued interest must be recognized each year under the OID rules, the
only way to avoid the recognition of all interest under the note would be
to forgive the accrued interest each year (in connection with a forgiveness in substantial part of the loan principal). However, if the accrued
interest is forgiven each year, that is a factor that may be considered in
refusing to recognize the loan as a bona fide loan rather than as an equity transfer.299 Indeed, an I.R.S. response to a letter from a practitioner suggests that having a plan to forgive the interest in each year
may result in recasting the transaction as an interest-free loan under the

297

Prop Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-11(a).
Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii) (listing types of authority considered in determining whether substantial authority exists for avoiding taxpayer penalty); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.6694-2(b)(1), -2(d)(2) (incorporating standards under § 6662 regulations for determining whether substantial authority or reasonable basis standard is met to avoid
preparer penalties).
299 Miller v. Comm’r , 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 1674 (1996). The factors listed in Miller v.
Commissioner include (1) whether interest was charged, (2) whether a demand for repayment was made, and (3) whether any actual repayment was made. Consistently forgiving
all interest payment would seem inconsistent with those factors. See supra Part I.B (discussing Miller and the other cases addressing whether the note is treated as debt or
equity).
298
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§ 7872 rules, which would seem to mean that the imputed forgone interest would be recognized each year.300
X. LOANS TO GRANTOR TRUSTS AND COROLLARY ISSUES
REGARDING LOANS TO INDIVIDUALS
Loans may be made to individuals; alternatively loans may be made
to grantor trusts. Many of the advantages of sale transactions to grantor
trusts could also be achieved with loans to grantor trusts. (The grantor
would pay income tax on the trust income, GST exemption can be allocated to the trust, etc.) Special considerations for loans made to grantor
trusts are addressed.
A. Does Demand Loan to Trust Cause Grantor Trust Treatment?
Several cases have upheld arguments by the I.R.S. that the grantor’s ability to demand repayment at any time of a demand note from
the trust causes the trust to be treated as a grantor trust under § 674(a)
of the Code, at least where the loan constituted the entire trust
corpus.301 The cases arose before the Supreme Court’s decision in
Dickman,302 and before the passage of § 7872, when interest-free loans
were often used as an income shifting and wealth transfer strategy. As a
separate taxpayer, the trust may have owed a very low income tax rate
(the facts arose before the compressed income tax rates were applied to
trusts).
Section 674(a) provides the general rule that the grantor is
treated as the owner of any portion of a trust in respect of
which the beneficial enjoyment of the corpus or the income
therefrom is subject to a power of disposition, exercisable by
the grantor or a nonadverse party, or both, without the approval or consent of any adverse party.
300 I.R.S. Field Service Advice 087777 (June 24, 1991) (response of I.R.S. Regional
Technical Coordinator responding to submission from practitioner requesting amendment or clarification of § 7872):
The legislative history of section 7872 reveals that the conferees recognized that
a term loan with deferred interest at a rate equal to or greater than the AFR,
and a related gift to defray all or part of the interest payable on the loan, may be
the economic equivalent of an interest-free loan with a principal amount equal
to the sum of the actual stated amount of the loan and the amount of the gift.
The conferees anticipated that under regulations, such a transaction would be
treated in accordance with its economic substance.
(citing H.R. Rep. No. 98-861 (1984), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 1445).
301 See, e.g., Wysong v. Comm’r, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 1456 (1988).
302 465 U.S. 330 (1984).
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The cases conclude that the grantor’s power to demand repayment of
the trust assets to repay the demand loan constitutes “an independent
power of disposition over the beneficial enjoyment of the corpus or
income.”303
In Kushner v. Commissioner,304 the grantor initially gave $100 to a
trust for his children and a month later loaned $100,000 to the trust in
return for a demand note. The loan was repaid a year later, and a new
$150,000 loan was extended on a demand note. The trust earned interest income over $16,000 in each of 1982 and 1983. The I.R.S. argued
that the grantor should have reported the interest income under the
grantor trust rules. The Tax Court concluded,
. . . petitioner’s ability to demand payment of the loans enabled
him to maintain direct dominion and control over the beneficial enjoyment of the trust’s corpus. Thus, petition is to be
treated as owner of the trust to the extent of the amounts
which he loaned to the trust.305
There are no reported cases in which the I.R.S. has made this argument following the adoption of § 7872, which removed the income tax
advantages of interest-free demand loans.
B. Ability of Trust to Repay Loan
For sales to grantor trusts, the common “folklore” is that the trust
should end up with equity value of about 10% after the sale (meaning
that the note value would not exceed 9 times the equity value of the
trust). There is no statue, regulation, or case law imposing that requirement, but the general theory is that the trust must have some net equity
value to support that the note is worth its face amount. (Otherwise, any
decline at all in the trust assets would leave the trust in a position that it
could not pay the note in full.) The same rationale would seem to apply
to loans to trusts. If a parent loans $1 million cash to a trust that has an
equity value of $10, the I.R.S. might be expected to take the position
that the note is not worth $1 million, and that the transaction results in a
gift (and opens the possibility of an argument that § 2036 applies to
cause inclusion of the trust assets in the parent’s estate at his or her
death). A possible counterargument is that there is no necessity of having a minimum trust amount in several situations sanctioned by regula303

McGinnis v. Comm’r, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 1870 (1993).
91 T.C.M. (CCH) 98 (1991), aff’d, 955 F.2d 41 (4th Cir. 1992).
305 Id. at 100. See also McGinnis, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 1870; Wysong v. Comm’r, 55
T.C.M. (CCH) 1456 (1988); Batson v. Comm’r, 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 1301 (1983).
304
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tions where the trust will owe annuity payments to the grantor, such as a
grantor retained annuity trust or charitable lead annuity trust.306
Cases addressing whether assets transferred to a trust in return for
a private annuity are included in the transferor’s estate under § 2036 as
a transfer with a retained interest have pointed to various factors, including: (i) annuity payments were limited to or substantially equal to
the income generated by the assets; (ii) the obligor’s personal liability
for the annuity payments is in some manner limited to the income generated by the assets; (iii) the obligor lacks the economic means from
which to make annuity payments other than the income generated by
the assets; and (iv) the annuitant maintains managerial control over the
assets.307 Items (i)-(iii) of that list all relate to whether there are assets
in the trust other than just the assets transferred in return for the private
annuity.308 Conservative planners structure transactions for parents to
make gifts to trusts and build equity value in trusts in other ways to
support the value of notes that the trusts gives for subsequent cash loans
or sales to the trust.309
C. Necessity That Individual Borrowers Have Financial Ability to
Repay
A corollary question to a requirement that a trust has “seeding” to
support a loan is whether the same approach should apply to cash loans
and to individuals. Should the individuals have sufficient net worth to
have the ability to repay the loans? The ability to repay loans is not a
factor under § 7872 in determining the amount of gift that occurs by
reason of making a below-market loan, and the proposed regulation
under § 7872 addressing the gift tax implications of below-market loans
306 Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-3 (providing GRATs have no limitation on needing minimum equity amount in trust above present value of annuity payments); Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2055-2(f)(2)(iv) (providing that in the case of a testamentary CLAT, where actuarial
value of annuity payments to charity exceeded the amount transferred to trust, the charitable deduction was the full value contributed to the trust and there was no taxable value
of the remainder).
307 ZARITSKY & AUCUTT, supra note 62, § 12.05[3][a][i].
308 However, some cases have held that § 2036 did not apply even though the trust
that paid for assets with a private annuity was minimally funded. E.g., Stern v. Comm’r,
747 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1984) (even though trust was minimally funded, there was no direct
tie-in between trust income and annuity payment and annuitant had limited powers over
trust). See Jerome M. Hesch & Elliot Manning, Beyond the Basic Freeze: Further Uses of
Deferred Payment Sales, 34 U. MIAMI HECKERLING INST. ON EST. PLAN. ¶ 1601.1 n.55
(2000) for cases referring to the requirement of a direct connection to paying the annuity
from trust income [hereinafter Hesch & Manning, Beyond the Basic Freeze].
309 Hesch & Manning, Beyond the Basic Freeze, ¶ 1601.1G (“[O]nly those who are
willing to take substantial risks should use a trust with no other significant assets [for
sales transactions with a trust].”).
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makes no reference to any factors other than comparison to the interest
rate on the note to the AFR.310 The ability to repay loans is a factor
that is considered in whether the transaction is respected as resulting in
debt rather than an equity transfer.311 In addition, there have been
cases that determined that gifts occurred when sales were made to individuals for notes where, among other factors, the individuals did not
have the ability to repay the notes.312 Some of the cases involving transfers to individuals in return for private annuities have also applied
§ 2036 where the individual had no ability to make the annuity payments other than with the transferred assets.313 Interestingly, the private annuity cases involving transfers to individuals in return for private
annuities have not focused so closely on the net value of the individuals
as compared to private annuity transactions involving trusts.314 However, there have been some cases that have not respected transfers for
private annuities promised by individuals where the individuals did not
have the financial wherewithal to pay the annuity.315 For example, in
Hurford v. Commissioner,316 a mother transferred all of the limited
partnership interests of a partnership to two of her children in return for
private annuities from the two children. The court held that
§ 2036(a)(1) applied for various reasons, including that the children had
no ability to make the annuity payments other than from the assets in
the partnership.317
310

Prop. Treas. Reg. § 25.7872-1.
E.g. Miller v. Comm’r, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 1674 (1996). See supra Part I.B.
312 E.g., Estate of Reynolds v. Comm’r, 55 T.C. 172 (1970) (units in voting trust sold
to two of decedent’s children for three separate $50,000 secured notes with terms of 10-15
years, interest-free except that 4% interest rate applied to late payments; $30,000 of payments were made on each of two of the notes and $27,000 of payments were made on the
third note; court agreed with I.R.S. that the value of each of the notes was only $30,000
and the excess values of the voting trust units over $30,000 constituted gifts; factors included interest-free nature of the note (until a payment default), large note amounts,
ability of children to repay, fact of default on payments and that no interest was ever
paid, prevailing interest rates in the years of the transfers, and no showing that any additional payments were ever made on the notes).
313 See, e.g., Estate of Rosen v. Comm’r, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 1220 (2006).
314 See, e.g. Miller, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 1674.
315 E.g., Estate of Mitchell v. Comm’r, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 1034 (1982) (determining
§ 2036 applied where children had no financial ability to make annuity payments and
never intended to make annuity payments).
316 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 422 (1998).
317 Id. The court pointed to other factors as well, including that the mother continued to exercise managerial control over the partnership and its assets after the transfer to
the children. In addition, while the assets were transferred to two of her children, there
was an understanding they would share benefits of the assets with a third child. The
Court also applied I.R.C. §§ 2036(a)(2), 2038.
311
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D. Non-Recourse Loans to Individuals
A further corollary issue is whether non-recourse loans can be
made to individuals, secured only by what the individuals buy with the
loan proceeds. Economically, this is no different than a recourse loan to
a trust whose only assets are assets that the trust acquires with the loan
proceeds. If the general thinking is that trusts should have adequate
“coverage” (the rule of thumb is 10% coverage) for sales or loans, does
that mean that nonrecourse loans to individuals would not be respected
as having full value? Interestingly, § 1274 addresses the effects of nonrecourse loans.318 (Various tax shelter arrangements previously involved “flipping” properties acquired with nonrecourse indebtedness in
excess of the fair market value of the property. Section 1274(b)(3) provides that where nonrecourse debt is used, the “issue price” for purposes of determining the amount of OID cannot exceed the value of the
property transferred in return for the nonrecourse note.) However,
§ 7872 does not address nonrecourse loans. Furthermore the cases addressing whether loan transactions are recognized as debt or equity
transactions do not specifically address nonrecourse loans as a factor in
that analysis, but they do include the borrower’s ability to repay the loan
as a factor, which would seem to suggest that having a nonrecourse loan
would be a negative factor in the debt-equity analysis.319 Some cases
have discounted the value of notes, in part because of the nonrecourse
nature of the notes.320
E. Guaranties
A variety of commentators have addressed the impact of guaranties
of notes in sale to grantor trust situations.321 Arguments can be made
that the a guaranty by a trust beneficiary of the trust’s note should not
be a gift, but merely represents the beneficiary’s effort to protect his or
her interest in the trust.322 However, there is uncertainty as to whether
a beneficiary’s guaranty of the trust’s note in a sale context constitutes
some kind of gratuitous transfer to the trust by the guarantor, and many
318

I.R.C. § 1274(b)(3).
See, e.g., Miller v. Comm’r, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 1674 (1996). See supra Part I.B.
320 E.g., Scott v. Comm’r, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 115 (1979) (taxpayer valued note at 70%
discount based on sale of similar note in arm’s length transaction; court concluded taxpayer did not show sufficient similarity to the prior transaction and for income tax purposes; allowed 30% discount based on nonrecourse nature of note, subordinated status of
lien, limited nature of security, subsequent default of maker, and timely receipt of interest payments).
321 See infra Part XII.A.1 (providing a detailed discussion of the effect of guaranties
in sale-to-grantor-trust transactions).
322 See Milford B. Hatcher & Edward M. Manigault, Using Beneficiary Guarantees in
Defective Grantor Trusts, 92 J. TAX’N 152 (2000).
319
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planners structure sale to grantor trust transactions so that the trust pays
market value for any guaranties of the trust’s obligations.
There does not seem to be any difference in the analysis for loan
transactions with trusts as opposed to sale transactions with trusts. Indeed, PLR 9113009,323 the I.R.S. letter ruling that initially raised concerns about the gift tax effects of loan guaranties, addressed the
guaranty of loans (as opposed to sale notes) made by the guarantor’s
children. While PLR 9113009 was withdrawn by PLR 9409018,324 which
addressed only other issues requested in the original ruling request without mention of gift tax issues, the earlier ruling nevertheless provides
the I.R.S.’s analysis of why gift guaranties may include gift elements.
The I.R.S. reasoned generally that the guaranty confers an economic
benefit from the date it is given and the promisor of a legally enforceable promise for less than adequate and full consideration makes a completed gift on the date the promise is binding and determinable in value
rather than when the promised payment is actually made.325 Cautious
planners will treat the use of guaranties as a way of providing “coverage” for loans transactions the same as in sale transactions. For a discussion of further issues involving the use of guaranties, such as whether
323

See PLR 9113009 (Mar. 29, 1991).
See PLR 9409018 (Mar. 4, 1994).
325 The I.R.S.’s full analysis of this issue in PLR 9113009 is as follows:
The gift tax was designed to encompass all transfers of property and property
rights having significant value. The transfer of a valuable economic right or
benefit is a property interest that is subject to the gift tax. The valuable economic right is generally readily measurable by reference to current interest
rates. See Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330 (1984). The term “gifts” was
meant to be used in its broadest and most comprehensive sense in order to “. . .
hit all the protean arrangements which the wit of man can devise that are not
business transactions within the meaning of ordinary speech.” Comm’r v.
Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303, 306 (1945). The agreements by T to guarantee payment
of debts are valuable economic benefits conferred upon the shareholders of the
acquiring companies and entities. You state that, without those guarantees,
those shareholders (T’s children) may not have obtained the loans or, in the
very least, would have had to pay a higher interest rate to obtain the loans.
Consequently, when T guaranteed payment of the loans, T transferred a valuable property interest to the shareholders. The promisor of a legally enforceable
promise for less than adequate and full consideration makes a completed gift on
the date the promise is binding and determinable in value rather than when the
promised payment is actually made. See Rev. Rul. 84-25, 1984-1 C.B. 191. Accordingly, the enforceable agreements by T to guarantee the loans on behalf of
the shareholders are transfers (subject to gift tax) of the economic benefit conferred upon the shareholders on the dates they are entered into by T. Likewise,
in the event that the primary obligors subsequently default on the loans and T
pays any outstanding obligation under the terms of the agreements, any
amounts paid by T, less any reimbursement from the primary obligors, will be
gifts subject to the gift tax.
324
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a fee must be paid for the guaranty and how to determine an appropriate amount to pay for the guaranty,326 see Part XII.A.1, infra.
XI. INTRA-FAMILY INSTALLMENT SALES (OTHER THAN SALES
GRANTOR TRUSTS)

TO

Planners have long used intra-family sales to freeze the estate tax
value of the assets sold, and to provide liquidity by replacing an illiquid
asset with cash. These advantages are balanced against the disadvantages of a sale, among them the recognition of gain, loss of control over
the asset, and loss of income from the asset. To avoid the immediate
recognition of gain, sales to family members are often structured as installment sales. The installment method permits a sale of property without the seller being required to report the gain until the actual receipt of
the payments (subject to the exceptions noted).
Although the installment sale method will generally be available
under § 453(a),327 there are significant exceptions. In particular, the installment sale method is not available for a sale of marketable securities
and other property regularly traded on an established market.328 It is
also not available to the extent that the gain in question is depreciation
recapture and may not be available at all if the sale consists of depreciable property and is to a controlled entity.329 Finally, sales of inventory
or dealer property will not generally qualify for installment
treatment.330
Even if the installment method is available, there may be limits on
its use. First, interest may be charged on the deferred tax liability if the
aggregate face amount of all of the seller’s installment obligations from
sales during the year exceeds $5,000,000.331 Also, a pledge of the installment note will trigger gain recognition.332 Lastly, a gift or other disposition of the installment note, or the sale of the purchased property by a
related purchaser within two years of the installment sale, may cause the
balance of the deferred gain to be recognized.333
326 See generally Martin M. Shenkman, Role of Guarantees and Seed Gifts in Family
Installment Sales, 37 EST. PLAN. 3 (Nov. 2010) (providing an excellent discussion of various issues involving the use of guaranties in loan transactions).
327 In fact, if a disposition qualifies as an installment sale, the installment method is
mandatory and automatically applies unless the taxpayer elects out under § 453(d)(1).
328 I.R.C. § 453(k)(2).
329 I.R.C. § 453(i), (g).
330 I.R.C. § 453(b)(2).
331 I.R.C. § 453A.
332 I.R.C. § 453A(d).
333 I.R.C. §§ 453(e), 453B.
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A. Safe Harbor Interest Rate
One primary, unresolved, issue involving gift loans under § 7872334
involves sales of property that may be regarded as part-sale, part-gift.
For example,335 assume a mother of an adult child decides to sell a tract
of undeveloped land for $500,000, paid $100,000 in cash and $400,000 by
a 15-year promissory note at 6% per annum, compounded semi-annually. Total payments over the term of the note will be $907,905. Assume the AFR is 10%. The present value of the payments under the
contract, discounted at the AFR, is $234,243. The difference between
this amount and the loan amount, $400,000, is $165,757. Because the
present value of the total payments under the loan is less than the
amount loaned, this is a below-market loan under § 7872, at least according to the I.R.S.
Under similar circumstances, however, taxpayers have argued, and
the Seventh Circuit has agreed, that no gift has occurred in the example
because the transaction falls under the income tax safe harbor of
§ 483(e), which provides a 6% safe harbor for land sales between relatives.336 The I.R.S., the Tax Court, and the Eighth337 and Tenth Circuits,338 however, disagree, and would assert that § 483(e) only provides
an income tax safe harbor, not a gift tax safe harbor.
What has happened to the relatively straightforward scheme outlined to this point in this paper? We have departed from the relative
safety of intra-family loans and stepped into the murk of intra-family
sales. This area has not garnered much attention in the past decade or
so because of the low interest rate environment. In contrast to June
1981, when the average prime rate was 20.3%, today 6% is not a valuable safe harbor.339 However, if and when interest rates (and therefore,
the AFR) rise, the sleeping bear may be roused.
As noted above, prior to the enactment of § 7872, Congress first
entered the realm of interest rate safe harbors in the context of installment sales. Congress enacted or amended income tax statutes §§ 483
(1964, amended in 1984) and 1274 (1984) to address a problem not involving the gift tax. Under these statutes, certain debt instruments is334 See discussion supra Part II.B (providing “gift” loans are not necessarily gifts, just
one type of loan to which § 7872 applies).
335 See John A. Lynch, Jr., Taxation of Below-Market Loans Under Section 7872: This
Could be a Lot Simpler!, 21 AKRON TAX J. 33, 66-67 (2006).
336 Ballard v. Comm’r, 854 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1988).
337 See Krabbenhoft v. Comm’r, 939 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1991).
338 See Schusterman v. United States, 63 F.3d 986 (10th Cir. 1995).
339 Cases that spawned the conflict over which rates should be applied to avoid income tax and gift tax include Ballard v. Commissioner, 854 F.2d 185 (I.R.S. alleged applicable gift tax discount rate of 18%), Krabbenhoft v. Commissioner, 939 F.2d 529 (11%),
and Schusterman v. United States, 63 F.3d 986 (11.5%).
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sued in connection with installment sales must bear interest at the AFR
to ensure that it provides “adequate stated interest.” The statutes were
aimed at installment sales transactions where the parties opted to inflate
the sales price and impose reduced or no interest payments. This allowed the seller to convert ordinary income to capital gain and allowed
the buyer to treat all payments as basis. Thus, although they employ the
same methodologies for imputing interest as § 7872, these sections ostensibly address not valuation issues, but rather characterization of
income.
Section 7872(f)(8) explicitly states that § 7872 does not apply to a
loan given in consideration for the sale or exchange of property; this area
is, at first glance, covered by §§ 483 and 1274. This is so even if §§ 483
and 1274 do not apply by reason of exceptions or safe harbor provisions.340 This straightforward statement is modified somewhat by the
regulations and proposed regulations, and transmogrified by case law
(see below).
As a brief overview, § 1274 provides the general rule for income tax
treatment of installment sales; it applies to a note issued in a sale or
exchange unless the note is excepted from its application. Section
1274(d)(2) provides that in a sale or exchange, the appropriate AFR is
the lowest such rate for the three-month period ending with the month
there was a “binding contract in writing for such sale or exchange.” The
appropriate AFR for sales transactions is based not on the term of the
note, but on its weighted average maturity.341 The weighted average maturity of an obligation equals the sum of the amounts obtained by multiplying the number of complete years from the issue date until the
payment is made by a fraction. The numerator of the fraction is the
amount of each payment under the instrument (other than qualified
stated interest), and the denominator is the stated redemption price at
maturity.342 Once an instrument’s term is calculated, the discount rate
used is the lowest AFR in effect during the three-month period ending
with the first month a binding written contract for the transaction exists.
Section 1274(c)(3) lists exceptions to the application of the section,
which exceptions include transactions to which § 483(e) applies. Section
1274A provides a safe harbor of 9% compounded semiannually for certain qualified debt instruments. For 2007, a qualified debt instrument
included any debt instrument given in exchange for property (other than
§ 38 property) that has a stated principal amount of not more than
340

I.R.C. § 7872(f)(8).
Treas. Reg. § 1.1274-4(c), referring to Treas. Reg. § 1.1273-1(e)(3).
342 See Treas. Reg. § 1.1273-1(f) for examples. For definitions of these terms, see
supra Part V.B.3.
341

\\jciprod01\productn\A\ACT\38-2-3\ACT2301.txt

Fall/Winter 2012]

unknown

Seq: 75

INTRA-FAMILY LOANS

7-FEB-14

13:19

125

$4,800,800.343 However, a debt instrument issued in a sale/leaseback
transaction cannot be a qualified debt instrument.344 This rate applies
only to bona fide sales between unrelated parties. For sale/leaseback
transactions involving the transferor or any related party, the discount
rate is 110% of the AFR, compounded semiannually, and not limited to
9%.345 The § 1274 rules are discussed in more detail in Part V.B, supra.
Section 483 of the Code applies, in limited circumstances, to debt
instruments issued in a sale or exchange of property excepted from
§ 1274 (see below). “Unstated interest” is determined pursuant to
§ 483(b) in a manner similar to the determination of the imputed principal amount in § 1274(b); that is, interest will be imputed to the Seller, at
the appropriate AFR, by discounting all payments to the date of sale
(i.e., by applying OID rules). Generally, § 483 applies to the most debt
obligations excepted from § 1274, which include: (1) sales for $250,000
or less;346 (2) sale of a farm for less than $1,000,000;347 (3) sale of a
principal residence;348 and (4) sales of land between family members.349
Most important in the intra-family sales context is § 483(e), which provides an exception to the AFR requirement. Under § 483(e), if a family
member contracts to sell land to another family member at a price of
$500,000 or less,350 the family members may use a 6% safe harbor interest rate.351
The § 483(e) safe harbor is directly applicable, and has attracted the
interest of taxpayers and the I.R.S. because of the value of a 6% safe
harbor in time of high interest rates. By enacting § 483(e), Congress
unequivocally bestowed favorable tax treatment to intra-family real estate sales in the context of imputed interest. The issue, discussed fully
below, is whether Congress intended, or even considered, whether this
favorable tax treatment should be extended to gift tax. Unfortunately,
343

I.R.C. § 1274A(b); Rev. Rul. 2007-4, 2007-4 I.R.B. 351.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1274A-1(b)(1).
345 I.R.C. § 1274(e).
346 I.R.C. § 1274(c)(3)(C).
347 I.R.C. § 1274(c)(3)(A).
348 I.R.C. § 1274(c)(3)(B). If a buyer uses the real property as a personal residence,
he or she is exempted also from § 483, although the seller will in most cases remain
subject to I.R.C. § 483.
349 I.R.C. § 1274(c)(3)(F).
350 I.R.C. § 483(e)(3).
351 I.R.C. § 483(e)(2) provides that a “qualified sale” means any sale or exchange of
land by a person to a member of such person’s family within the meaning of I.R.C.
§ 267(c)(4), which limits a person’s family to siblings, spouses, ancestors and lineal descendants. Under Treas. Reg. § 1.483-3(b)(2)(iii), if the property sold or exchanged includes any property other than land, § 483(e) applies only to the extent that the stated
principal amount of the debt instrument issued in the sale or exchange is attributable to
the land (based on the relative fair market values of the land and the other property).
344
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§ 483 contains no language that clearly excludes its application in the
gift tax context.
Practice Note: If an intra-family sale transaction does not involve real property, and therefore falls within the general ambit of §§ 483 or 1274 of the Code (as opposed to § 483(e)), the
stakes in the conflict described below are lower: the difference
between the income tax safe harbor interest rates (§§ 483 or
1274) and the § 7872 gift and income tax interest rate safe harbor is not as profound. With the income tax safe harbor statutes, the taxpayer may use the three-month AFR, an option
which is not available under § 7872. In these circumstances,
the judicious practitioner will bite the bullet and use the § 7872
rate.
The Proposed Regulations under § 7872 “clarify” that the exception of § 7872 from transactions where 483 or 1274 applies, set forth in
7872(f)(8), is a general rule only, and that § 7872 will apply to such a
loan if it is a gift loan that is 1) a demand loan352 or 2) issued in a sale or
exchange where the property will be held by the buyer for personal use
and the seller does not make sales on the same terms and conditions to
the general public.353 A fixed-term mortgage note given by a child in
purchasing a home from his parent is an example of a personal use note.
The scheme certainly implies, to the extent it may not be explicit,
that the statutes are mutually exclusive. Either §§ 1274 and/or 483 apply
to the exclusion or § 7872 applies, or vice versa. Section 7872(f)(8) explicitly states that where § 483 applies, § 7872 shall not apply. Under
narrow assumptions (intra-family gift loan in connection with a sale or
exchange, for personal use property) it is fairly clear that § 7872 applies
exclusively. Unfortunately no parallel provision in § 483 closes the loop
– no provision explicitly states that where § 483 applies, it trumps § 7872
and therefore, as is implied, applies for gift tax purposes in those limited
circumstances. In other words, there is no explicit statement in the statutes that where §§ 483 and/or 1274 apply, they apply to the exclusion of
§ 7872 for both the income tax and gift tax applications.354
352 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-2(a)(2)(ii)(A). Accord Treas. Reg. §§ 1.12741(b)(3)(ii), 1.483-1(c)(3)(iii).
353 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-2(a)(2)(ii)(C). The term “personal use” means use in
other than a trade or business or in connection with an investment. I.R.C. § 1275(b)(3);
See Treas. Reg. 1.483-1(c)(3)(ii)-(iii) (note Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-2(a)(2)(ii)(C) is
broader than its counterpart, Treas. Reg. 1.483-1(c)(3)(ii), in that it excludes the application of §§ 483 and 1274 to both parties to the described transaction, rather than just the
obligee (seller)).
354 In fact, a line of cases has adopted this reasoning, initially prior to the enactment
of § 7872, and then, in the Frazee case, after the enactment of § 7872. See Frazee v.
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For example, what about an intra-family installment sale to a child
who intends to use the property for business use?355 This appears to be
covered by § 483(e), and thereby completely excluded from § 7872 income and gift tax treatment by § 7872(f)(8), or so it would seem. These
are the facts of Frazee v. Commissioner,356 discussed immediately
below.
The integration of these code sections runs into darkness and fog,
when, in search of a consistent policy, the courts attempt to divine the
intent of Congress. In the face of Congressional silence, the courts have
had a difficult time processing the issue, taking the ambiguity of the
scheme and running with it, mainly against the taxpayer. The muddled
result is that if §§ 483 or 1274 applies to an intra-family installment sale
or exchange, the I.R.S. and the courts, for the most part, do not respect
the apparent exclusivity of the schemes, and apply both § 7872 and the
applicable income tax safe harbor statute (§§ 483 or 1274).
Frazee was the culmination of the I.R.S.’s efforts through the early
1980s and into the 1990s to restrict the safe harbors of § 483 (and, theoretically, § 1274) to the income tax province, against efforts of taxpayers
to use the lowest safe harbor rate as a safe harbor for both income and
gift tax.357 The I.R.S.,358 the Tax Court, Eighth359 and Tenth Circuits360
contend that § 483 does not act as a safe harbor for gift tax purposes,
and that a taxpayer utilizing § 483 will incur a gift tax if the AFR exceeds the § 483 safe harbor. The reasoning of this group, in a nutshell, is
Commissioner, 98 T.C. 554 (1992), and its antecedents such as Krabbenhoft v. Commissioner, 939 F.2d 529 (1991).
355 One example in the Regulations misses the opportunity to further clarify the relationship between § 7872 and its income tax counterparts. See, e.g., Prop. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1274-1(c). In Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1274-1(c), Example 3 assumes a term loan payment for an intra-family sale of non-farm real property, and applies §§ 1274 and 483(e) to
a note in the amount of $650,000 — ignoring the potential application of § 7872. Adding
the detail of whether the child intended to use the property for personal or business use
would have been extremely helpful because as it is, the Section assumes a business use is
the only way to reconcile section (i) of this example with the § 7872 of the proposed
regulations. Likewise, section (ii) assumes the amount not subject to § 483(e) will be
subject to § 1274, again contradicting the § 7872 Proposed Regulations. Compare Prop.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1274-1(c) and I.R.C. § 483(e) with Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872.
356 98 T.C. 554.
357 See Estate of True v. Comm’r, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 27 (2001) (following Frazee for
the proposition that I.R.C. § 7872 can apply to deferred payment arrangements in intrafamily sales).
358 See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,566 (Oct. 23, 1986).
359 Krabbenhoft, 939 F.2d at 534.
360 The 10th Circuit is aligned with this group of taxpayer nemeses as well, having
held that the prefatory language of § 483 (“For purposes of this title. . .”) does not preclude the I.R.S. from valuing an installment sales contract using prevailing market rates.
See Schusterman, 63 F.3d 986.
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that § 483 addresses only the characterization of payments as income or
principal under an installment sale, NOT valuation of the installment
obligation for gift tax purposes. A concurring opinion in the Eighth Circuit’s Krabbenhoft case, however, noted the anomalies of the decision to
apply § 483 only for income tax purposes:
Looking at section 483 in isolation and ignoring subsequent litigation, it is possible to conclude the “safe harbor” provision is
applicable only to the income tax. In reaching this technical
conclusion, one must accept the proposition that Congress either intended, or else simply failed to consider, the possible
“gift tax traps” that would be created any time market rates
rose above six percent.361
A ray of hope, however, was also indicated in Judge Henley’s opinion, which noted that, like Ballard,362 the Krabbenhoft transaction occurred before the enactment of §§ 1274 and 7872:
Unfortunately, Congress did not get around to dealing with the
problem until the 1983-1984 term when it created a uniform
market-based system of interest rates. Through Sections 12711274, Congress enacted a market rate system for different
types of loans that is updated periodically through Revenue
Procedures. As government’s counsel confirmed at oral argument, sections such as 483 and 7872 (low interest or no interest
loans) now govern the gift and income tax treatment of most
loans.363
In opposition to the authorities who apply § 483 only as an income
tax safe harbor stands the Seventh Circuit, which, in Ballard, held that
the qualifying introductory language of § 483 mandates its application to
both gift and income tax, and constitutes a safe harbor from all adverse
tax consequences under Title 26 of the United States Code.364
The confusion in this area reached its glorious apex with the puzzling Tax Court holding in Frazee v. Commissioner,365 a case that, unlike
Ballard and Krabbenhoft, involved a dispute occurring after the enactment of § 7872. Frazee involved the installment sale of real property
ripe for development by a mother to her three children. The interest
rate for the note was 7%, compounded semiannually, which exceeds the
§ 483(e) rate but was lower than the AFR at the time. The taxpayer
361

Krabbenhoft v. Comm’r, 939 F.2d 529, 534 (1991) (Henley, J., concurring).
Ballard v. Comm’r, 854 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1988); See supra Part XI.A.
363 Krabbenhoft, 939 F.2d at 534 (emphasis in original) (Judge Henley’s assumption
was not borne out in the Frazee case).
364 Ballard, 854 F.2d 185.
365 Frazee v. Comm’r, 98 T.C. 554 (1992).
362
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argued that § 483(e) applied to protect her from imputed income and
gift tax liability. In its opinion, the court first disregarded contemporary
proposed regulations that stated that § 483 would govern for gift tax
purposes.366 After holding (correctly) that § 483(e) (providing a 6%
safe harbor) applied to the transaction for income tax purposes, the
Court fudged its way around newly enacted § 7872(f)(8), stating that
“[t]he presence of Section 7872(f)(8) signaled Congress’ belief that Section 7872 could properly be applicable to some seller financing. We are
not here to judge the wisdom of Section 7872, but rather, to apply the
provision as drafted.”367 In other words, since § 483 applies only for
income tax characterization purposes, § 7872(f)(8) applies only to exclude § 7872 as an income tax safe harbor when both sections otherwise
apply. This reasoning is circular.368
Although the taxpayer lost in Frazee, it could have been worse.
What if the I.R.S. had urged, and the Court had held, that i) § 483(e)
applies for income tax purposes but not gift tax purposes; therefore ii)
§ 7872 does not apply for any purpose because § 7872(f)(8) states that it
shall not apply; and iii) in the absence of a controlling statute, the fair
market approach of Ballard v. Commissioner369 shall be employed?
This is certainly a logical progression.370 Fortunately for taxpayers,
since the enactment of § 7872, the I.R.S. has conceded this point in Frazee and subsequent private letter rulings.371 In Frazee, the court reasoned that § 7872 applies in seller financing situations,372 and
366 Id. at 588 (dismissing proposed regulations as “no more than a litigation
position.”).
367 Id.
368 See, e.g., Courtney N. Stillman, Choosing Interest Rates for Family Transactions to
Avoid a Gift as Well as Imputed Income, 83 J. TAX’N 155 (1995).
369 854 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1988); Accord Blackburn v. Comm’r, 20 T.C. 204 (1953).
370 This is similar to the reasoning reemployed by the Tenth Circuit in Schusterman,
which involved a transaction prior to the enactment of § 7872. Schusterman v. United
States, 63 F.3d 986 (10th Cir. 1995). In Schusterman, the Court applied fair market value
analysis for gift tax purposes to promissory notes issued by related irrevocable trusts for
family stock. The court held that § 483, although it applies to all of Title 26, only applies
to re-characterize income and principal payments when below-market interest rates are
charged – it is not a valuation provision applicable to the gift. Id. at 992-93.
371 TAM 8552007 (Sept. 18, 1985); PLR 8806048 (Nov. 17, 1987); PLR 9535026 (Sept.
1, 1995).
372 Nowhere does the text of section 7872 specify that section 7872 is limited to
loans of money. If it was implicit that it was so limited, it would be unnecessary
to specify that section 7872 does not apply to any loan to which sections 483 or
1274 apply. The presence of section 7872(f)(8) signaled Congress’ belief that
section 7872 could properly be applicable to some seller financing. We are not
here to judge the wisdom of section 7872, but rather, to apply the provision as
drafted.
Frazee v. Comm’r, 98 T.C. 554, 588 (1992).
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acknowledged the I.R.S. concession that § 7872 applied for gift tax purposes rather than valuing the note under a market rate approach: “We
find it anomalous that respondent urges as her primary position the application of § 7872, which is more favorable to the taxpayer than the
traditional fair market value approach, but we heartily welcome the concept.”373 Similarly, in Estate of True v. Commissioner,374 the court held
that § 7872 applies to a purchase transaction under a buy-sell agreement
for a deferred payment.
Relatively recent PLRs confirm the I.R.S. position that § 7872 will
apply to the gift tax valuation of notes issued in intra-family sales transactions, regardless of the application of §§ 1274 or 483 to the transaction
for income tax purposes, and that using an interest rate that is equal to
or greater than the AFR will not be treated as a gift, merely because of
the interest rate that is used on the note.
Private Letter Ruling 9535026375 involved an installment sale of assets to a grantor trust in return for a note that paid interest annually at
the § 7872 rate (i.e., the AFR), with a balloon payment of principal at
the end of 20 years. The ruling summarizes the provisions of § 7872 and
discusses the Frazee case (which it summarizes as concluding that § 7872
is not limited to loans of cash but is broadly interpreted to include any
extension of credit). The ruling reasoned that neither § 483 nor § 1274
applies for valuing the note for gift tax purposes, but that § 7872 was
enacted specifically to address the gift tax treatment of below-market
loans. It further reasoned that § 7872 is not limited to loans of cash but
“is broadly interpreted to include any extension of credit.”376 The ruling observes that the stated interest rate on the notes in question equals
the § 7872 rate.
Thus, we conclude that, if the fair market value of the stock
transferred to the [trust] equals the principal amount of the
note, the sale of stock to the [trust] will not result in a gift
subject to gift tax. This ruling is conditioned on satisfaction of
both of the following assumptions: (i) No facts are presented
that would indicate that the notes will not be paid according to
373

Id. at 590.
82 T.C.M. (CCH) 27 (2001) (“We concluded in Frazee v. Commissioner, supra at
588-589, that section 7872 does not apply solely to loans of money; it also applies to
seller-provided financing for the sale of property. In our view, the fact that the deferred
payment arrangement in the case at hand was contained in the buy-sell agreements,
rather than in a separate note as in Frazee, does not require a different result.”), aff’d on
other grounds, 390 F.3d 1210 (10th Cir. 2004).
375 PLR 9535026 (Sept. 1, 1995).
376 Frazee, 98 T.C. at 590.
374

\\jciprod01\productn\A\ACT\38-2-3\ACT2301.txt

Fall/Winter 2012]

unknown

Seq: 81

7-FEB-14

INTRA-FAMILY LOANS

13:19

131

their terms; and (ii) the [trust’s] ability to pay the notes is not
otherwise in doubt.377
Private Letter Ruling 9408018378 addressed whether the redemption of a mother’s stock from a corporation, where her son was the remaining shareholder, constituted a gift. The note’s interest rate equaled
the greater of (i) 120% of the applicable federal mid-term rate, or (ii)
the rate sufficient to provide the note with “adequate stated interest”
under § 1274(c)(2) (which is tied to the applicable federal rate). The
ruling employed similar reasoning in PLR 9535026, and concluded that
because the interest rate on the note will be at least equal to the applicable federal rate for the month during which the note is executed, the fair
market value of the note for federal gift tax purposes is the face value of
the note.379 (That ruling similarly was conditioned on (i) there being no
indication that the note would not be paid according to its terms and (ii)
the corporation’s ability to pay the notes is not otherwise in doubt.)
The bottom line is that this issue will remain submerged so long as
the AFR remains around 6%, unless Congress intervenes.380 When the
AFR climbs above 6%, in intra-family land sales transactions, careful
planners will apply the AFR unless gift taxes are not an issue. Aggressive planners outside of the Eighth and Tenth Circuits may always
choose to use the 6% safe harbor, relying on Ballard, common sense,
and fairness.381
With intra-family sales transactions involving sales of personal use
property (i.e., not land held for investment), at least under the § 7872
proposed regulations, § 483 is not applicable and § 7872 should be used.
The penalty for using the 7872 safe harbor in that case, however, is not
burdensome, as the § 483 or 1274 AFR (permitting the lowest of the
prior three months’ AFRs) is usually not substantially better than the
§ 7872 AFR.

377

Id.
PLR 9408018 (Feb. 25, 1994).
379 Frazee v. Comm’r, 98 T.C. 554, 590 (1992).
380 See Stephen J. Wolma, Ambushed in a Safe Harbor, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 309
(1998) (advocating Congressional action to resolve the conflict, short of Supreme Court
intervention).
381 The Eighth and Tenth Circuits hold that the 6% safe harbor does not apply for
gift tax purposes. Krabbenhoft v. Commissioner, 939 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1991); Schusterman v. United States, 63 F.3d 986 (10th Cir. 1995). The Seventh Circuit has held that the
6% safe harbor does apply for gift tax purposes as well. Ballard v. Commissioner, 854
F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1988).
378
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B. Consequence of Inadequate Stated Interest
If either of §§ 483 or 1274 applies, and the applicable safe harbor
interest rate is not utilized (the note does not call for qualified stated
interest), interest will be imputed under § 483 as “imputed interest” or
under § 1274 as “OID” (Original Interest Discount). Both are calculated in the same manner. However, they differ as to the timing of recognition of unstated interest.
When § 1274 applies, OID is determined on a daily basis and is
income to the seller and deductible by the buyer (unless the buyer is an
individual and the interest is personal interest) without regard to the
taxpayer’s use of the accrual or cash method. The practical effect when
OID is imputed is that OID will be allocated daily, thus thwarting the
tax deferral effects of the delayed interest payments. By contrast, in the
limited situations in which § 483 still applies, the taxpayer’s accounting
method (i.e., cash or accrual) controls the timing for reporting unstated
interest; interest is not included or deducted until a payment is made or
due. The computation of OID is discussed in Part V.B.3, supra.
C. Income Tax Implications for Seller
1. Recognition of Gain or Loss
An installment sale is a disposition of property in which one or
more payments are to be received after the year of the disposition.382
Under § 453(a), “income from an installment sale” is usually reported
by “the installment method.” With the installment method, gross profit
is determined by subtracting the seller’s adjusted basis from the selling
price. The gross profit is then divided by the selling price (less any
“qualifying indebtedness” assumed or taken subject to by the buyer) to
arrive at the “gross profit ratio.”383 Each payment of principal received
by the seller is then multiplied by the gross profit ratio to determine the
amount of each payment allocable to the gain and to nontaxable return
of basis.384
Example: If property with an adjusted basis of $30 is sold for
$50, payable $10 at the closing and $10 annually for four years
thereafter, with interest at an adequate rate on the deferred
payments, the gross profit is $20 (contract price of $50 less adjusted basis of $30), resulting in a gross profit ratio of 40%
($20/$50). Thus, the seller has gain for the year of sale of $4
(40% of $10), and 40% of each later installment will be simi382
383
384

I.R.C. § 453(b)(1).
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15A.453-1(b)(2)(1)(i)-(iii).
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15A.453-1(b)(2)(i).
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larly includable in income when the installment is collected.385
If the selling price is less than the seller’s basis, a loss would be
realized, but would most likely be disallowed under § 267(a)
because the purchaser would likely be a member of the seller’s
family to whom § 267(b)(1) would apply, or a trust created by
the grantor to which § 267(b)(4) would apply.
2. Disposition of Installment Note
A potential tax issue of which practitioners should be aware is
caused when the selling family member disposes of an installment obligation. In that case the seller will be required to recognize all or part of
the deferred gain if the installment obligation “is satisfied at other than
its face value or distributed, sold, or otherwise disposed of” before the
buyer completes the payments.386
Giving an installment note back to the obligor is also a disposition,
and giving an installment obligation to a related party recognizes the
entire unpaid principal balance on the note at the time of the gift.387
Often a related party seller will forgive installment payments as they
come due. In such case the donor/seller will be taxed on both the interest and gain portions of the forgiven installment, even though no cash is
received. The forgiven gains are taxed as a partial disposition of the
obligation under § 453B(f), and the donor will recognize the previously
untaxed gain portion of the forgiven installment.
Example:388 Parent sells an asset to Child for $100,000. Parent’s adjusted basis at the time of the sale is $20,000. Child
gives Parent an installment note amortized by seven $20,000
annual payments and an eighth payment of $5,640, each payment including interest at the then-appropriate rate of 10%.
Parent forgives the first installment and Parent consents to gift
split. They intend to forgive each subsequent installment in
the same manner. The I.R.S. does not successfully challenge
the transaction. Child’s payments amortize the installment
debt as follows:

385
386
387
388

See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 87, ¶ 108.1, at 108-2.
I.R.C. § 453B(a).
I.R.C. § 453B(f).
See ZARITSKY & AUCUTT, supra note 62, § 12.02[4][a].
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Year

Payment

Principal

Interest

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

$20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
5,640

$10,000
11,000
12,100
13,310
14,640
16,106
17,716
5,128

$10,000
9,000
7,900
6,690
5,360
3,894
2,284
512

When Parent forgives the first $20,000 installment, Parent still must
report $10,000 of interest income and $8,000 of long-term capital gain
(the capital gain on the sale was $80,000 of the total $100,000 sales price,
so 80% of each principal payment is a capital gain). Assuming that Parent is in the 35% marginal income tax bracket, Parent must pay $4,700
of income tax in the first year, even though Parent receives no cash
(35% × $10,000 interest) + (15% × $8,000 capital gain).
Upon the death of the holder of the installment note, a bequest of
an installment obligation that arose during the seller’s lifetime to someone other than the obligor on the note does not trigger gain,389 but the
income is IRD — the recipient of the obligation recognizes gain on the
future payments to the extent the seller would have recognized it.390 A
bequest of an installment note to the obligor cancels the note (because a
merger of interest has occurred) and accelerates the incidence of taxable
IRD,391 causing the decedent’s estate to recognize the difference between the face amount and the decedent’s basis in the obligation.392
Such a bequest to an unrelated party, however, will cause the estate only
to recognize the difference between the note’s fair market value and the
decedent’s basis immediately before death, without regard to the actual
outstanding balance.
In addition, any cancellation of such a note is treated as a transfer
that triggers immediate gain on the note. If the decedent’s will specifically bequeaths the note to someone other than the obligor of the note,
389 I.R.C. § 453B(c). See generally Robert J. LeDuc, Avoiding Unintended Dispositions of Installment Obligations, 31 EST. PLAN. 211 (2004).
390 I.R.C. § 691(a)(4)-(5).
391 Id. While I.R.C. § 453B(c) contains a general exception for distributing a decedent’s installment note to beneficiaries of the estate that section applies “except as provided in section 691.” See § 453B(c). Section 691(a)(5)(A)(i) provides that a transfer by
the estate of a decedent’s installment note to the obligor of the note will trigger recognition of gain on the note. I.R.C. § 691(a)(5).
392 I.R.C. § 691(a)(4)(A). If the obligor is related to the decedent, within the meaning of I.R.C. § 453(f)(1), the amount of gain triggered by the disposition will be based on
the full-face amount of the note instead of just the fair market value of the note, if the
fair market value is lower. I.R.C. § 691(a)(5)(A)(iii), 691(a)(5)(B).
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the gain should not be triggered to the estate. If the estate elects to
make a non-pro rata distribution of the assets pursuant to authority in
the will or state law, and if the executor elects to distribute an installment note to someone other than the obligor, it is not clear whether
recognition of the gain to the estate will be avoided. The I.R.S. might
conceivably take the position that there has been an indirect distribution
of the note to the obligor.393
A cancellation of a note at death, or a bequest of an installment
note to the obligor, will trigger recognition of inherent gain on the note
to the estate. However, the triggering transfer and the related reporting
of gain does not occur until the earliest of (1) the executor’s assent to
the distribution of the note under state law, (2) the actual cancellation of
the note by the executor, (3) upon the note becoming unenforceable
due to the applicable statute of limitations or other state law, or
(4) upon termination of the estate.394 For example, if an installment
note passes by the residuary clause to the decedent’s child, the accelerated gain is reported by the estate in the year in which the note is actually distributed to the child.395
If the estate made the sale after the decedent’s death, a transfer of
an installment obligation would generally cause the transferor immediately to recognize any remaining gain which has been deferred by the
installment reporting method.396 Of course, in many situations in which
the estate sells an asset for an installment note, there should be little
gain to recognize upon a disposition of the installment obligation due to
the step-up in basis of the asset at death. If an estate asset is to be sold
that has substantial appreciation above its stepped-up basis, consider
distributing the asset to a beneficiary and allowing the beneficiary to
make the installment sale.
3. Sale by Related Buyer
Additional tax issues arise if the party purchasing property using an
installment note sells that property. Under § 453(e), the related buyer’s
sale of the purchased asset within two years of the date of the purchase
393 See PLR 8806048 (Nov. 17, 1987). See generally Jerome M. Hesch, Dispositions
of Installment Obligations by Gift or Bequest, 16 TAX MGMT. EST., GIFTS & TR. J. 137
(1991).
394 TAM 8552007 (Sept. 18, 1985).
395 PLR 8806048.
396 I.R.C. § 453B(a) (the exception under I.R.C. § 435B(c) for the disposition of an
installment obligation at death does not help because it applies only to installment obligations passing from a decedent, rather than installment notes arising after the decedent’s
death); See also Rev. Rul. 55-159, 1955-1 C.B. 391.
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is treated as a disposition by the original seller of the obligation.397
Thus, an intra-family installment sale imposes a risk on the seller that
the buyer will take some action that causes the seller’s tax on the deferred gain to be accelerated.
Example:398 Parent sells a building to Child for $100,000. Parent’s adjusted basis at the time of the sale is $20,000. Child
gives Parent an installment note amortized by seven $20,000
annual payments and an eighth payment of $5,640, each payment including interest at the then-appropriate rate of 10%.
One year (and one payment) after buying the building, Child
resells it for $125,000. Parent is deemed to have received a
complete payment of Child’s installment note and must recognize the previously unrecognized $70,000 gain on the sale
($80,000 total gain on the sale less $10,000 gain recognized on
the first installment payment). Assuming that Parent is in the
15% capital gains tax bracket, this produces a $10,500 capital
gains tax (15% × $70,000 = $10,500).
A related buyer need not resell the purchased assets to create a
problem for the seller. If the buyer’s “disposition” is something other
than a sale or exchange, the amount the seller is deemed to have received is the fair market value of the asset at the time of the second
disposition.399 Certain transactions, including the transmission of the
asset at death, are not acceleration events under this rule, but gifts, notably, are dispositions.400
XII. INSTALLMENT SALES

TO

GRANTOR TRUSTS

A. Description
A very effective method of freezing an individual’s estate for federal estate tax purposes is to convert the appreciating assets into a fixedyield, non-appreciating asset through an installment sale to a family
member.401 The traditional disadvantage of an installment sale is that
397 I.R.C. § 453(e). For this purpose, a related buyer includes the seller’s spouse,
child, grandchild, or parent, or a related trust, estate, partnership, or corporation. See
generally I.R.C. § 453(f)(1). The seller’s brother, sister, stepbrother, stepsister, aunt, uncle, or relative by marriage (other than the seller’s spouse) is not a related party. Id.
398 See ZARITSKY & AUCUTT, supra note 62, § 12.02[2].
399 I.R.C. § 453(e)(4).
400 I.R.C. § 453(e)(6).
401 See Michael D. Mulligan, Sale to Defective Grantor Trust: An Alternative to a
GRAT, EST. PLAN. 3-10 (Jan. 1996), for an excellent discussion of the issues involved
with sales to grantor trusts; See also Louis A. Mezzullo, Freezing Techniques: Installment
Sales to Grantor Trusts, 14 PROB. & PROP. 16, 17-23 (2000); AUCUTT, supra note 269, at
617-681.
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the donor has to recognize a substantial income tax gain as the installment payments are made. The gains would typically be taxed at 15%
(without considering state income taxes), and the interest would be
taxed at ordinary income tax rates. If the sale is made to a trust that is
treated as a grantor trust for income tax purposes, but which will not be
included in the settlor’s estate for federal estate tax purposes, the estate
freezing advantage can be achieved without the income tax costs usually
associated with a sale. In addition, care must be taken to select a “defect” that would cause the grantor to be treated as the “owner” of trust
income as to both ordinary income and capital gains.
There is a trade-off in the fact that the assets transferred in the sale
will have carryover basis; however, if the low basis assets are purchased
by the grantor prior to death, this loss of basis step-up would be
avoided. The steps of planning an installment sale to a grantor trust are
briefly outlined below.
1. Create and Fund Grantor Trust
The individual should create a trust that is treated as a grantor trust
for federal income tax purposes (meaning that the grantor is the owner
of the trust for income tax purposes). The trust will be structured as a
grantor trust for income tax purposes, but will be structured so that the
grantor is not deemed to own the trust for estate tax purposes.402 This
type of trust (which is treated as owned by the grantor for income but
not estate tax purposes) is sometimes called a “defective trust”.
The grantor trust should be funded (or “seeded”) with meaningful
assets prior to a sale.403 There is lore that the value of equity inside the
grantor trust must be 10% of the total value in order for the sale to be
respected. In PLR 9535026,404 the I.R.S. required the applicants to contribute trust equity of at least 10% of the installment purchase price in
order to avoid association status for income tax purposes and to have
the trust be treated as a trust. Various planners have suggested that is
not required absolutely, and some respected national speakers said that
the equity amount could be as low as 1% — depending on the situa402 See Stephen R. Akers, Jonathan G. Blattmachr & F. Ladson Boyle, Creating Intentional Grantor Trusts, 44 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 207 (2009), for a detailed discussion of ways to structure the trust so that it is a grantor trust as to both income and
principal; Howard M. Zaritsky, Open Issues and Close Calls—Using Grantor Trusts in
Modern Estate Planning, 43 U. MIAMI HECKERLING INST. ON EST. PLAN. ch. 3 (2009);
Amy E. Heller, Grantor Trusts: Take Nothing For Granted, 46 U. MIAMI HECKERLING
INST. ON EST. PLAN. (Special Session Materials) (2012).
403 See Shenkman, supra note 326, at 3, for an outstanding discussion of the various
issues regarding the need for seeding of the trust prior to a sale and of the implications of
using guarantees.
404 PLR 9535026 (Sept. 1, 1995).
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tion.405 One planner (who considers himself a conservative planner) has
used less than 10% sometimes, and on occasions he is concerned
whether 10% is enough. The legal issue is whether there is debt or equity. (For example, if it is debt, it is permissible to use the AFR as the
interest rate.) The issue is whether there is comfort that the “debt” will
be repaid.
McDermott v. Commissioner406 involved a 19.6 to 1 debt equity ratio (which translates to a 5.6% equity amount). The I.R.S. acquiesced in
McDermott. One attorney uses that as a base point – he never uses less
than 5.6% seeding. On the other hand, there is a published ruling involving a 20% contribution, and the I.R.S. ruled it was debt.407 (That
was not a sale to grantor trust situation.) In Petter v. Commissioner,408
footnote 8 notes that the estate tax attorney involved in structuring the
transaction “said he believed there was a rule of thumb that a trust capitalized with a gift of at least 10% of its assets would be viewed by the
I.R.S. as a legitimate, arm’s length purchaser in the later sale.” At least
this is a reference to the 10% rule of thumb in a reported case.
Under the 10% rule of thumb, the trust should hold approximately
10% in value of the eventual trust assets after a purchase occurs in step
2. As an example, if a $900,000 asset will be sold to the trust, the settlor
might make a gift of $100,000 to the trust. After the trust purchases the
asset, it would own assets of $1,000,000, and it would have a net worth of
$100,000, or 10% of the total trust assets. (This is analogous to the 10%
cushion requirement in § 2701(a)(4).) Stated differently, if the 10%
seeding is based on analogy to the initial seeding, the gift should be
11.1% of the amount of the later sale to the trust (if values remain constant.) If the grantor transfers $11.10 to the trust, and later sells an asset
for a $100.00 note, the $11.10 “seeding” would be 10% of the total
$111.10 assets in the trust following the sale. That means there would be
a 9:1 debt equity ratio.
In determining whether the note represents debt or equity, one
must consider a variety of factors, including the nature (and volatility)
of assets in the trust, and the risk profile of the clients. If there is experience of assets actually increasing in value after sales to the trust and
payments actually being made, when the next grantor trust sale is considered, the grantor would seem to have good reason to be more comfortable using a lower equity cushion. Some commentators have
405 See Richard A. Oshins, Robert G. Alexander, & Kristen E. Simmons, The Beneficiary Defective Inheritor’s Trust (“BDIT”), OSHINS.COM (2008), http://www.oshins.com/
images/BDIT_article.pdf
406 13 T.C. 468 (1949), acq. 1950-1 C.B. 3
407 Id.
408 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 534 (2009).
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suggested that initial seeding should not be required as long as the taxpayer can demonstrate that the purchaser will have access to the necessary funds to meet its obligations as they become due.409 Even those
authors, however, observe that the § 2036 issue is an intensely factual
one, and that “only those who are willing to take substantial risks should
use a trust with no other significant assets.”410 The seed money can be
accomplished either through gifts to the trust, or through transfers to
the trust from other vehicles, such as a GRAT.
Most planners do not use joint trusts with both spouses as grantors.
There is the theoretical concern of whether one spouse might be treated
as selling the assets, which are eventually sold to the trust, to the portion
of the trust treated as a grantor trust as to the spouse. If so, there would
be no gain recognition on the sale (under § 1041), but interest on the
note would be taxable.411 Furthermore, there is significant uncertainty
regarding the effect of a subsequent divorce or death of a spouse.
Can “Seeding” Be Provided by Guarantees? A guarantee by a
beneficiary or a third party may possibly provide the appropriate seeding, sufficient to give the note economic viability. Beware that if the
trust does not pay a fair price for the guarantee, the person giving the
guaranty may be treated as making an indirect contribution to the trust,
which might possibly result in the trust not being treated as owned
wholly by the original grantor.412
Of particular concern is PLR 9113009.413 This letter ruling initially
raised concerns about the gift tax effects of loan guaranties made by the
guarantor’s children. While PLR 9113009 was withdrawn by PLR
9409018,414 which addressed only other issues requested in the original
ruling request without mention of gift tax issues, the earlier ruling nevertheless provides the I.R.S.’s analysis of why gift guaranties may include gift elements. The I.R.S. reasoned generally that the guaranty
confers an economic benefit from date it is given and the promisor of a
legally enforceable promise for less than adequate and full consideration
makes a completed gift on the date the promise is binding and determinable in value rather than when the promised payment is actually made.
The I.R.S.’s full analysis of this issue in PLR 9113009 is quoted in Part
X.E, supra.
Some commentators argue, however, that a beneficiary who guarantees an indebtedness of the trust is not making a gift until such time, if
409
410
411
412
413
414

Hesch & Manning, Beyond the Basic Freeze, supra note 308, ¶ 1601.1.
Hesch & Manning, Beyond the Basic Freeze, supra note 308, ¶ 1601.1.
See Gibbs v. Comm’r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2669 (1997).
See supra note 326 and accompanying text.
PLR 9113009 (Mar. 29, 1991).
PLR 9409018 (Mar. 4, 1994).
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at all, that the guarantor must “make good” on the guarantee. (Otherwise, the beneficiary would be treated as making a gift to him or herself.)415 If the beneficiary has a real interest in the trust, and the
beneficiary gives a guarantee to protect his or her own investment, the
guarantee arguably is not a gift to the trust. The leading case is Bradford v. Commissioner,416 in which the I.R.S. acquiesced. (If the beneficiary is making a gift to the trust, the beneficiary is a grantor to that
extent, and the trust is no longer a wholly grantor trust as to the original
grantor, so there could be bad income tax consequences to the grantor
of the trust as well as gift tax consequences to the person giving the
guaranty.)417 The best analogy supporting that the beneficiary does not
make a gift is in the life insurance area. There are various cases and
acquiescences that if a beneficiary pays premiums to maintain the policy
that is owned by a trust, that is not a gift to the trust.418 Indeed, that is
an actual transfer, not just a guarantee. The timing and amount of the
gift from a beneficiary-guarantee, if any, is unclear.
Probably the closest commercial analogy is a bank’s charge for
a letter of credit. Generally, the bank makes an annual or
more frequent charge for such a letter. By analogy, there will
be an annual gift, probably in the range of one to two percent
of the amount guaranteed, so long as the guarantee is outstanding. However, it may also be argued that a much larger,
one-time taxable gift will occur at the inception of the guarantee, especially if the loan precludes prepayment. [Citing Rev.
Rul. 94-25, 1994-1 C.B. 191.] The final possibility is that no gift
will occur until a beneficiary actually has to make a payment
under the guarantee. In this event, the measure of the gift will
presumably be the amount of the payment under the guarantee. [Citing Bradford v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 1059 (1960).]
It is by no means a given that a guarantee by a beneficiary is a
gift. Instead, the clear weight of authority seems to support the
absence of any gift by the beneficiaries to the trust, at
least where the guarantee is a bona fide obligation of the beneficiary making the guarantee, and where the beneficiary has
sufficient net worth to make good on the guarantee in the
event of a default by the trust.419
415

See Hatcher & Manigault, supra note 322.
34 T.C. 1059 (1960).
417 Id.
418 See, e.g., Pleet v. Comm’r, 17 T.C. 77 (1951).
419 Milford B. Hatcher, Jr., Planning for Existing FLPs, 35 U. MIAMI HECKERLING
INST. ON EST. PLAN. ¶ 302.3.B.2 (2001). See Hatcher & Manigault, supra note 322. The
author set forth a detailed rebuttal of a taxable gift being imputed by reason of a bona
416
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If the planner is squeamish about guarantees by beneficiaries, the
trustee could pay an annual fee to the beneficiary in return for the guarantee.420 Some planners report using a fee between 1-2%. Other planners suggest that the fee would typically be higher (about 3%). The 12% (or lower) fee for a typical bank letter of credit is based on having a
pre-existing relationship with a person who has substantial assets. The
difficulty with paying a guaranty fee is determining the correct amount
of the fee. There may be a gift if no fee or if an insufficient fee is paid
for the guarantee. (Some planners have reported using Empire Financial to value these guaranties.) One planning alternative is to file a nontransfer gift tax return reporting the guarantee transaction.
Thus, in summary, the safest course is to pay for the guarantee and
the safer alternative if that is not done is to have the guarantee be made
by a beneficiary rather than a third party.
2. Sale for Installment Note; Appropriate Interest Rate
The individual will sell property to the grantor trust in return for an
installment note for the full value of the property (taking into account
appropriate valuation discounts). The note is typically secured by the
sold asset, but it is a full recourse note. The note is often structured to
provide interest-only annual payments with a balloon payment at the
end of the note term. The interest is typically structured to be equal to
the § 7872 rate. Often a longer term note is used to take advantage of
the current extremely low AFRs for a number of years. Typically, the
note would permit prepayment of the note at any time without penalty.
The note should be shorter than the seller’s life expectancy in order to
minimize risks that the I.R.S. would attempt to apply § 2036 to the assets transferred in return for the note payments.
fide, pro rata guarantee by a beneficiary of a defective grantor trust. Another favorable
factor in avoiding a gift by a beneficiary-guaranty is where the upside potential from the
beneficial interest of the guarantor-beneficiary is sufficient to warrant that guarantorbeneficiary take the downside risk posed by the guarantee.
420 Unfortunately, there is no safe harbor for the amount to be paid for the guarantee. The safe harbor AFR rate under § 1274 applies for intra-family loans, but there is no
similar safe harbor for a guarantee fee. See generally Shenkman, supra note 326, for an
excellent discussion of various approaches in determining appropriate fee, saying that
some appraisers suggest guarantee fees in the range of 5% to 6%+ because of the nature
of the underlying assets supporting the guarantee; Richard Oshins, LEVERAGED GIFTING
TRANSACTIONS IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 10 (2006) (“We take the conservative position
and pay for the guarantee”); Hatcher, Planning for Existing FLPs, supra note 419, ¶
302.3.B.2 (discussing if the I.R.S. succeeds in treating guaranty as gift, by analogy to bank
charge for a line of credit, annual gift would probably in the range of 1-2%, but a larger,
one-time gift may occur at the inception of the guarantee, especially if the loan precludes
prepayment).
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Many planners are using long term notes (over 9 years) in light of
the extremely low long term rate because the interest rate is still relatively low; but they use a note term shorter than the seller’s life expectancy. (The buyer could prepay the note if desired, but there would be
the flexibility to use the low long term rate over the longer period.)
Some planners structure the transaction to leave time between the time
of the “seed” gift and the subsequent sale, by analogy to the “real economic risk of a change in value” analysis in Holman v. Commissioner.421
Pierre v. Commissioner422 applied a step transaction analysis to aggregate the gift and sale portions of LLC interests that were transferred
within 12 days of each other for valuation purposes. A possible concern
(though the I.R.S. has not made this argument in any reported case) is
that the gift and sale may be aggregated and treated as a single transaction for purposes of applying § 2036, which would mean that the sale
portion does not qualify for the bona fide sale for full consideration exception in § 2036.423
Some planners have suggested taking the position that the lowest
AFR in the month of a sale or the prior two months can be used in a
sale to defective trust situation, relying on § 1274(d). Section 1274(d)
says that for any sale or exchange, the lowest AFR for the month of the
sale or the prior two months can be used. However, relying on § 1274(d)
is problematic for a sale to a defective trust — because such a transaction, which is a “non-event” for income tax purposes, may not constitute
a “sale or exchange” for purposes of § 1274(d). The apparently unqualified incorporation of § 1274(d) in § 7872(f)(2) arguably gives some credibility to this technique. However, relying on a feature that depends on
the existence of a “sale” as that word is used in § 1274(d)(2) [in the
income tax subtitle] in the context of a transaction that is intended not
to be a “sale” for income tax purposes seems unwise.
421 130 T.C. 170 (2008) (avoiding step transaction argument with respect to funding
and gifts of interests in a family limited partnership); See also Heckerman v. United
States, 104 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-5551 (W.D. Wash. 2009) (holding step transaction doctrine
applied for funding and gift of LLC interest on same day). While the Ninth Circuit in
Linton v. United States, 630 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir. 2011) held that the step transaction doctrine did not apply to treat a donor as giving assets in an LLC rather than (discounted)
interests in the LLC where the funding and transfers of interests occurred on the same
day, the court observed that a timing test does apply under Holman and remanded the
case for consideration under that test. Compare Linton, 630 F.3d 1211, with Holman, 130
T.C. 170. Some respected planners suggest leaving as long as possible between the
“seed” gift and the subsequent sale (e.g., 30, 60, 90 days or even wait until the following
taxable year).
422 99 T.C.M. (CCH) 1436 (2010) (finding lack of control discount reduced from 10%
to 8% because of aggregating gift and sale portions to treat the aggregate 50% LLC
interests transferred to each of two separate trusts).
423 See infra Part XII.I.
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Most planners use the applicable federal rate, under the auspices of
§ 7872, as the interest rate on notes for intra-family installment sales.
Section 7872 addresses the gift tax effects of “below-market” loans, and
§ 7872(f)(1) defines “present value” with reference to the “applicable
Federal rate.” Using § 7872 rates for sales is supported by the position
of the I.R.S. in a Tax Court case and by a subsequent Tax Court case and
in several private rulings,424 as discussed in Part XI.A, supra.
3. Operation During Term of Note
Hopefully the trust will have sufficient cash to make the interest
payments on the note. If not, the trust could distribute in-kind assets of
the trust in satisfaction of the interest payments. Payment of the interest, whether in cash or with appreciated property, should not generate
any gain to the trust or to the grantor, because the grantor is deemed to
be the owner of the trust for income tax purposes in any event.
Because the trust is a grantor trust, the grantor will owe income
taxes with respect to income earned by the trust. Payment of those income taxes by the grantor is not an additional gift to the trust.425 To the
extent that the entity owned by the trust is making distributions to assist
the owners in making income tax payments, the cash distributions to the
trust could be used by the trust to make note payments to the grantor/
seller, so that the grantor/seller will have sufficient cash to make the
income tax payments.
Consider having the seller elect out of installment reporting. The
theory is that the gain would then be recognized, if at all, in the first
year, but there should be no income recognition in that year.426 Death
during a subsequent year of the note arguably would be a non-event for
tax purposes. Some (probably most) commentators believe that installment reporting is not even available for sales to a grantor trust, because
the transaction is a non-event for income tax purposes.
4. Pay Note During Seller’s Lifetime
Plan to repay the note entirely during the seller’s lifetime. Income
tax effects may result if the note has not been paid fully by the time of
the seller’s death. Income tax issues with having unpaid note payments
due at the grantor’s death and planning alternatives to avoid those issues are discussed in Part XII.E, infra. The installment note could be
424 Frazee v. Comm’r, 98 T.C. 554 (1992) (I.R.S. position was to apply § 7872); Estate
of True v. Comm’r, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 27 (2001); PLR 9535026 (Sept. 1, 1995); PLR
9408018 (Feb. 25, 1994).
425 Rev. Rul. 04-64, 2004-2 C.B. 7.
426 See Rev. Rul. 85-15, 1985-1 C.B. 132; see also Installment Sales, I.R.S. Pub. 537, at
4 (Dec. 4, 2012).
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structured as a self-canceling installment note (“SCIN”) that is payable
until the expiration of the stated term of the note or until the maker’s
death, whichever first occurs. SCIN transfers are discussed further in
Part XIII, infra.427
B. Best Practices
In the context of sales of closely held business interests, a number
of best practices can be identified. For example, one might, as a starting
point, create voting and non-voting units. Perhaps 999 non-voting
shares would be created for every 1 voting share. Non-voting shares can
be transferred without fear of the client losing control of the business.
Second, consider a gift of 10% and sale of 90%, leaving 1/9 ratio of
equity to debt. Third, note that the installment sale allows tremendous
leverage. For example, the client could make a gift of $5 million and
then sell $45 million worth of closely held business interests. Fourth,
remember that cash from the investment assets or other assets could be
used to make the gift to fund the initial equity of the trust. Fifth, consider making the gift to the trust a significant time before the sale (i.e.,
30, 60 or 90 days, or even the prior taxable year).428 Ideally, the initial
gift to the trust will be cash so that the cash is available to help fund
note payments. Sixth, note that the key of using the installment sale is
to get an asset into the trust that has cash flow. For example, if the
business does not have cash flow, real estate that is used by the business
but that is leased by the business from the business owner could be
transferred to the trust because it does have cash flow. Seventh, remember that cash flow from the business may be sufficient to assist making
payments on the promissory note. Consider modeling anticipated cash
flow from the business in structuring the note.
For pass-through entities, cash distributed from the entity to owners
so they can pay income taxes on the pass-through income will be distributed partly to the grantor trust as the owner of its interest in the entity;
that cash can be used by the trust to make note payments; the grantor
could use that cash to pay the income tax. This “tax distribution cash
flow” may be enough to fund a substantial part of the note payments.
427 See Edward P. Wojnaroski, Private Annuities and Self-Canceling Notes, EST. TAX
PORT. (BNA) 805-3d (2010) for excellent discussions of the use of notes with self-cancelling features, including how to value such notes; Hesch & Manning, Beyond the Basic
Freeze, supra note 308, ¶ 1601.3; Hayes, supra note 104, at 21, 33. A key advantage of
SCINs is that the cancellation feature removes any remaining value on the note from the
seller’s gross estate for estate tax purposes. However, any remaining gain must be reported on the estate’s fiduciary income tax return, at least under the position of the
Eighth Circuit. Estate of Frane v. Comm’r, 998 F.2d 567 (8th Cir. 1993).
428 See the discussion of the Holman, Heckerman, Linton, and Pierre cases supra in
Part XII.A.2.
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The goal is to be able to pay off the note during the seller’s lifetime.
Lack of control and lack of marketability discounts would apply, based
on the asset that is sold.
In terms of avoiding §§ 2036 and 2038 arguments, best practices include not making entity distributions based on the timing and amount of
note payments (make distributions at different times than when note
payments are due and in different amounts than the note payments). In
addition, consider using a defined value clause to protect against gift
consequences of the gift and sale of hard-to-value assets to the trust. (If
a charitable entity is used for the “excess value,” typically a donor advised fund from a Communities Foundation is used. It should act independently in evaluating the values. It should hire an appraiser to review
the appraisal secured by the family. The donor advised fund will want
to know an exit strategy for being able to sell any business interest that
it acquires. An advantage of using a donor advised fund as compared to
a private foundation is that it is not subject to the self-dealing prohibition, so the family is able to repurchase the business interest.)
Note that interest rates are very low. For example, in December
2013 a nine-year note would have an interest rate of 1.65%.429 If there
is a 30% discount, effectively the interest rate as compared to the underlying asset value is about 1.16%, so if the business has earnings/growth
above that, there is a wealth shift each year. This approach takes advantage of opportunities that could be eliminated in the future, such as discounts, current large gift and GST exemption, and extremely low
current interest rates.
C. Basic Estate Tax Effects
The installment note (including any accumulated interest) will be
included in the grantor/seller’s estate. There may be the possibility of
discounting the note if the interest rate and other factors surrounding
the note cause it to be worth less than face value.430 However, the asset
that was sold to the trust will not be includible in the grantor’s estate,
regardless how long the grantor/seller survives. (There is some risk of
estate inclusion if the note is not recognized as equity and if the grantor
is deemed to have retained an interest in the underlying assets. The risk
is exacerbated if a thinly capitalized trust is used – less than 10% equity.)431 The grantor’s payment of income taxes on income of the grantor trust further decreases the grantor’s estate that remains at the
grantor’s death for estate tax purposes.
429

Rev. Rul. 2013-26, 2013-50 I.R.B. 628.
See supra Part VIII (regarding the possibility of discounting notes for gift and
estate tax valuation purposes).
431 See infra Part XII.H.
430

\\jciprod01\productn\A\ACT\38-2-3\ACT2301.txt

146

unknown

ACTEC LAW JOURNAL

Seq: 96

7-FEB-14

13:19

[Vol. 38:51

Note that a new question was added to Form 706432 in October
2006 in Part 4, Question 13e. Question 13a asks “Were there in existence at the time of the decedent’s death any trusts created by the decedent during his or her lifetime?” Question 13b asks: “Were there in
existence at the time of the decedent’s death any trusts not created by
the decedent under which the decedent possessed any power, beneficial
interest or trusteeship?” Question 13e now asks: “Did decedent at any
time during his or her lifetime transfer or sell an interest in a partnership, limited liability company, or closely held corporation to a trust described in question 13a or 13b?”433 This question underscores the
desirability of reporting sales of discounted interests in closely-held entities on a gift tax return.434 Eventually the I.R.S. will learn about this
transaction. This Form 706 question applies retroactively to all transfers
made by decedents filing the Form 706. The question only applies to
transfers to trusts and not to transfers to individuals.
D. Basic Gift Tax Effects
The grantor should “seed” the trust with approximately 10% of the
overall value to be transferred to the trust by a combination of gift and
sale. This could be accomplished with an outright gift when the grantor
trust is created. Alternatively, the grantor trust could receive the remaining amount in a GRAT at the termination of the GRAT to provide
seeding for a further installment sale. The sale to the trust will not be
treated as a gift (assuming the values are correct, and assuming that
there is sufficient equity in the trust to support valuing the note at its full
432 Dep’t of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Serv., United States Estate (and Generation-Skipping Transfer) Tax Return, Form 706, 3 (Rev. Aug. 2012) available at http://
www.irs.gov/file_source/pub/irs-pdf/f706.pdf.
433 Interestingly, there seems to be a way around the question. The obvious way
around this question, to stay “under the radar screen,” would be to create the grantor
trust, sell to the grantor trust, have the grantor trust pay off the note while it is still a
grantor trust (so there is no income recognition) then terminate the trust before the decedent dies. The trust would not be described in Question 13a or b, so the answer to Question 13e would be no. That would seem to work if the client wants the trust to terminate
during his or her lifetime. (But that is not practical in many situations.) Query whether
having the trustee “decant” the assets to a new trust created by the trustee under a decanting power would avoid answering Question 13a in the affirmative? Be careful in
looking for technical ways to avoid this question. If the planner is “too clever,” the I.R.S.
may say the planner is being misleading and allege a Circular 230 violation. Furthermore, even if the planner could avoid the current question, the I.R.S. can change the
form in the future in reaction to clever plans to avoid the question.
434 See infra Part XII.I for further discussion of whether to report sales on gift tax
returns.
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face value.) There is no clear authority for using a valuation adjustment
clause as exists under the regulations for GRATs.435
E. Basic Income Tax Effects
The initial sale to the trust does not cause immediate gain recognition, because the grantor is treated as the owner of the trust for income
tax purposes.436 In addition, because the grantor is treated as the owner
of the trust, interest payments from the trust to the grantor should also
be a non-event for income tax purposes. (On the other hand, if there
are sales between spouses, while there is no gain recognition on the sale
under § 1041, interest payments would constitute taxable income.)437
In order to avoid gain recognition on a sale to a grantor trust, the
grantor must be treated as wholly owning the assets of the trust. Theoretically, this may be endangered if the trust contains a Crummey withdrawal clause. However, recent private letter rulings reconfirm the
I.R.S.’s position that using a Crummey clause does not endanger the
grantor trust status as to the original grantor.438
The grantor will be liable for ongoing income taxes for the trust
income. This can further reduce the grantor’s estate for estate tax pur435

Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-3(b)(1)(ii)(B).
See Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(c) ex.5; Rev. Rul. 85-13, 1985-1 C.B. 184 (to the extent
the grantor is treated as the owner of the trust, the trust will not be recognized as a
separate taxpayer capable of entering into a sales transaction with the grantor). In Rev.
Rul. 85-13, 1985-1 C.B. 184, the I.R.S. indicated that it would not follow Rothstein v.
United States, 735 F.2d 704 (2nd Cir. 1984) to the extent it would require a different
result. See also Rev. Rul. 2007-13, 2007-1 C.B. 684 (determining that in Situation 1 of the
ruling, that the sale of a policy from one “wholly-owned” grantor trust to another
“wholly-owned” grantor trust is not a transfer at all for income tax purposes because the
grantor is treated as the owner of the assets of both trusts); Rev. Rul. 92-84, 1992-2 C.B.
216 (finding a gain or loss on the sale of an asset by QSST, which is a grantor trust, is
treated as a gain or loss of the grantor or other person treated as the owner under the
grantor trust rules and not of the trust, even if the gain or loss is allocable to corpus
rather than to income).
437 See Gibbs v. Comm’r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2669 (1996).
438 PLR 200729005 (July 20, 2007); PLRs 200729007-200729011 (July 20, 2007); PLRs
200729013-200729016 (July 20, 2007); PLR 200730011 (July 27, 2007); PLR 201235006
(August 31, 2012). Even if the trust does continue as a grantor trust as to the original
grantor, it is not clear what happens at the grantor’s death and whether the trust becomes
a grantor trust as to the Crummey beneficiary. See PLR 9321050 (May 28, 1993), rev’g,
PLR 9026036 (June 29, 1990) (the I.R.S. initially ruled that the beneficiary would be
treated as the owner. Several years later, the I.R.S. revoked that position and said the
beneficiary would not be treated as the owner without further discussion). At the grantor’s death, the trust may become a grantor trust as to the beneficiary, creating an extremely advantageous planning vehicle if the beneficiary also wishes to maximize transfer
planning opportunities while still remaining a potential discretionary beneficiary of the
trust. See PLR 9321050.
436
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poses and allow the trust to grow faster. However, the grantor must be
willing to accept this liability. Giving someone the discretion to reimburse the grantor for paying income taxes of the trust may be an alternative.439 (An additional possible alternative for the sale to grantor trust
strategy is that if the grantor’s spouse is a discretionary beneficiary of
the trust, the trust could make a distribution to the spouse that would be
sufficient to pay the income taxes that would be payable on the joint
return of the grantor and the grantor’s spouse.)
If the seller dies before the note is paid off, the I.R.S. may argue
that gain recognition is triggered at the client’s death. The better view
would seem to be that gain recognition is deferred under § 453 until the
obligation is satisfied after the seller’s death. The recipient of installment payments would treat the payments as income in respect of decedent. Presumably, the trustee would increase the trust’s basis in a
portion of the business interest to reflect any gain actually recognized.
The income tax effect on the trust if the grantor dies before the note is
paid in full has been hotly debated among commentators.440 A concern
439 Rev. Rul. 2004-64, 2004-2 C.B. 7 held that the grantor’s payment of income taxes
attributable to a grantor trust is not treated as a gift to the trust beneficiaries (which
applies to Situation 1). Furthermore, the Ruling provides that a mandatory tax reimbursement clause would not have any gift consequences, but would cause “the full value
of the Trust’s assets” at the grantor’s death to be included in the grantor’s gross estate
under § 2036(a)(1) because the grantor would have retained the right to have the trust
assets be used to discharge the grantor’s legal obligation (which applies to Situation 2).
Id. at 9. However, the statement that the “full value of the trust assets” would be includible may overstate the issue. Courts might limit the amount includible in the estate to the
maximum amount that might possibly be used for the grantor’s benefit at his or her
death. Observe that if a reimbursement is mandatory and it is not paid, the grantor will
be treated as making a gift. Id. In addition, giving the trustee the discretion to reimburse
the grantor for income taxes attributable to the grantor trust may risk estate inclusion if
there were an understanding or pre-existing arrangement between the trustee and the
grantor regarding reimbursement, or if the grantor could remove the trustee and appoint
himself as successor trustee, or if such discretion permitted the grantor’s creditors to
reach the trust under applicable state law (which applies to Situation 3). Id. The Ruling
provides that the I.R.S. will not apply the estate tax holding in Situation 2 adversely to a
grantor’s estate with respect to any trust created before October 4, 2004. Id. Some planners suggest allowing a third person to authorize the trustee to reimburse or to allow an
independent trustee to reimburse the grantor for payment of income taxes attributable to
the trust. Other planners suggest drafting the reimbursement clause to provide that the
discretionary reimbursement power does not exist to the extent that it exposes the trust
assets to claims of the grantor’s creditors. Some states are amending their laws to provide that the mere existence of a discretionary power by the trustee to reimburse the
grantor for income taxes attributable to the trust will not give creditors access to the
trust. See, e.g., TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.035(d) (West 2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 564-B:5-505(a)(2) (B) (2013). Where a discretionary reimbursement provision is used,
the planner should select a state which has such a law to govern the trust.
440 Compare Carol A. Cantrell, Gain is Realized at Death, TR. & EST., Feb. 2010, at
21-22 (grantor is treated as having transferred property to the trust and a gain is realized

\\jciprod01\productn\A\ACT\38-2-3\ACT2301.txt

Fall/Winter 2012]

unknown

Seq: 99

INTRA-FAMILY LOANS

7-FEB-14

13:19

149

regarding the possibility of immediate recognition of income at death is
that if grantor trust status is terminated during the grantor’s life while
any part of the note is unpaid, the capital gain is accelerated and taxed
immediately.441 However, the result may be different following the
death of the grantor. One of the articles addressing this issue provides
the following arguments in its detailed analysis of why income should
not be realized as payments are made on the note after the grantor’s
death.442
First, the authors assert that no transfer to the trust occurs for income tax purposes until the grantor’s death (because transactions between the grantor and the trust are ignored for income tax purposes.)443
They note that there is no rule that treats a transfer at death as a realization event for income tax purposes, even if the transferred property is
subject to an encumbrance such as an unpaid installment note.444 However, the property does not receive a step up in basis because the property itself is not included in the decedent’s estate. Moreover, the note
itself is included in the decedent’s estate, and the authors argue that the
note should be entitled to a step up the basis.445 A step up in basis is
precluded only if the note constitutes income in respect to the decedent
(“IRD”) under § 691. They argue that the note should not be treated as
IRD because the existence, amount and character of IRD are determined as if “the decedent had lived and received such amount.”446 The
to the extent that the note balance exceeds the basis in the property), and Deborah D.
Dunn & David A. Handler, Tax Consequences of Outstanding Trust Liabilities When
Grantor Status Terminates, 95 J. TAX’N 49 (2001) (if a trust has outstanding liabilities
upon termination of grantor trust status, gain will be recognized by the grantor to the
extent the amount of those liabilities exceeds the grantor’s basis in the assets deemed
transferred to the trust), with Mitchell M. Gans & Jonathan G. Blattmachr, No Gain at
Death, TR. & EST., Feb 2010, at 34 (no gain is recognized at death), and Elliot Manning &
Jerome M. Hesch, Deferred Payment Sales to Grantor Trusts, GRATs, and Net Gifts:
Income and Transfer Tax Elements, 24 TAX MGMT. EST., GIFTS & TR. J. 3, 21 (1999)
(neither the grantor-seller nor his estate recognize gain on death). See also Milford B.
Hatcher, Jr. & Edward M. Manigault, Using Beneficiary Guarantees in Defective Grantor
Trusts, 92 J. TAX’N 152, 162-64 (2000) (trust should not be entitled to any increase in the
basis of its assets and gain is deferred until trust sells respective assets); Jonathan G.
Blattmachr, Mitchell M. Gans & Hugh H. Jacobson, Income Tax Effects of Termination
of Grantor Trust Status by Reason of the Grantor’s Death, 97 J. TAX’N 149 (2002) (gain is
not recognized by the transferor in connection with a testamentary or lifetime gift).
441 Madorin v. Comm’r, 84 T.C. 667, 678 (1985) (holding trustee’s renunciation of
power to add charitable beneficiaries was a deemed disposition of trust assets and a realization event); Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(c) ex.5; Rev. Rul. 77-402, 1977-2 C.B. 222.
442 See Manning & Hesch, supra note 440, at 3.
443 Manning & Hesch, supra note 440, at 7.
444 See Rev. Rul. 73-183, 1973-1 C.B. 364.
445 Manning & Hesch, supra note 440, at 21.
446 I.R.C. § 691(a)(3).
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decedent would not have recognized income if the note were paid during life,447 so the note should not be IRD. This position is supported by
the provisions of § 691(a)(4) & (5), which provide rules for obligations
“reportable by the decedent on the installment method under section
453.”448 The installment sale to the grantor trust was a nonevent for
income tax purposes, and therefore there was nothing to report under
§ 453. This position does not contradict the policy behind § 691, because the income tax result is exactly the same as if the note had been
paid before the grantor’s death – no realization in either event. If the
unpaid portion of the note were subject to income tax following the
grantor’s death, double taxation would result. The sold property, which
is excluded from the grantor’s estate, does not receive a stepped-up basis — so ultimately there will be an income tax payable when that property is sold.
One possible planning approach if the grantor does not expect to
survive the note term is for the grantor to make a loan to the trust and
use the loan proceeds to pay the installment note before the grantor’s
death. (A step transaction argument presumably could be avoided by
having the trust borrow funds from someone other than the grantor to
be able to pay off the note.)
Some authors have suggested a strategy they identify as “basis
boosting.”449 If an individual sells assets to a grantor trust and the individual dies, most planners think gain should not be realized at death.
But the answer is unclear. The authors suggest contributing other property to the grantor trust with basis sufficient to eliminate gains. Example: An individual sells an asset with a basis of 10 for a note for 50. The
asset appreciates to 100 before the grantor dies. The potential gain
would be 50 minus 10 or 40 when the trust is no longer a grantor trust.
If the grantor contributes additional assets to the grantor trust with a
basis of 40, that basis could be applied and offset the gain. However, it
is not yet clear that this will work. The amount realized from the relief
of liability (50 in the example) might have to be allocated between the
two assets. If one must allocate the amount deemed realized between
the two assets, the gain would not be totally eliminated.
The result might be better if the two assets are contributed to a
partnership or LLC, which would require having another partner or
member to avoid being treated as a disregarded entity. There would
seem to be a stronger argument that there would be no apportionment
of the amount realized between the two classes of assets in that
situation.
447
448
449

Rev. Rul. 85-13, 1985-1 C.B. 184, 185.
I.R.C. § 691(a)(4)-(5).
Deborah V. Dunn & Lucy K. Park, Basis Boosting, TR. & EST., Feb. 2007, at 22.
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Chief Counsel Memo 200923024450 concluded that a conversion
from nongrantor to grantor trust status is not a taxable event (addressing what seems to be an abusive transaction). An interesting statement
in the CCA is relevant to the commonly asked question of whether
there is gain recognition on remaining note payments at the death of the
grantor if the grantor has sold assets to a grantor trust for a note. In
addressing the relevance of the authorities suggesting that a taxable
event occurs if the trust loses its grantor trust status during the grantor’s
lifetime, the CCA observed, “We would also note that the rule set forth
in these authorities is narrow, insofar as it only affects inter vivos lapses
of grantor trust status, not that caused by the death of the owner which is
generally not treated as an income tax event.”451
The basis of a gifted asset under § 1015 is the donor’s basis, except
that for loss purposes, the basis is limited to the asset’s fair market value
at the time of the gift. There is no clear answer as to whether the basis
of assets given to a grantor trust is limited to the asset’s fair market
value for loss purposes (if the donor’s basis exceeds the fair market
value). One commentator takes the position that the loss limitation
does not apply to gifts to a grantor trust.452
If a donor makes a gift to the grantor trust in order to “seed” an
installment sale, and if the donor has to pay gift tax with respect to the
initial gift, can the trust claim a basis adjustment under § 1015(d) for the
gift tax paid? There is no definitive authority as to whether the basis
adjustment is authorized, but there would seem to be a good-faith argument that the gift-tax paid basis adjustment should be permitted even
though the gift was to a grantor trust.
F. Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax Effects
Once the trust has been seeded, and GST exemption has been allocated to cover that gift, no further GST exemption need be allocated to
the trust with respect to the sale (assuming that it is for full value). A
potential risk, in extreme situations, is that if the sold asset is included in
the transferor’s estate under § 2036, no GST exemption could be allocated during the ETIP.

450

I.R.S. Chief Couns. Mem. 200923024 (June 5, 2009) (emphasis added).
Id.
452 Schneider, Determining the Income Tax Basis of Property Gratuitously Transferred to Grantor Trusts, AMER. BAR. ASSN. REAL PROP. TR. & EST. LAW SECTION
NEWSLETTER, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/rpte_
ereport/TE_Schneider.authcheckdam.pdf.
451
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G. Advantages of Sale to Grantor Trust
A sale to a grantor trust offers a number of advantages over a grantor retained annuity trust. For example, the estate freeze is completed
without the requirement for survival for a designated period. A corollary of this advantage is that the discount when selling a partial interest
is locked in as a result of the sale. For example, if a client owns 100% of
an entity and sells one-third of the entity to each of three trusts, with the
one-third interests being valued as minority interests,453 the discount
amount is removed from the client’s estate regardless of when the person dies. If the sale had not occurred and the client owned the 100%
interest at his or her death, no minority discount would be available.
Second, the interest rate on the note can be based on the § 7872 rate
(which is based on the relatively low interest rates on U.S. government
obligations). Third, the sale can be made to a GST exempt trust, or a
trust for grandchildren, so that all future appreciation following the sale
will be in an exempt trust with no need for further GST exemption allocation. Fourth, the installment note conceivably can be structured as an
interest-only balloon note. (With a GRAT, the annuity payments cannot increase more than 120% in any year, requiring that substantial annuity payments be paid in each year.) However, the planner must judge,
in the particular situation, if using an interest-only balloon note might
raise the risk of a § 2036 challenge by the I.R.S. It would seem that a
§ 2036 challenge is much less likely if the transaction looks like a traditional commercial transaction. (Another aspect of avoiding § 2036 is
that the trust should not, as a practical matter, simply use all of its income each year to make note payments back to the seller.) While there
is no requirement that even the interest be paid currently, it “may be
most commercially reasonable to require the payment of interest at least
annually . . . even if all principal balloons at the end.”454 Finally, the
estate freeze is completed without having to recognize any income tax
on the sale of the assets as long as the note is repaid during the seller’s
lifetime. In addition, the interest payments will not have to be reported
by the seller as income.
H. Potential Risks and Disadvantages
Under extreme circumstances, it is possible that the I.R.S. may take
the position that the note is treated as a retained equity interest in the
trust rather than as a mere note from the trust. If so, this would raise
potential questions of whether some of the trust assets should be included in the grantor’s estate under §§ 2036 and 2702. It would seem
453
454

See Rev. Rul. 93-12, 1993-1 C.B. 202.
AUCUTT, supra note 269, at 661-62.
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that § 2036 (which generally causes estate inclusion where the grantor
has made a gift of an asset and retained the right to the income from
that asset) should not apply to the extent that the grantor has sold
(rather than gifted) the asset for full market value.455 If the note that is
received from the trust is treated as debt rather than equity, the trust
assets should not be included in the grantor/seller’s gross estate under
§ 2036. This means that the analysis of whether the note is treated as
debt or as a retained equity interest is vitally important. This issue is
addressed in detail in Part I.B, supra. A number of cases have highlighted a variety of factors that are considered.456 One Technical Advice
Memorandum concluded that § 2036 did apply to property sold to a
grantor trust in return for a note based on the facts in that situation.457
Analogy to private annuity cases would suggest that § 2036 should
not typically apply to sale transactions. For example, the Supreme
Court refused to apply the predecessor of § 2036 to the assignment of
life insurance policies coupled with the retention of annuity contracts,
because the annuity payments were not dependent on income from the
transferred policies and the obligation was not specifically charged to
those policies.458 Various cases have followed that approach (in both
income and estate tax cases).459
One commentator has suggested that there is a significant risk of
§ 2036(a)(1) being argued by the I.R.S. if “the annual trust income does
not exceed the accrued annual interest on the note.”460 Much of the risk
of estate inclusion seems tied to the failure to have sufficient “seeding”
of equity in the trust prior to the sale.
Tax litigators have reported handling cases in which the I.R.S. takes
the position that notes given by grantor trusts in exchange for partnership interests should be ignored, based on the assertion that the “eco455 See PLR 9436006 (Sept. 9, 1994) (holding § 2702 does not apply to stock contributed to a grantor trust and other stock sold to the trust for a 25-year note); PLR 9535026
(Sept. 1, 1995) (holding that a note, interest-only AFR rate for 20 years with a balloon
payment at end of 20 years, is treated as debt and the “debt instrument is not a ‘term
interest’ within the meaning of Section 2702(c)(3).” The court specifically refrained from
ruling on the § 2036 issue).
456 E.g., Miller v. Comm’r, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 1674 (1996); Estate of Rosen v.
Comm’r, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 1220 (2006).
457 TAM 9251004 (Dec. 18, 1992) (holding § 2036 applies to retained right to payments under a note, reasoning that note payments would constitute a major share, if not
all, of the trust income, thus causing inclusion of trust property in estate).
458 Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust v. Smith, 356 U.S. 274, 277 (1958).
459 See Hesch & Manning, Beyond the Basic Freeze, supra note 308, ¶ 1601.1 n. 55,
for a listing of cases that have addressed the application of § 2036 in the context of private annuity transactions where are the grantor is retaining the right to receive substantial payments from a trust.
460 U.S. TRUST, PRACTICAL DRAFTING 4365, 4367 (1996).
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nomic realities of the arrangement . . . do not support a part sale,”461
and that the full value of the partnership interest was a gift not reduced
by any portion of the notes. (This position conflicts with Treasury Regulation Section 25.2512-8, which provides that transfers are treated as
gifts “to the extent that the value of the property transferred by the
donor exceeds the value in money or money’s worth of the consideration given therefore.”)462 If the note term is longer than the seller’s life
expectancy, the I.R.S. would have a stronger argument that § 2036
applies.
The I.R.S. has questioned the validity of a sale of limited partnership interests to a grantor trust in the Karmazin case,463 (discussed below) which was settled in a manner that recognized the sale. The I.R.S.
argued, among other things, that commercial lenders would not make
similar loans because the nine-to-one debt/equity ratio was too high,
there was insufficient security (no guarantees were used in that transaction), and there was insufficient income to support the debt.
One commentator summarizes planning structures to minimize
the estate tax risk.
The reasoning in Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust suggests that the
estate tax case is strongest when the following features are
carefully observed:
a. The note should be payable from the entire corpus of the
trust, not just the sold property, and the entire trust corpus
should be at risk.
b. The note yield and payments should not be tied to the performance of the sold asset.
c. The grantor should retain no control over the trust.
d. The grantor should enforce all available rights as a
creditor.464
The same commentator summarizes the possible risks of thin capitalization as follows:
461 Hayes, supra note 104, at 6. The I.R.S. is taking this position in companion cases
filed in the Tax Court on December 23, 2013. Estate of Donald Woelbing v. Comm’r, No.
30261-13; Estate of Marion Woelbing v. Comm’r, No. 30260-13. Mr. Woelbing sold stock
to a trust (presumably a grantor trust) in return for a promissory note bearing interest at
the AFR. The I.R.S. position is that the note should be treated as having a zero value for
gift tax purposes under § 2702. For estate tax purposes, the I.R.S. position is that the
note should not be included as an estate asset but the stock that was sold should be
included in the estate under §§ 2036 and 2038. The Notices of Deficiency allege gift and
estate tax liabilities over $125 million and penalties over $25 million.
462 Hayes, supra note 104, at 6 n.28.
463 Karmazin v. Comm’r, No. 2127-03 (T.C. Oct. 15, 2003) (stipulated decision).
464 AUCUTT, supra note 269, at 667.

\\jciprod01\productn\A\ACT\38-2-3\ACT2301.txt

Fall/Winter 2012]

unknown

Seq: 105

7-FEB-14

INTRA-FAMILY LOANS

13:19

155

a.
b.
c.
d.

includibility of the gross estate under section 2036,
a gift upon the cessation of section 2036 exposure,
applicability of section 2702 to such a gift,
the creation of a second class of equity in the underlying
property with possible consequences under section 2701,
e. possible loss of eligibility of the trust to be an S
Corporation,
f. treatment of the trust as an association taxable as a
corporation,
g. continued estate tax exposure for three years after cessation of section 2036 exposure under section 2035, and
h. inability to allocate GST exemption during the ensuing
ETIP.
The section 2036 problem may go away as the principal on the
note is paid down, or as the value of the purchased property
(the equity) appreciates, but the ETIP problem would
remain.465
The risks of thin capitalization were highlighted in Karmazin v.
Commissioner,466 in which the I.R.S. made a number of arguments to
avoid respecting a sale of limited partnership units to a grantor trust,
including §§ 2701 and 2702. The I.R.S. argued that the note in the sale
transaction involved in that case should be treated as debt rather than
equity for various reasons, including that (i) the only assets owned by
the trust are the limited partnership interests, (ii) the debt is non-recourse, (iii) commercial lenders would not enter this sale transaction
without personal guaranties or a larger down payment, (iv) a nine-toone debt equity ratio is too high, and (v) insufficient partnership income
exists to support the debt. Another potential risk of thin capitalization
that is rarely mentioned is the risk of having the trust treated as an association, taxable as a corporation. The planners involved in securing
PLR 9535026467 indicate that the I.R.S. required having a 10% equity
interest to avoid association status in that situation.
There is potential gain recognition if the seller dies before all of the
note payments are made. The I.R.S. may argue that the gain is accelerated to the moment of death. It would seem more likely that the gain
should not be recognized until payments are actually made on the note.
Credible arguments can be made for no income realization either during
or after the grantor’s death, as discussed in Part XII.E, supra.
465
466
467

AUCUTT, supra note 269, at 669.
Karmazin, No. 2127-03.
PLR 9535026 (Sept. 1, 1995).
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If the I.R.S. determines that the transferred assets exceed the note
amount, the difference is a gift. There is no regulatory safe harbor of a
“savings clause” as there is with a GRAT.468 One way that might reduce the gift tax exposure risk is to use a defined value clause, as discussed in Part XII.J, infra.
There is also a volatility risk. If the asset that is sold to the trust
declines in value, the trust still owes the full amount of the note to the
grantor. Thus, any equity that had been gifted to the trust prior to the
sale could be returned to the donor or included in the donor’s estate.
Furthermore, if beneficiaries or others give guaranties to provide the
10% “seeding,” the guarantors will have to pay the guaranteed amount
to the trust if the trust is otherwise unable to pay the note. Realize that
equity contributed to a grantor trust is really at risk. Also, appreciation
in the grantor trust is at risk if there is a subsequent reversal before the
note is repaid. If the trust is used for new purchases, that can have great
benefit – but it also has risks.
I. Summary of Note Structure Issues
The term of the note usually does not exceed 15-20 years, to ensure
treatment of the note as debt rather than a retained equity interest. The
term of the note should be less than the grantor’s life expectancy
(whether or not a SCIN is used). The § 7872 interest rate is typically
used. The note typically calls for at least having the interest paid currently (annually or semi-annually). While there is no absolute requirement to have interest paid currently, doing so makes the note appear to
have more “commercial-like” terms than if interest merely accrues over
a long term. Using a secured note is permissible. In fact, having security for the note helps ensure that the value of the note equals the value
of the transferred property.
If the gift to the trust and the subsequent sale occur close to each
other, the I.R.S. might conceivably attempt to collapse the two steps and
treat the transaction as a part-sale and part-gift. However, that would
not seem to change the overall result. Some planners structure the
transaction to leave time between the time of the seed gift and the subsequent sale, by analogy to the “real economic risk of a change in value”
analysis in Holman v. Commissioner.469 (Conceivably, the I.R.S. might
argue that the combined transaction is a transfer with retained interest
that is not covered by the bona fide sale for full consideration exception
468

Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-3(b)(2).
130 T.C. 170 (2008), aff’d on other grounds, 601 F.3d 763 (8th Cir. 2010) (avoiding
step transaction argument with respect to funding and gifts of interests in a family limited
partnership). See further discussion of Holman and other relevant cases supra Part
XII.A.2.
469
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in § 2036 because of the gift element of the combined transaction. However, there are no reported cases where the I.R.S. has taken that position based on gifts and sales within a short period of time of each other.)
To be totally conservative and assure that the trust is treated as a
grantor trust as to the original grantor, consider not using a Crummey
clause. However, the I.R.S. has ruled numerous times that using a
Crummey clause does not convert the trust to being partially a grantor
trust as to the beneficiary rather than as to the owner.470
In general, the entire corpus of the trust should be liable for the
note, not just the property sold in return for the note. The amount and
timing of payments should in no way be tied to the performance of the
sold asset—or else the note has the appearance of being a retained equity interest in the property itself. The grantor should retain no control
over the sold asset. The risk of inclusion under § 2036, in a situation
where the grantor is retaining payments from the transferred property,
is exacerbated if the grantor also has any control over the transferred
property. Preferably, the required ongoing note payments would be less
than the income produced by the sold assets. Furthermore, the trust
should not routinely make prepayments to distribute all trust income to
the grantor as note payments. The trust should have sufficient assets to
make principal and interest payments as they become due.
The existence of the notes should be reflected on financial statements and interest income and expenses must be properly reported. Various planners typically have not reported sales on gift tax returns.
However, they may rethink that position in light of Question 12(e) on
Form 706 about whether the decedent ever sold an interest in an entity
to certain types of trusts. Even so, many planners still tend not to report
sale transactions on gift tax returns in most circumstances. If the planner decides to report the transaction, how much should be disclosed?471
Many planners attach copies of all of the sale documents, including any
sales agreement, transfer documents, notes, security agreements, deeds
of trust, UCC filings, etc. Disclosing all of that information illustrates
that the transaction was treated and documented as an arms’ length
commercial transaction. Some attorneys also report adding to the dis470

See supra Part XII.E.
Treas. Reg. § 301.6501(c)-1(f)(4) provides that
“[c]ompleted transfers to members of the transferor’s family, as defined in section 2032A(e)(2), that are made in the ordinary course of operating a business
are deemed to be adequately disclosed . . ., even if the transfer is not reported
on a gift tax return, provided the transfer is property reported by all parties for
income tax purposes.”
The regulations give, as an example, the payment of compensation to a family member.
The transfer of an interest in a business, however, would not be “made in the ordinary
course of operating a business” and would not seem to be within the exception.
471
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closure a statement that the return and all attachments, taken together,
are intended to satisfy the requirements of the adequate disclosure regulations. The intent is to communicate that the planner is ready in case
the case is selected for audit.
Some attorneys prefer giving cash to comprise the “10% gift element” in order to stay under the I.R.S.’s radar screen. If a partnership
interest is given to the trust, the box on Schedule A must be checked on
the gift tax return (Form 709) reflecting that the asset was valued with a
discount. (That may have been what triggered the audit that resulted in
the Karmazin lawsuit, discussed in Parts I.B and XII.H, supra.)
If at some point after the transaction, the value of the trust assets is
less than the amount of the debt, the transaction may need to be revisited. Alternative approaches include: (1) renegotiating the interest rate
if the AFR has become lower; (2) renegotiating the principal amount of
the note (but why would the grantor renegotiate for a lower principal
payment?; there seems to be no advantage to the grantor unlike the
typical bank renegotiation in which the bank may renegotiate in order
to receive some upfront payment or more favored position; the trust has
nothing “extra” to grant to the grantor in a renegotiation; this approach
seems risky); (3) having the grantor sell the note from the original grantor trust that purchased the asset to a new grantor trust (the note would
presumably have a lower value than its face value; any appreciation
above that value would inure to the benefit of Trust 2 even though Trust
1 ends up having to pay all of its assets on the note payments. A big
disadvantage is that the new trust would have to be “seeded” and the
value of the underlying asset could decrease even further so that the
seeding to Trust 2 would be lost as well); or (4) having the grantor contribute the note from the grantor trust to a new GRAT (future appreciation would inure to the benefit of the GRAT remaindermen but there
would be no new “seeding” requirement which could be lost as well if
there were more deprecation in the value of the underlying assets).472
J. Defined Value Structures
As discussed above, a valuation risk is that a gift may result if the
I.R.S. determines that the value of the transferred asset exceeds the consideration given in the sale transaction. One way that might reduce the
gift tax exposure risk is to use a defined value clause—defining the
amount transferred by way of a fractional allocation between an (1) irrevocable trust and (2) the spouse (or a QTIP Trust or a GRAT or a
charity) to which the transfer would not generate gift taxes. The I.R.S.
472 See Milford B. Hatcher, Underwater GRATs and ISGT, Presentation at ACTEC
2008 Summer Meeting (June 27, 2008).
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does not recognize defined value clauses on public policy grounds but
several cases have now rejected that argument where the “excess
amount” passes to charity.473 Some of the cases have directly involved
sales to grantor trusts.
Petter v. Commissioner474 involved classic inter vivos gifts and sales
to grantor trusts using defined value clauses that had the effect of limiting gift tax exposure. The gift document assigned a block of units in an
LLC and allocated them first to the grantor trusts up to the maximum
amount that could pass free of gift tax, with the balance being allocated
to charities. The sale document assigned a much larger block of units,
allocating the first $4,085,190 of value to each of the grantor trusts (for
which each trust gave a 20-year secured note in that same face amount)
and allocating the balance to charities. The units were initially allocated
based on values of the units as provided in an appraisal by a reputable
independent appraiser. The I.R.S. maintained that a lower discount
should be applied, and that the initial allocation was based on inappropriately low values. The I.R.S. and the taxpayer eventually agreed on
applying a 35% discount, and the primary issue was whether the I.R.S.
was correct in refusing, on public policy grounds, to respect formula allocation provisions for gift tax purposes. The court held that the
formula allocation provision did not violate public policy and allowed a
gift tax charitable deduction in the year of the original transfer for the
full value that ultimately passed to charity based on values as finally
determined for gift tax purposes.475
Similarly, Hendrix v. Commissioner476 involved combined gifts and
sales using defined value formula clauses. Parents transferred stock in a
closely-held S corporation to trusts for their daughters and descendants
and a charitable donor advised fund, to be allocated between them
under a formula. The formula provided that shares equal to a specified
dollar value were allocated to the trust and the balance of the shares
passed to the charitable fund. The trust agreed to give a note for a
lower specified dollar value and agreed to pay any gift tax attributable
to the transfer. Under the formula, the values were determined under a
hypothetical willing buyer/willing seller test. The transfer agreement
provided that the transferees were to determine the allocation under the
473 McCord v. Comm’r, 461 F.3d 614 (5th Cir. 2006) (public policy issue not before
court), rev’g, 120 T.C. 358 (2003); Christiansen v. Comm’r, 130 T.C. 1, 16-18 (2008), aff’d,
586 F.3d 1061 (8th Cir. 2009) (formula disclaimer that operated like defined value
clause); Petter v. Comm’r, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 534 (2009), aff’d, 653 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir.
2011); Hendrix v. Comm’r, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1642 (2011).
474 Petter, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 534, 534.
475 Id. at 544-45.
476 Hendrix v. Comm’r, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1642.
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formula, not the parents.477 The court recognized the effectiveness of
the transfers of defined values under the formulas.478
One case has approved a straightforward defined value gift assignment of a dollar amount of LLC units that did not involve a charitable
transfer.479 A similar structure conceivably could be structured in a sale
transaction, by providing that only a defined value of assets are sold in
the sale transaction in return for the note given as consideration, if the
rationale of that case is accepted by other courts.
Another possible “defined value” approach to avoid (or minimize)
the gift risk is to provide in the trust agreement that any gift before Date
1 passes to a gift trust. The initial “seed gift” to the trust would be made
before that date. The trust would say that any gift after that date goes
10% to a completed gift trust and 90% to an incomplete gift trust. If a
court ultimately determines that the note does not equal the full value
of the asset that is sold to the trust, 90% of the gift element would pass
to an incomplete gift trust, and there would be no immediate gift taxation on that portion.
Another possibility is to use a disclaimer even for a sale to a grantor
trust. The trust would specifically permit a trust beneficiary to disclaim
any gift to the trust and the trust would provide that the disclaimed asset
passes to a charity or back to the donor or to some other transferee that
does not have gift tax consequences. After a sale to the trust, the beneficiary would disclaim by a formula: “To the extent any gift is made by
father to me, I disclaim 99% of the gift.”
477 Id. The trust obtained an appraisal of the shares and the charitable fund hired
independent counsel and an independent appraiser to review the original appraisal. Id.
at 1643. The trust and charitable fund agreed on the stock values and the number of units
that passed to each. However, this description is simplified; in reality, each of the parents
entered into two separate transfer transactions involving a “GST trust” and an “issue
trust” and the same Foundation using this formula approach. Id. at 1644.
478 Id. As to the public policy argument, the court determined that the formula
clauses do not immediately and severely frustrate any national or State policy. Id. at
1647. The Procter case was distinguished because there is no condition subsequent that
would defeat the transfer and the transfers further the public policy of encouraging gifts
to charity. Contra Comm’r v. Procter, 142 F.2d 824 (4th Cir. 1944). The court observed
that there is no reason to distinguish the holding in Christiansen v. Commissioner, 130
T.C. 1 (2008), aff’d, 586 F.3d 1061 (8th Cir. 2009), that similar formula disclaimers did not
violate public policy. Hendrix, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1647.
479 Wandry v. Comm’r, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1472, 1476-78.
Wandry arguably is inconsistent with Procter, 142 F.2d 824. Companion cases recently filed in the Tax Court
involve the sale of stock for a note providing that if the I.R.S. or a court re-determined
the value of the stock, the number of shares transferred would automatically adjust so
that the fair market value of the stock sold would equal the face value of the note. Estate
of Donald Woelbing v. Comm’r, No. 30261-13 (T.C. filed Dec. 23, 2013); Estate of
Marion Woelbing v. Comm’r, No. 30260-13 (T.C. filed Dec. 23, 2013). See supra note 461.
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If the sale is made to a grantor trust for the client that is created by
the client’s spouse, an advantage is that the client could be given a
power of appointment. If the sale results in a gift element, it would be
an incomplete gift. That portion of the trust would continue to be included in the grantor’s estate, but the client would have achieved the
goal of transferring as much as possible at the lowest possible price without current gift tax exposure. Gain would not be recognized on the sale,
but a downside to this approach is that the selling spouse would recognize interest income when the spouse’s grantor trust makes interest
payments.480
XIII. SELF-CANCELLING INSTALLMENT NOTES
A. SCINs in General
A potential disadvantage of a basic intra-family installment sale or
sale to a grantor trust is the potential inclusion, in the seller’s estate, of
the unpaid obligation at its fair market value on the date of the seller’s
death. One way to avoid this problem is to use a self-canceling installment note (SCIN), a debt obligation containing a provision canceling
the liability upon the death of the holder. If the holder dies prior to the
expiration of the term of the SCIN, the automatic cancellation feature
may operate to remove a significant amount of assets from what would
otherwise be includible in the estate of the holder.481 This feature can
also be useful if the seller does not want to burden the purchaser with
the continued obligation to make payments after the seller’s death.
Planning with SCINs followed the seminal case of Estate of Moss v.
Commissioner.482 The Tax Court held that the amount of the remaining
payments that would have been due following the maker’s death under
a SCIN was not includable in the decedent’s gross estate under § 2033
because “[t]he cancellation provision was part of the bargained for consideration provided by decedent for the purchase of the stock” and as
such “it was an integral provision of the note.”483 There was been little
480

Gibbs v. Comm’r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2669 (1996).
Hayes, supra note 104.
482 74 T.C. 1239 (1980), action on dec., 1981-28 (Jan. 5, 1981).
483 Id. at 1246-47. In Moss, the parties stipulated that the SCIN sale transactions
(between an employer and employees) were bona fide transactions for full and adequate
consideration and that the cancellation provision was part of the bargained for consideration for the purchase price of the stock. The court observed that “there was nothing to
indicate that his life expectancy would be shorter than the approximate 10 years of life
expectancy which was indicated by generally accepted mortality tables.” (The notes had
varying terms, but one of the notes had a term of 9 years and 7 months, so the term of
note was very close to the seller’s life expectancy.)
481
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case law regarding SCINS. In Estate of Costanza v. Commissioner,484
the Sixth Circuit recognized a SCIN as providing valuable consideration
in a gift tax case. In Estate of Musgrove v. United States,485 a SCIN was
not recognized as a bona fide transaction in an estate tax case.
The potential advantages of using SCINs for estate tax savings may
be further enhanced by “backloading” the payments. That may result in
a significantly smaller amount being paid to the seller during life and
with a greater amount being cancelled, thus resulting in exclusion of
more value from the seller’s gross estate.486 A potential disadvantage of
the SCIN transaction is that if the seller outlives his or her life expectancy, the premium that is paid for the cancellation feature may result in
more value being included in the seller’s estate than if the cancellation
provision had not been used.
As discussed below, the SCIN transaction works best when the
seller/client dies prior to, and “preferably” materially prior to, his or her
actuarial life expectancy. The ideal candidate is someone in poor health,
484 320 F.3d 595 (6th Cir. 2003), rev’g, T.C. Memo. 2001-128. In Costanza, the decedent sold real property to his son in exchange for a SCIN that was fully secured by the
real property. The note was payable over 11 years. The interest rate increased by onehalf percent every 24 months, beginning at 6.25 percent and ending at 8.75 percent the
last 12 months of the note. The decedent died unexpectedly five months after the note
was issued, after payments had been made for only three months. (He had heart disease
but medical experts testified that his life expectancy at the time of the SCIN transaction
was between 5 and 13.9 years.) The Tax Court concluded that the sale was not a bona
fide transaction and that the SCIN provided no consideration. The Sixth Circuit stated
that “a SCIN signed by family members is presumed to be a gift and not a bona fide
transaction.” Id. at 597. However, the presumption could be rebutted by an affirmative
showing that there existed at the time of the transaction a real expectation of repayment
and intent to enforce the collection of the indebtedness. The court concluded that, on the
facts of the case, the estate “rebutted the presumption against the enforceability of an
intrafamily SCIN by affirmatively showing that there existed at the time of the transaction a real expectation of repayment and intent to enforce the collection of the indebtedness.” The Sixth Circuit remanded the case to the Tax Court to determine the value of
the note and whether the SCIN constituted a bargain sale with some gift element. The
parties settled.
In Costanza, the I.R.S. interestingly argued that the parties entered into the SCIN
transaction because they presumed the father would die prior to the note being fully
satisfied. “If they had thought [the father] would outlive the final payment due under the
SCIN, . . . there would have been no reason to have signed the SCIN, as opposed to an
unconditional promissory note.” The Sixth Circuit rejected this argument, reasoning that
it effectively would invalidate all SCINs, but SCINs were recognized in Estate of Moss.
485 33 Fed. Cl. 657 (1995). A demand-note SCIN transaction was not recognized as a
bona fide transaction because of the absence of a real expectation of repayment (since
the seller was in poor health and the purchaser did not have other funds and the seller
declared that he was not likely to demand payment on the note). As a result, the SCIN
was included in the decedent’s gross estate.
486 See infra Part XIII.I.
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but whose death is not imminent, or someone with a very poor family
health history. As with all sophisticated tax planning strategies, the
SCIN is not for all clients or all situations, especially since clients’ actual
life expectancies are never truly known in advance.
There are also numerous issues concerning the technique which
have not yet been fully resolved. In addition to the obvious mortality
issue, there are questions as to what base rates should be used (the
§ 7520 rate or the AFR?), what life expectancies should be used (the
tables used under § 7520, the tables used under § 72, or the seller’s actual life expectancy?), how the payments should be allocated for income
tax purposes (what amounts are return of basis, interest, and gain?) and
the effect of the cancellation of the note upon the seller’s death for income tax purposes (is the cancellation a taxable event for the debtor?).
As is the case for all intra-family notes, the taxpayer must be able to
establish that the notes constitute “bona fide debt,”487 and this issue is
particularly significant for SCINs.488 In any event, the use of SCINs
adds a whole new dimension of tax uncertainties and complexities.489
B. Note Terms
Although it is tempting to apply the below-market safe harbor of
§ 7872 (and, arguably, § 1274(d)), there is an additional element at work
with the SCIN that makes it advisable to structure the SCIN so that the
value of the SCIN is at least equal to the value of the property sold. For
the value of the SCIN to equal the value of the property sold, the seller
of the property must be compensated for the risk that the seller may die
during the term of the note, and thus not receive the full purchase price.
Since such a feature must be bargained for at arm’s length to be
respected, the seller must be compensated for the risk associated with
the potential cancellation either by an increase in the purchase price or
487

See supra Part I.B.
See Estate of Costanza v. Comm’r, 320 F.3d 595 (6th Cir. 2003), rev’g, T.C.
Memo. 2001-128 (taxpayer rebutted presumption that SCIN was not a bona fide transaction); Estate of Musgrove v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 657 (1995) (SCIN not recognized
as a bona fide transaction for estate tax purposes). The I.R.S. is taking the position in a
case pending before the Tax Court that SCIN transactions were not bona fide transactions, primarily because there was no reasonable expectation of repayment of the SCINs,
which had a very large mortality risk premium. Estate of William Davidson v. Comm’r,
Tax Court Cause No. 013748-13 (filed June 14, 2013). The Davidson case and the accompanying Chief Counsel Advice are discussed infra, Part XIII.B.
489 See Wojnaroski, supra note 437, for an outstanding comprehensive discussion of
the use of SCINs including their valuation and tax treatment. For a discussion of planning alternatives, including the relative low mortality premium that exists under current
conditions, see Maher & Laffey, Practical Planning With Self-Cancelling Installment
Notes, TR. & EST., April 2012, at 22.
488
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by a higher interest rate.490 To calculate the premium, an advisor must
determine what stream of payments is required, taking into consideration the possible death of the seller, to have the same present value as
the principal amount of the promissory note.491 There is not universal
agreement on how payments under a SCIN are properly valued, for
there is no clear answer concerning which mortality tables should be
used and which discount rate should be applied to value the payments.
Some commentators use the life expectancies in Table 90CM for May
1999-April 2009 and Table 2000CM from May 2009 forward,492 and a
rate equal to the greater of 120% of the mid-term AFR, assuming annual payments, as prescribed by § 7520, or the AFR for the actual term
of the note, as prescribed by § 7872.493 Others use the annuity tables
under § 72494 and the AFR as prescribed by § 7872.495 Additionally,
some commentators have recommended that the actual life expectancy
be used.496 While an advisor could determine these payment streams
and resulting rates manually, or by use of a computer program, some
commentators recommend that an actuary be employed.497
Although the matter is by no means free from doubt, some commentators are persuaded by the well-reasoned approach of Hesch and
Manning.498 The § 7872 AFRs are, more likely than not, appropriate,
and the examples used in regard to SCINs will generally use AFRs, not
§ 7520 rates. Nonetheless, AFRs should not be used by the faint of
heart. A conservative planner probably should use the higher of the
§ 7520 rate or the AFR for the actual term of the note, as recommended
by Covey.499 Clearly, many, if not most, practitioners are using the
higher of the § 7520 rate or the AFR for the actual term of the note; the
estate tax risk of using a rate that is too low is simply too great.
490 See Sheldon I. Banoff & Michael O. Hartz, Self-Canceling Installment Notes: New
IRS Rules Expand Opportunities, 65 J. TAX’N 146 (1986).
491 See Richard B. Covey, et al., Q&A Session I of the Twenty-Seventh Annual Institute on Estate Planning, 27 U. MIAMI HECKERLING INST. ON EST. PLAN. ¶ 216 (1993).
492 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7(d)(7); Actuarial Valuations, Book Aleph, I.R.S. Pub. 1457,
tbl.90CM (July 1999); Actuarial Valuations, Version 3A, I.R.S. Pub. 1457, tbl.2000CM
(May 2009).
493 Actuarial Valuations, Version 3A, I.R.S. Pub. 1457, at 6; See Covey, supra note
491.
494 Treas. Reg. § 1.72-9, tbl.V.
495 See Hesch & Manning, Beyond the Basic Freeze, supra note 308, ¶ 1601.3.B(1)(2).
496 See Sheldon I. Banoff & Michael O. Hartz, Sales of Property: Will Self-Canceling
Installment Notes Make Private Annuities Obsolete?, 59 TAXES 499, 515 (1981).
497 See Covey, supra note 491; Susan K. Smith & Alfred J. Olsen, Fractionalized Equity Valuation Planning: Preservation of Post-Mortem Valuation Discounts, 34 U. MIAMI
HECKERLING INST. ON EST. PLAN. ¶ 1103.3(F)(2) (2000).
498 Hesch & Manning, Beyond the Basic Freeze, supra note 308, ¶ 1601.3.B(1)-(2).
499 Covey, supra note 491, ¶ 216.
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The term of the SCIN should not equal or exceed the individual’s
life expectancy, or the SCIN might be recharacterized as a private annuity.500 Even this conclusion is not universally accepted.501 As noted
above, however, there is a difference of opinion as to how life expectancy is to be determined. Are the 90CM estate tax tables (for May
1999-April 2009) and Table 2000CM (from May 2009 forward),502 the
Table V income tax annuity tables,503 or the Seller’s actual life expectancy to be used? While a conservative approach would be to structure
the SCIN to have a term which is shorter than the shortest of all of these
possible life expectancies, such a structure would materially detract
from the primary advantage of the SCIN—the likelihood that a wouldbe seller with health problems or a poor family health history will die
before he or she is “supposed to.” If the seller has a “terminal illness,”
however, the actuarial tables should not be used.504 If § 7520 applies for
these purposes, “terminal illness” means that the individual has an “incurable illness or other deteriorating physical condition” which results in
at least a 50% probability that he or she will die within one year.505 If
the person lives for 18 months or longer after the relevant valuation
500 I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,503, Conclusion B (May 7, 1986). Conclusion C of
G.C.M. 39,503 concludes that if the stated monetary amount would be received before
the expiration of the transferor’s life expectancy, the transaction will be treated as an
installment sale rather than as an annuity.
In light of the uncertainty of whether the actuarial tables under § 7520 apply to
SCINs, as discussed in notes 508-509 infra, some planners suggest that annuitites may be
safer than SCINs, because § 7520 clearly applies to annuities. Possible disadvantages of
annuities are (1) that the purchasing trust must have sufficient assets to make annuity
payments to age 110 (perhaps requiring a large gift to the trust before the sale occurs),
see Treas. Reg. § 25.7520-3(b)(2)(i) (commonly referred to as the “exhaustion test”), and
(2) there is a risk of having to make payments for many years if the seller far outlives his
or her life expectancy. (In addition, private annuities have special income tax complexities, but these should not apply if the private annuity sale is made to a grantor trust.) To
use an annuity while avoiding these possible disadvantages, consider selling assets to a
grantor trust in return for an annuity that will be paid until the earlier of the payee’s
death or a date that exceeds the payee’s life expectancy. (As an example, a payee who
has a 5-year life expectancy might sell assets in return for payments of $X per year to be
made until the earlier of 6 years or the payee’s death.) Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,503 appears
to treat that as an annuity, because the amount would not be paid in a period less than
the actual life or life expectancy of the transferor. The exhaustion test would not require
funding to age 110 beause no payments are required beyond the 6-year annuity period.
501 See Hesch & Manning, Beyond the Basic Freeze, supra note 308, ¶ 1601.3.A.
502 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7(d)(7); see Actuarial Valuations, Book Aleph, I.R.S. Pub.
1457, tbl.90CM (July 1999); Actuarial Valuations, Version 3A, I.R.S. Pub. 1457,
tbl.2000CM (May 2009).
503 Treas. Reg. § 1.72-9, tbl.V.
504 See Treas. Reg. § 20.7520-3(b)(3) (discussing that depending on whether § 7520
rates apply to SCINs, this section may or may not apply).
505 Id.
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date, he will be presumed not to have been terminally ill at the time of
the transaction, unless the existence of a terminal illness can be established by clear and convincing evidence.506 Whether or not SCINs are
technically subject to this regulation, it is probably wise not to use standard actuarial tables when a person is gravely ill.507
In Chief Counsel Advice 201330033 the I.R.S. takes the position
that § 7520 does not apply at all in valuing SCINs, but that the value of
the notes must be determined under the general willing-buyer willingseller standard and that the seller’s life expectancy should be determined “taking into consideration [the] medical history on the date of the
gift.”508 The case to which C.C.A. 201330033 relates is a pending Tax
506

Id.
See Hesch & Manning, Beyond the Basic Freeze, supra note 308, ¶ 1601.3.C.
508 We do not believe that the § 7520 tables apply to value the notes in this
situation. By its terms, § 7520 applies only to value an annuity, any interest for
life or term of years, or any remainder. In the case at hand, the items that must
be valued are the notes that decedent received in exchange for the stock that he
sold to the grantor trusts. These notes should be valued based on a method that
takes into account the willing-buyer willing-seller standard in § 25.2512-8. In
this regard, the decedent’s life expectancy, taking into consideration decedent’s
medical history on the date of the gift, should be taken into account. I.R.S.
Gen. Couns. Mem. 39503 (May 7, 1986).
C.C.A. 201330033 (February 24, 2012).
The C.C.A describes the following facts. Sales of stock were made in return for
SCINs, some with a principal premium (almost double the value transferred), and others
with a large interest premium. GRATs were also funded about the same time. The decedent was diagnosed with a serious illness “very shortly after” the SCIN and GRAT transactions and died less than six months after the transactions, having received no payments
at all on the notes. The C.C.A. distinguished Costanza v. Comm’r, 320 F.3d 595 (6th Cir.
2003), rev’g, T.C. Memo. 2001-128, to support its position that the SCINs “lack the indicia
of genuine debt.” The C.C.A. observed that the SCINs had been valued based upon the
§ 7520 tables (presumably, meaning the relevant mortality tables under § 7520), but the
I.R.S. position is that § 7520 does not apply in valuing SCINs.
The C.C.A. cites I.R.S. General Counsel Memorandum 39503 taking the same position that § 7520 does not necessarily apply in valuing notes for an installment sale (although that G.C.M. predated § 7520). I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39503 (May 7, 1986)
(“unlike the private annuity, there is no requirement that the actuarial tables are to be
used in determining the gift taxation of an installment sale. Thus, the taxpayer’s particular health status may be considered.”) In that respect, the position in the C.C.A. is basically consistent with prior position statements from the I.R.S. Various commentators
have noted this position of the I.R.S. ROBERT A. ESPERTI, RENNO L. PETERSON, ROBERT S. KEEBLER, IRREVOCABLE TRUST: ANALYSIS WITH FORMS, § 16.06[4][A] (1998);
BNA Tax Management Portfolio 805, ¶III(C)(3)(“there is no requirement that the actuarial tables are to be used in determining the gift taxation of SCINs,” quoting GCM
39503).
Other commentators, however, have suggested that the §7520 actuarial tables should
apply unless there are serious health issues. See ZARITSKY & AUCUTT, supra note 62,
§ 12.02[3] (“Section 7520 states that it must be used to value ‘an interest for life or a term
of years,’ which precisely describes the payments under a SCIN. Furthermore, the IRS
507
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Court case, Estate of William Davidson v. Comm’r,509 in which the
I.R.S. assessed a deficiency of over $2.6 billion.
publication ‘Actuarial Values, Alpha Volume,’ which implements the IRS actuarial tables
under Section 7520, includes an example that uses the tables to determine ‘the present
worth of a temporary annuity of $1.00 per annum payable annually for 10 years or until
the prior death of a person aged 65. . . .’ This, too, appears to describe precisely the
calculation of the premium for a SCIN. Thus, Section 7520 appears to apply to the valuation of a SCIN premium.”).
A fairly recent case, Dallas v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2006-212 appears to have used
§7520 in valuing a SCIN. See ZARITSKY & AUCUTT, supra note 62, § 12.02[3] at n.19.8
(“It is not possible to replicate this calculation perfectly from the facts reported in the
court’s opinion and in the pleadings available online. It is, however, possible to get close
enough to believe strongly that the Section 7520 tables were used by the IRS in its determination of the value of the SCIN in this case.”)
509 Tax Court Cause No. 013748-13 (Petition filed June 14, 2013). Based on information in the Petition, in Davidson, an 85-year old individual sold closely-held stock to
trusts in return for SCINs in January 2009. Some of the SCINs were structured with a
principal premium (combined transfers of $162.3 million of stock for $305.9 million face
value, 5-year balloon SCINs, with annual interest payments at a rate of 2.4% [the §7520
rate]; principal premium of about 88% over the stock value). Other SCIN transactions
were in return for SCINs with an interest premium (combined transfers of $432 million of
stock for $432 million face value, 5-year balloon SCINs, with annual interest payments at
a rate of 15.83% [reflecting an interest rate premium of 13.43% over the §7520 rate]).
The mortality tables under §7520 indicate that the life expectancy was 5.8 years at the
time of the sale transactions (based on Table 90CM, which applied to transactions from
May 1999-April 2009 [Table 2000CM applies to transactions from May 2009 forward]).
The facts relating to the decedent’s life expectancy at the time of the transfers will
obviously be quite significant. The decedent’s primary physician wrote a letter in October
20, 2008 stating: “Mr. Davidson continues an active exercise schedule, and is routinely
working at home or in the Guardian Headquarters Office. Based on regular medical
assessments and oversight, I believe that Mr. Davidson is in good health commensurate
with his age group, and participates in a healthy lifestyle, exercise regimens, and activities
which require keen mental rigor. He has no current conditions which will impact his
actuarial life expectancy.” On December 16, 2008, the primary physician wrote another
letter stating that he had completed a routine medical assessment of the decedent the
prior week. He concluded that “there are no changes in his health and he has no current
conditions which would impact his actuarial life expectancy and continues to work in his
usual capacity.” A specialist in physical medicine and rehabilitation examined the decedent in early January 2009 and wrote a letter stating: “I considered [Mr. Davidson’s]
prognosis for return to standing and short distance assisted ambulation within 6 months
to be good.” This letter indicates that the decedent had significant ambulatory limitations in January 2009.
One of the I.R.S.’s medical experts estimated that the decedent had a significantly
shorter life expectancy, 2.5 years. He estimated that the decedent had only a 19.3%
probability of surviving for five years. The expert never personally examined the decedent but based his estimates on the decedent’s medical records as well as prognostic
studies and statistical studies. The I.R.S.’s valuation of the SCINs was based on this medical expert’s life expectancy estimate.
In connection with the estate tax audit the decedent’s medical records were reviewed
by four medical consultants, two of whom were selected by the estate and two of whom
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As discussed above in the context of an installment sale to a grantor
trust, a SCIN term which is too long may raise debt/equity concerns,
especially when the sale is to a trust with comparatively few other assets.
The mortality component of the SCIN increases as the term of the SCIN
increases, for a greater risk premium must be added to the SCIN to
compensate the seller for the higher probability that the seller will die
prior to the expiration of the longer term.
If the risk premium is not reflected in a higher interest rate, then it
must be added to the sales price and reflected in a higher face amount of
the SCIN. As discussed below, a principal risk premium should be
treated as a capital gain to the seller and increase the basis of the property in the hands of the purchaser.
If a self-amortizing note with equal principal and interest payments
is used, there should be no difference for estate tax purposes between
choosing an interest risk premium and a principal risk premium, as the
annual payments under either structure would be the same. If, however,
an interest-only SCIN or a level principal payment SCIN is used, then
for estate tax purposes, the relative merits of choosing the principal premium or interest rate premium to compensate the seller for the risk of
death occurring during the term of the SCIN should be analyzed, as the
benefits depend upon the type of note used.
For income tax purposes, choosing to increase the principal balance
of the purchase price will generally result in higher capital gains taxes
and lower interest income being reported by the seller, with the buyer
receiving a higher basis in the purchased asset and a lower current deduction, if any, for the payment of interest. If the asset being sold has a
high basis, the seller may prefer the principal adjustment approach, because there may be minimal capital taxes payable in any event. Conversely, if the purchase price remains equal to the fair market value of
the property sold and the interest rate is instead increased, then the
seller will report more interest and less capital gains income. In turn,
were selected by the I.R.S. All four medical consultants concluded that the decedent had
a greater than 50% probability of living at least one year in January 2009.
If the court gets beyond the “bona fide transaction” issue, because all of the medical
consultants agree that the decedent had a greater than 50% probability of living at least
one year on the date of the sale transactions, the court presumably will be squarely faced
with addressing whether § 7520 applies in valuing SCINs. If § 7520 applies in valuing
SCINs, Treas. Reg. § 1.7520-3(b)(3) indicates that the § 7520 mortality tables can be used
“to determine the present value of an annuity, income interest, remainder interest, or
reversionary interest” even if the individual who is a measuring life is in poor health as
long as he or she is not terminally ill, defined to mean the person has a greater than 50%
probability of living at least one year. The government’s position in its Answer filed
August 9, 2013 is that “whether or not the decedent was terminally ill within the meaning
of Treasury Regulation § 1.7520-3(b)(3) is not relevant.” Therein lies the dispute that
may be squarely before the court.

\\jciprod01\productn\A\ACT\38-2-3\ACT2301.txt

Fall/Winter 2012]

unknown

Seq: 119

INTRA-FAMILY LOANS

7-FEB-14

13:19

169

purchaser will take a lower cost basis in the acquired property, but may
have a higher current deduction for the increased interest payments.510
C. Income Tax Consequences to Seller for Sale to Family Member
or Non-Grantor Trust
A sale of property to a family member or a non-grantor trust in
exchange for a properly structured SCIN is a taxable event and, unless
the seller elects otherwise, should generally result in installment sale
treatment for the seller.511 Under the installment method, it is assumed
that the seller will outlive the term of the SCIN, and the maximum principal amount to be received by the seller in the SCIN transaction, including any principal premium, is the “selling price.”512 The seller’s
adjusted basis is then subtracted from this selling price to determine the
gross profit, if the selling price exceeds the basis.513
A portion of each payment will also consist of interest, which may
be calculated under one of two methods, depending upon whether the
SCIN is treated as a maximum selling price installment sale, or as a contingent payment installment sale.514 By treating the payment stream as
a maximum selling price installment sale, the interest paid will be frontloaded. In contrast, if the payment stream is treated as a contingent
payment installment sale, the interest paid will be back-loaded.
If the SCIN is cancelled by reason of the death of the seller during
the note term, any deferred gain will be recognized as income. The primary question is whether the deferred gain is properly includible (a) on
the deceased seller’s final return, in which event the resulting income
tax liability should be deductible as a § 2053 claim against the estate for
estate tax purposes, or (b) in the initial return of the deceased seller’s
estate as an item of income in respect of a decedent (“IRD”) under
§ 691.515
When the issue arose in Estate of Frane,516 the Tax Court agreed
that gain should be recognized upon the death of the seller prior to the
expiration of the term of the SCIN, but held that the gain was properly
510 Jerome M. Hesch & Elliot Manning, Family Deferred Payment Sales, Installment
Sales, SCINs, Private Annuity Sales, OID and Other Enigmas, 26 U. OF MIAMI HECKERLING INST. ON EST. PLAN. ¶ 310.3.B (1992) [hereinafter Hesch & Manning, Family
Deferred Payment Sales]. These basis/gains/interest effects likely will not apply for assets
sold to a grantor trust in return for a SCIN. See infra Part XIII.D.
511 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15A.453-1(c)(1).
512 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15A.453-1(c)(2)(i)(A).
513 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15A.453-1(b)(2)(v).
514 Hesch & Manning, Family Deferred Payment Sales, supra note 510, ¶ 310.3.B(4).
515 See Banoff & Hartz, supra note 490, at 150-51; Hesch & Manning, Family Deferred Payment Sales, supra note 510, ¶ 310.1.F.
516 Estate of Frane v. Comm’r, 98 T.C. 341, 354 (1992).
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reportable by the seller on the seller’s final return, not by the seller’s
estate. The Tax Court held that the income tax consequences of the
cancellation were governed by § 453B(f), which had been enacted, in
part, to overrule the outcome of Miller v. Usury,517 so that the cancellation of a SCIN would be treated as a disposition.518 Because the cancellation was in favor of a related party, the fair market value of the
obligation would be no less than the face amount of the obligation.519
Since the Tax Court held that the gain was properly reportable on the
seller’s final income tax return, it also held that the Seller’s estate was
not taxable under the IRD rules of § 691(a).
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the Tax Court in
favor of the I.R.S.’s alternate position that the decedent’s estate recognizes the deferred gain on its initial income tax return as an item of
IRD. In Estate of Frane,520 the Eighth Circuit held that the cancellation
of a SCIN is not a “disposition” which is taxed to the seller under
§ 453B pursuant to § 453B(f), but is rather a “transmission” which is
taxable as IRD to the estate under § 691 pursuant to § 453B(c).521 The
Eighth Circuit based this decision on the language in § 691(a)(5)(iii)
that “cancellation occurring at the death of obligee shall be treated as a
transfer by the estate, taxable under Section 691(a)(2).”522 This holding
is in accord with I.R.S.’s published position.523 The Eighth Circuit decision in Frane may not be the final word on the issue of whether the
deferred gain is includible in income by the deceased seller on his final
return or by the estate of the deceased seller on its initial return. The
Eighth Circuit’s position has not been adopted by any other Circuits.
An argument can be made that the gain should be recognized by the
seller on his or her final income tax return in accordance with the Tax
Court decision and § 453B(f).524 Furthermore, some commentators argue that the cancellation should not result in any income recognition.525
If the seller dies before all note payments have been paid, the net
effect is that the amount of the unpaid payments is excluded from the
517
518
519
520
521
522
523

160 F. Supp. 368 (W.D. La. 1958).
I.R.C. § 453B(f)(1).
I.R.C. § 453B(f)(2).
Estate of Frane v. Comm’r, 998 F.2d 567 (8th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 572.
Id.
See Rev. Rul. 86-72, 1986-1 C.B. 253; I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,503 (May 7,

1986).
524 See Wojnaroski, supra note 427, at VII.A.4.C (“Taxpayers outside the Eighth Circuit may argue, in the alternative, that if the seller must recognize gain, then an estate tax
deduction is available to the extent of the decedent’s share of income tax liability consistent with the Tax Court’s majority opinion in Frane.”).
525 See id. (discussing the 5-judge dissent in the Frane Tax Court decision taking the
position that no gain results to either the decedent or the decedent’s estate).
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gross estate for estate tax purposes, but is treated as income for income
tax purposes. As the estate and income tax rates become closer in
amounts, does using SCINs make sense? There is a net advantage, even
if the estate and income tax rates are the same, because the estate tax
savings is based on the entire amount of the remaining payments
whereas the income tax cost is based on just the amount of taxable income, which is the amount of the remaining payments less basis attributable to those payments. For example, if a high basis asset is sold, the
income tax cost may be relatively small.
D. Income Tax Consequences to Seller for Sale to Grantor Trust
As in the case of a typical installment sale to a grantor trust, the
trust’s purchase of the seller’s property in exchange for a SCIN should
not be a taxable event, at least as long as the trust remains a grantor
trust. If the grantor trust ceases to be a grantor trust during the grantor’s lifetime, and if the SCIN is still outstanding at the time of such
cessation, a taxable event is likely to be deemed to have occurred at the
time the trust ceases to be a grantor trust.526 Presumably, any gain will
be based on the excess of the amount then due under the SCIN over the
adjusted basis of the grantor trust’s assets.
The grantor’s death before the end of the term of the SCIN results
in the cancellation of the remaining payments otherwise due under the
SCIN. Because of the cancellation feature, and because the sale never
took place for income tax purposes during the life of the seller, the deferred gain that would normally be recognized upon the death of the
seller under Frane arguably should not be recognized by the seller or the
seller’s estate, although the matter is not free from doubt.527
E. Income Tax Consequences to Purchaser for Sale to Family
Member or Non-Grantor Trust
If the sale is to a family member or a non-grantor trust, the first
income tax consideration for the buyer-debtor is the calculation of the
526 See Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(c) ex.5; Madorin v. Comm’r, 84 T.C. 667 (1985); Rev.
Rul. 77-402, 1977-2 C.B. 222; TAM 200010010 (Mar. 10, 2000).
527 See Hesch & Manning, Beyond the Basic Freeze, supra note 308, ¶ 1601.4.
In addition, planners may structure a SCIN transaction with an irrevocable
grantor trust as the buyer. The logical argument follows that if the seller realized no gain during life, then death during the term of the SCIN cannot constitute a taxable event. Section 691 contemplates a realization event for income
tax purposes. In effect, the gain remains deferred until the disposition by the
buyer with a carryover or substitute income tax basis.
Wojnaroski, supra note 427, at VII.A.4.C; See also supra Part XII.E (concerning the income tax treatment upon the death of the seller before all payments are made on a normal installment sale to a grantor trust).
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basis in the property received. Unfortunately, the manner in which basis is determined is not completely settled. G.C.M. 39503528 concludes
that the buyer-debtor acquires a basis equal to the maximum purchase
price of the property. This result would be symmetrical to the treatment
of cancellation at death in favor of a related party as a disposition under
§ 453B(f) and is arguably supported by what might be dicta in the
Eighth Circuit’s decision in Frane.529 G.C.M. 39503 and the Frane appellate decision, however, both predate the final versions of Treasury
Regulation sections 1.483-4 and 1.1275-4(c)(5), which provide that a
purchaser only receives basis when payments are made on a contingent
payment instrument, not when the contingent payment obligation is issued. Although it is not clear that a SCIN is a contingent payment instrument subject to these regulations, a conservative purchaser may
choose to increase basis only to the extent that payments are made, especially because of the potential penalties under § 6662(e)(1)(A) and
(h)(2) if the adjusted basis claimed exceeds 200% of the amount determined to be correct.530
The second income tax consideration for the purchaser is the
amount and deductibility of interest. The amount of the interest component of each payment should be computed under one of the two methods discussed above in regard to the seller. As for the buyer’s ability to
deduct the interest, while G.C.M. 39503 states that “[in] the installment
sale situation, . . . interest is fully deductible by the buyer,” the purchaser will be subject to the typical limitations placed on the deductibility of interest, depending upon the nature of the assets purchased.
Although the default classification of interest for an individual is nondeductible personal interest,531 interest payments under a SCIN, unless
issued in regard to the purchase of a personal use asset other than a
primary or secondary residence, should generally be deductible as investment interest under § 163(h)(2)(B) (subject to the limitations of
§ 163(d)), as qualified residence interest with respect to a primary or
secondary residence under § 163(h)(2)(D) and (h)(3), as passive activity
interest under §§ 163(h)(2)(C) and 469, or as business interest under
§ 163(h)(2)(A). Finally, although the death of the seller during the term
528

I.R.S. Gen Couns. Mem. 39,503.
See Estate of Frane v. Comm’r, 998 F.2d 567, 571 n.5 (8th Cir. 1993); Hesch &
Manning, Beyond the Basic Freeze, supra note 308, ¶ 1601.3.F. Other commentators conclude that the purchaser takes a basis equal to the maximum purchase price without
noting any caveats, other than noting that there is no authority of what the purchaser’s
basis would be if it should be determined that no gain should be recognized either to the
decedent or the decedent’s estate. Wojnaroski, supra note 427, at VII.B.2.
530 See Hesch & Manning, Beyond the Basic Freeze, supra note 308, ¶ 1601.3.F (a
SCIN should not be treated as a contingent payment obligation for these purposes).
531 I.R.C. § 163(h)(1)-(2).
529
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of the SCIN arguably may represent cancellation of indebtedness, resulting in a reduction of the buyer’s basis under § 108(e) (and possibly
taxable income to the buyer to the extent that the cancellation of indebtedness exceeds basis), this result does not seem to comport with the
intent of § 108(e).532
F. Income Tax Consequences to Purchaser for Sale to Grantor Trust
As in the case of a typical installment sale to a grantor trust, the
trust’s purchase of the seller’s property in exchange for a SCIN should
not be a taxable event, at least as long as the trust remains a grantor
trust. If the trust ceases to be a grantor trust during the grantor’s lifetime, if the SCIN is still outstanding at the time of such cessation, and if
a taxable event is deemed to have occurred at the time the trust ceases
to be a grantor trust, then the trust will take either a cost basis for the
purchased property, which presumably will equal the outstanding balance under the SCIN at the time the trust ceases to be a grantor trust, or
possibly will take a basis for such property equal to the payments under
the SCIN, as provided in the regulations for a contingent payment
instrument.533
The grantor’s death before the end of the term of the SCIN results
in the cancellation of the remaining payments otherwise due under the
SCIN. As in the case of a typical installment sale to a grantor trust, the
outcome is certainly not free from doubt, but because of the cancellation feature, and because the grantor trust would not be obligated to
make any payments under the SCIN after the seller’s death, the trust
should take a basis under § 1015(b), which would typically be a carryover basis as opposed to a cost basis.534
G. Gift Tax Considerations
There are several gift tax considerations in regard to a SCIN transaction. These are substantially the same as those in regard to a typical
installment sale to a grantor trust. First, there is the normal valuation
issue with respect to the assets sold in the transaction. Second, if the
value of the SCIN received is found to be worth less than the value of
the property sold (or not “substantially equal” to the value under the
standard set forth in G.C.M. 39503), then the transaction will be treated
532 Compare Burgess J.W. Raby & William L. Raby, Self-Canceling Installment Notes
and Private Annuities, 91 TAX NOTES 2035, 2038 (June 18, 2001) (taking the position that
I.R.C. § 108(e) applies), with Hesch & Manning, Beyond the Basic Freeze, supra note 308,
¶ 1601.3.F and Jerome M. Hesch, The SCINs Game Continues, 91 TAX NOTES TODAY
136-96 (2001) (making a persuasive argument that I.R.C. § 108(e) does not apply).
533 See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1275-4(c)(5), 1.483-4.
534 See Hesch & Manning, Beyond the Basic Freeze, supra note 308, ¶ 1601.4.
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as a part sale/part gift. The potential negative implications of such a
bargain sale are very similar to those discussed above with respect to a
typical installment sale to a grantor trust. Not only would a taxable gift
result, but if the property is sold to a trust, the gift may even cause the
assets in the trust to be ultimately includible in the grantor’s gross estate, for estate tax purposes, at their date of death or alternate valuation
date values, including any appreciation after the initial transfer of the
assets to the trust.
If a trust is the purchaser in a SCIN transaction in which a principal
premium approach is used, substantially greater “seed” funding may be
required to insure that the SCIN will be regarded as bona fide debt. In
all probability, the total trust assets, or access to assets (taking into account bona fide guarantees), should be at least 10% (or possibly 11.1%)
more than the principal obligation under the SCIN, including the principal premium. Otherwise, the transfer to the trust may be treated as an
equity contribution, which almost inevitably would result in a significant
taxable gift.535
H. Estate Tax Considerations
If the SCIN is properly structured, and if there are no other retained interests in the SCIN or in a purchasing trust which would result
in inclusion, the seller’s death prior to the expiration of the SCIN term
should result in the inclusion in the seller’s gross estate, for federal estate tax purposes, of only the payments made or due under the SCIN
during the seller’s life (and any income or appreciation attributable to
such payments). The balance due under the SCIN, exclusive of any payments due but not made during the seller’s life, will be cancelled and
will escape inclusion in the seller’s gross estate.536 In this regard,
G.C.M. 39503 states that “in the case of an installment sale, when a
death-extinguishing provision is expressly included in the sales agreement and any attendant installment notes, the notes will not be included
in the transferor’s gross estate for Federal estate tax purposes.” This
removal of assets from the seller’s gross estate is the primary motivation
for using a SCIN.
The obvious tradeoff from an estate tax standpoint of a SCIN, of
course, is that if the seller lives longer than he or she is “supposed to”
and thus survives the end of the SCIN term, the assets included in the
seller’s gross estate will be greater, and possibly much greater, than if
the seller had sold the property in a typical installment sale. Because of
535 See supra Part XII.A.1 (regarding the structuring of installment sales to grantor
trusts); Cf. PLR 9535026 (Sept. 1, 1995).
536 Estate of Moss v. Comm’r, 74 T.C. 1239, 1247 (1980), acq. in result only, 1981-1
C.B. 2.
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the risk premium, the SCIN payments will be materially higher than typical installment payments, and unless the payments are consumed or
otherwise insulated from estate tax inclusion, they will be includible in
the decedent’s taxable estate. Depending upon the total return on the
assets sold and interest rates, the estate tax inclusion could be even
worse than if the seller had done nothing.
I. Advantages and Disadvantages of SCINs
The conventional wisdom is that a SCIN will provide the maximum
estate tax benefit only if the seller is expected to die prior to his or her
actuarial life expectancy. If the seller obliges by passing away prior to,
and “preferably” materially prior to, his or her actuarial life expectancy,
the estate tax savings can be quite substantial. In so many words, the
seller in a SCIN transaction is gambling on his or her premature death.
Unless the purchased property consists of personal use property
(other than a primary or secondary residence), the interest paid by the
purchaser under the SCIN should generally be deductible. This assumes
that the purchaser in the SCIN transaction is not a grantor trust.
Although the issue is not free from doubt, the basis of a purchaser
(other than a grantor trust) in a SCIN transaction should be the initial
principal obligation under the SCIN, including any principal premium.
In contrast, the purchaser’s basis for property purchased in a private
annuity transaction may be limited to the aggregate annuity payments,
which could result in a lower basis, especially if the seller dies prematurely (as anticipated).
A payment deferred under either a SCIN or a private annuity is a
payment that may never have to be made. Backloading of payments is
much more easily structured under a SCIN, as opposed to a private annuity. Conceptually, either interest or principal should be deferrable to
a date within the seller’s actuarial life expectancy, but an appropriate
principal premium or interest premium would have to be calculated and
ultimately paid (unless the seller dies before the due date). However, in
Estate of Musgrove v. United States,537 a demand SCIN transaction was
held to be a gift because of the absence of a real expectation of repayment (since the seller was in poor health and the purchaser did not have
other funds). This permissible backloading is a distinct SCIN advantage.
The property sold in exchange for the SCIN can be used as security,
thus better assuring the stream of payments if the seller is otherwise
concerned that payments will not be made. In contrast, a private annuity should not be secured or guaranteed.538 Although the issue is by no
537
538

33 Fed. Cl. 657, 669 (1995).
See Banoff & Hartz, supra note 490, at 149.
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means free from doubt, there is a distinct possibility that the interest
rate under the SCIN can be based on the generally lower AFR for the
particular note pursuant to § 7872, as opposed to 120% of the mid-term
AFR under § 7520. However, the planner must judge whether use of
the § 7872 AFR is worth the gift tax risk and possibly the estate tax
risk.539
With these many advantages to recommend it, one may ask why
there are so few SCIN transactions in practice. Part of the answer is
that, as outlined above, the SCIN is replete with tax uncertainties. In
addition, if the seller dies before the SCIN matures, the deferred gain
will be recognized for income tax purposes, upon cancellation of the
note as of the seller’s death, either in the deceased seller’s final return or
her estate’s first return. This disadvantage is much more significant as
the estate and income tax rates become closer to each other. However,
even if the rates are close together, there may still be a significant advantage with a SCIN because the estate tax savings is based on the entire amount that is cancelled whereas the income tax cost is based on the
amount cancelled less basis that is attributable to that amount. It is less
clear whether the same, or similar, income tax results will follow if the
purchaser is a grantor trust; arguably, the remaining deferred gain
should not be recognized by the seller or seller’s estate.540
XIV. LOANS INVOLVING ESTATES
Estates often have liquidity needs for a variety of reasons, not the
least of which is to be able to pay federal and state estate taxes nine
months after the date of death. Other family entities may have liquid
assets that would permit loans to the estate. This is a very commonly
occurring situation. A very important tax issue that arises is whether the
estate will be entitled to an estate tax administrative expense deduction
for the interest that it pays on the loan.
On other side of the coin (and of less importance), there may be
situations in which beneficiaries need advances before the executor is in
a position to be able to make distributions. One possible scenario where
this can occur is if only one beneficiary needs assets from the estate
quickly, but the executor wants to make pro rata distributions when distributions are made. An advance could be made to the one beneficiary
with needs until distributions can be made.
539

See supra Part XIII.B (discussion of the interest rate selection issue).
See supra Part XIII.D (regarding installment sales to grantor trusts for a SCIN);
See also supra Part XII.D (regarding traditional installment sales to grantor trusts). Presumably, the income tax treatment would be similar for these two situations.
540
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Section 2053 does not refer to the deduction of interest as such. To
be deductible, interest must qualify as an administration expense.541
Deducting interest as an estate tax deduction is not as attractive as at
one time, because the interest would be recognized as income when received and the decrease in the estate tax rates reduces the amount of
arbitrage on the rate differential between the estate tax savings and the
income tax cost. Even so, substantial savings may be achieved because
the estate tax reduction occurs nine months after date of death whereas
the interest income may not be recognized until later years.
Interest payable to the I.R.S. on a federal estate tax deficiency is
deductible as an administration expense to the extent the expense is allowable under local law.542 Unlike interest payable to the I.R.S. on deferred estate tax payments, interest on private loans used to pay estate
taxes is not automatically deductible. The I.R.S. recognizes that interest
is deductible on amounts borrowed to pay the federal estate tax where
the borrowing is necessary in order to avoid a forced sale of assets.543
Various cases have permitted deduction of interest on amounts borrowed to pay federal estate tax, in situations where the loan was necessary to avoid a forced sale of assets.544 The interest is deductible only
for the time period for which the loan is reasonably necessary for that
purpose.545
Various cases have permitted an interest deduction where the funds
were borrowed from a family-owned entity rather than being borrowed
541 See generally Philip M. Lindquist, Making Lemonade from Lemons—Deducting
Interest on the Form 706, 14 PROB. & PROP., May/June 2000 at 21-26 (outstanding general
discussion); Michael Harmon, & William N. Kulsrud, When is Interest Deductible as an
Estate Administration Expense?, 77 PRAC. TAX STRATEGIES 166 (Sept. 2006).
542 See Estate of O’Neal v. Comm’r, 258 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2001); Rev. Rul. 79-252,
1979-2 C.B. 333 (discussing interest on estate tax deficiency). The interest expense is
deductible even if the interest accrues as a result of the estate’s willful delay in filing the
estate tax return and in paying the estate tax. Rev. Rul. 81-154, 1981-1 C.B. 470.
543 Rev. Rul. 84-75, 1984-1 C.B. 193 (finding interest on a private loan obtained to
pay federal estate taxes deductible because the loan was obtained to avoid a forced sale
of assets).
544 See generally Hipp v. United States, 29 A.F.T.R.2d 72-1498 (D. S.C. 1971); Estate
of Graegin v. Comm’r, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 387 (1988); Estate of Sturgis v. Comm’r, 54
T.C.M. (CCH) 221 (1987); Estate of Webster v. Comm’r, 65 T.C. 968 (1976); Estate of
Todd v. Comm’r, 57 T.C. 288 (1971), acq. 1973-2 C.B. 4; Estate of Huntington v. Comm’r,
36 B.T.A. 698, 726 (1937).
545 Estate of Lasarzig v. Comm’r, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 448 (1999). The court refused to
allow the estate to deduct interest on borrowing to pay estate tax where the beneficiaries
rather than the estate borrowed the funds after an extended period of time. The court
was troubled by the estate’s effort to keep the case open for up to 20 years after the
parties had resolved all controversies, observing that the I.R.S. allowed deferral of payment of the estate tax for 5 years, “which seems to be a sufficient time to raise the funds
to pay an agreed tax obligation.”
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from a bank.546 In Estate of Murphy,547 the estate borrowed $11,040,000
from the FLP on a 9-year “Graegin” note (i.e., which had a fixed term
and interest rate and which prohibited prepayment). The estate also
borrowed an additional $41.8 million from a prior trust on a “regular”
note (i.e., that had a floating interest rate and that permitted prepayment). The I.R.S. argued that the interest should not be deductible for
two reasons. (1) The interest was not necessarily incurred because the
estate illiquidity was the result of the decedent’s transfer of assets to an
FLP. The court disagreed because the FLP was created “in good faith
and for legitimate and significant non-tax purposes,” and because decedent retained sufficient assets ($130 million) at the time the FLP was
created to pay his living expenses and anticipated estate taxes.548 (2)
The FLP could have sold some of its assets and made a distribution of
cash to the estate to pay taxes. The court also rejected this argument,
reasoning that “[i]f the executor acted in the best interest of the estate,
the courts will not second guess the executor’s business judgment.”549
In Beat v. United States,550 the estate owned largely illiquid farmland. The estate distributed the assets to the beneficiary subject to a
refunding agreement, and the estate borrowed money from the beneficiary to pay estate taxes. The estate had not paid interest to the plaintiff;
it was bankrupt and could not pay the interest. The court reasoned that
even if the asset had not been distributed there would have had to be
borrowing to pay the estate tax and that the borrowing was “necessary
and beneficial to the Estate.”551
An interest deduction was allowed on a Graegin loan in Estate of
Duncan v. Commissioner.552 A revocable trust (responsible for paying
546 See, e.g., Duncan v. Comm’r, 102 T.C.M. (CCH) 421 (2011); Estate of Thompson
v. Comm’r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 426 (1998) (determining that after estate borrowed $2
million from irrevocable life insurance trust, regulations “do not require that an estate
totally deplete its liquid assets before an interest expense can be considered necessary.”);
McKee v. Comm’r, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) 324 (1996) (court refused to disallow interest deduction even though estate could have qualified for § 6166 election to defer payment of
estate tax, concluding that it would not “second guess the business judgments of the executors”); Graegin, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 387; Estate of Murphy v. United States, 104
A.F.T.R.2d 2009-7703 (W.D. Ark. 2009); Beat v. United States, 107 A.F.T.R.2d 20111804 (D. Kan. 2011); Keller v. United States, 104 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-6015 (S.D. Tex. 2009)
($114 million borrowed after death from FLP on a 9-year note).
547 104 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-7703.
548 Id. at 7720.
549 Id. at 7722 (citing McKee v. Comm’r, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) 324).
550 107 A.F.T.R.2d 2011-1804.
551 Id. at *9.
552 102 T.C.M. (CCH) 421 (2011). The decedent had transferred a substantial part of
his estate, including oil and gas businesses to a revocable trust. The decedent at his death
exercised a power of appointment over an irrevocable trust that had been created by
decedent’s father to appoint the assets into trusts almost identical to trusts created under
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estate taxes) borrowed funds from an almost identical irrevocable trust.
The loan was evidenced by a 6.7%553 15-year balloon note that prohibited prepayment. A 15-year term was used because the volatility of oil
and gas prices made income from the oil and gas businesses difficult to
predict.554 The estate claimed a deduction under § 2053 of about $10.7
million for interest that would be payable at the end of the 15-year term
of the loan, which the court allowed because (i) the loan was bona fide
debt,555 (ii) the loan was actually and reasonably necessary,556 and (iii)
the amount of the interest was ascertainable with reasonable
certainty.557
A deduction was similarly allowed in Estate of Kahanic.558 The estate was trying to sell the decedent’s medical practice when the estate
taxes were due, and did not have the liquid funds to pay the estate taxes
the revocable trust. The irrevocable trust and the revocable trust had the same trustees
and beneficiaries. The irrevocable trust had liquidity and the revocable trust (which was
responsible to pay the estate tax) did not.
553 The 6.7% interest rate was the rate quoted by the banking department of one of
the corporate co-trustee for a 15-year bullet loan (at the time of the loan, the long term
AFR was 5.02% and the prime rate was 8.25%). Id. at 423.
554 In fact, the revocable trust ended up being able to generate to over $16 million in
cash within the first three years, but the note prohibited prepayment. The revocable trust
did not expect to generate sufficient cash to repay the loan within three years. Id. at 425.
555 Even though the lender and borrower trusts had the same trustees and beneficiaries, the loan still had economic substance because the parties were separate entities
that had to be respected under state law. Id. at 426.
556 The revocable trust could not meet its obligations without selling its illiquid assets
at reduced prices. Id. at 425. Because of the trustee’s fiduciary duty, the irrevocable trust
could not merely purchase assets from the revocable trust without requiring a discount
that third parties would apply. Id. The terms of the loan were reasonable and the court
refused to second guess the business judgments of the fiduciary acting in the best interests of the trust. Id. The 15-year term was reasonable because of the volatile nature of
the anticipated income. Id. The interest rate was reasonable; using the AFR as the interest rate would have been unfair to the irrevocable trust because the AFR represents the
appropriate interest rate for extremely low risk U.S. government obligations. See id. at
425-26. The I.R.S. complained that there were no negotiations over the rate, but the
court said that the trustees had made a good-faith effort to select a reasonable interest
rate and that “formal negotiations would have amounted to nothing more than playacting.” Id.
557 Id. The I.R.S. argued that the loan might be prepaid and that there is no economic interest to enforce the clause prohibiting prepayment. The court found that prepayment would not occur because the two trusts had to look out for their own respective
economic interests. Id. at 426. If a prepayment benefited one trust it would be a financial detriment to the other. Id.
558 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1434 (2012). Observe, this case did not involve a “Graegin”
loan, discussed in Duncan, because the loan could be repaid at any time. Accordingly,
the estate in Kahanic did not claim a deduction on the estate tax return for the interest
that would accrue over the life of the loan; the issue was merely whether the interest that
had accrued up to the time of trial could be deducted under § 2053. Id. at 1435.
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without a forced sale of the medical practice. Immediately before paying the estate taxes, the estate had about $400,000 of cash and owed
about $1.125 million of liabilities, including the federal and state estate
taxes. The estate borrowed $700,000 from the decedent’s ex-wife for a
secured note bearing interest at the short-term AFR (4.85%). The court
allowed the amount of interest that had accrued up to the time of trial
because (i) the loan was bona fide debt,559 (ii) the loan was actually and
reasonably necessary,560 and (iii) the interest will be paid by the
estate.561
Cases have not always allowed the full estate tax deduction for interest when an estate borrows funds from a family entity. In Estate of
Koons v. Commissioner562 the court disallowed a $71 million interest
deduction on a $10.75 million note. The estate had about $19 million of
liquid assets and the return positions indicated that it owed about $21
million of estate tax and the decedent’s revocable trust owed about $5
million of GST tax. (The I.R.S. position was that those liabilities were
$64 million and $20 million, respectively.) The estate borrowed the cash
in 2006 from an LLC owned 71% by the estate. Payments under the
note were to be paid over 8 years (2024-2031) beginning 18 years after
the loan was made from an LLC. The court reasoned that the estate
could have forced a distribution from the LLC to pay the estate tax, and
that the loan merely delayed the time for such a distribution because the
559 The I.R.S. argued that the lender never intended to create a genuine debt because
she never demanded repayment and because she benefitted from the estate being able to
pay its estate taxes because otherwise she would have been liable for some of the estate
taxes because of transferee liability. The court responded that she did not demand payment when the loan became due because that would have exhausted the estate’s funds
and prevented the estate from being able to challenge the I.R.S.’s estate tax determination. The court also agreed with the estate that the ex-wife’s benefiting from the estate’s
payment of its taxes and did not mean that she did not mean to collect the loan. Id. at
1443-44.
The I.R.S. also argued that the estate never intended to repay the loan. The court
disagreed, believing the executor’s testimony that she intended to repay the loan when it
was made but the estate financially deteriorated when the medical practice could not be
sold as a going concern. Id. at 1444-45.
560 The I.R.S. argued that the estate could have recovered from the ex-wife a portion
of the estate tax liabilities, but the court stated that the estate did not have a right of
contribution from her for estate taxes at the time they were due because the residuary
estate value at that time was sufficient to pay the taxes. In addition, the I.R.S. maintained that the estate could have sold its illiquid assets in time to pay the taxes. The court
disagreed, finding that it would have had to sell the medical practice and its receivables at
a deep discount. Id.
561 The I.R.S. believed the estate had not shown that it could pay the interest, but the
court accepted the estate’s counter that based on other findings in the case, the estate
taxes would be reduced to the point that it could pay the interest. Id. at 1445.
562 T.C. Memo. 2013-94.
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estate’s only ability to repay the loan was from eventual distributions
from the LLC. The estate argued that a loan from the LLC was preferable to a cash distribution because a cash distribution would leave the
LLC with less cash to buy businesses. However, the court noted that the
loan also depleted the LLC of cash. Furthermore, the court noted that
the estate would have to remain active long enough to repay the loan,
and keeping the estate open 25 years “hinders the ‘proper settlement’ of
the Estate.”
The court rejected an interest deduction for amounts loaned from
an FLP to the estate in Estate of Black v. Commissioner.563 An FLP
sold about one-third of its very large block of stock in a public company
in a secondary offering, generating about $98 million to the FLP, and
the FLP loaned $71 million to the estate to pay various taxes, expenses,
and a charitable bequest. The court found that the loan was not necessary, basing its analysis primarily on the “no economic effect” rationale
that the I.R.S. gave in its “no bona fide loan” argument.564 The partnership had to sell the stock, and it loaned the sale proceeds to the estate.
Under the court’s analysis, the key factor in denying any deduction for
loans obtained to pay debts and expenses seems to be that the loan was
not necessary to avoid selling assets—the company stock that was
owned by the FLP was in fact sold by the FLP.565 The partnership could
have redeemed the estate’s interest in the FLP and the estate could have
sold the assets received from the partnership to pay the estate tax.566
563 133 T.C. 340 (2009). The estate argued four reasons for allowing an interest deduction. (1) The executor exercised reasonable business judgment when he borrowed
funds, (2) the FLP was not required to make a distribution or redeem a partnership
interest from the estate, (3) the son was the managing partner and executor and owed
fiduciary duties to both the estate and the partnership, and (4) the loan itself was a bona
fide loan. The I.R.S. argued that the loan was (1) unnecessary and (2) not bona fide
(because the transaction had no economic effect other than to generate an estate tax
deduction). For further discussion, see generally Stephen Liss, Estate of Black: When Is It
“Necessary” to Pay Estate Taxes With Borrowed Funds?, 112 J. TAX’N 373 (2010).
564 The court noted that the partnership agreement allowed modifications, and a
modification permitting a distribution of stock to the partners or a partial redemption of
the estate’s interest would not have violated the son’s fiduciary duties, as managing partner, to any of the partners. The court reasoned further that the estate had no way to
repay the loan other than actually receiving a distribution from or having its partnership
interest redeemed by the partnership in return for the stock, which it would then use to
discharge the debt. Instead, the partnerships sold the stock and loaned the sale proceeds
to the estate Id. at 384-85.
565 Id. at 384. The other cases cited by the taxpayer in which an interest deduction
was allowed involved situations where the estate avoided a forced sale of illiquid assets or
company stock.
566 John Porter (the attorney representing the estate) points out a business judgment
problem with the redemption argument. Id. at 381. The estate’s interest would be redeemed at market value, with a discount. A redemption in that fashion enhances the
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In Estate of Stick v. Commissioner,567 the estate reported liquid assets of nearly $2 million and additional illiquid assets of over $1,000,000.
The residuary beneficiary of the estate (a trust) borrowed $1.5 million
from the Stick Foundation to satisfy the estate’s federal and state estate
tax liabilities. The court concluded that the estate had sufficient liquid
assets to pay the estate taxes and administration expenses without borrowing, and denied a deduction of over $650,000 on interest on the
loan.568 (This was despite the fact that the liquid assets of the estate
appeared to have exceeded its obligations at the time of the borrowing
by only about $220,000. That seems like a rather narrow “cushion” for
an estate that owed over $1.7 million of liabilities, and other courts have
been reluctant the second guess the executor’s business judgment in
somewhat similar situations.)569
Technical Advice Memorandum 200513028570 refused to allow any
interest deduction for amounts borrowed from a family limited partnership to pay estate taxes.571 The ruling gave various reasons for denying
a deduction for the interest expenses. (The I.R.S. did not refer to the
creation of the FLP as a self-imposed illiquidity as one of the reasons.)
First, the I.R.S. reasoned that the loan was not necessary to the administration of the estate because one of the decedent’s sons who was a coexecutor of the estate was the remaining general partner of the FLP, the
FLP was not engaged in any active business that would necessitate retention of liquid assets, and there was no fiduciary restraint on the coexecutor’s ability to access the funds.572 Second, the I.R.S. reasoned
value of the other partners, and the executor often makes a business decision not to do
that. John Porter’s view is that the court in Black substituted its business judgment for
that of the executor.
567 98 T.C.M. (RIA) 2010-192 (2010).
568 Id. at 1155.
569 See supra note 549 and accompanying text.
570 TAM 200513028 (Apr. 1, 2005)
571 In that situation, the decedent created a family limited partnership with 90% of
his assets, and died 5 1/2 years later. The estate borrowed funds from the FLP to pay
federal and state estate taxes under a 10-year note with principal and all interest payable
on maturity, with a prohibition against any prepayments. The stated interest rate was 1%
over the prime rate and 3% more than the 15-year mortgage rate on the date of the note.
The estate’s 99% interest in the FLP was pledged as security for the note. Id. at 2-3.
572 Id. at 5. The I.R.S. rejected the notion that the estate could not require a distribution from the partnership since the estate possessed only a 99% assignee interest:
It seems clear that the same parties (closely related family members whose proportionate interests in the Estate are virtually identical to their proportionate
interests in the partnership) stood on all sides of this transaction. Thus, the
assets held in Partnership were readily available for the purposes of paying the
federal estate tax. Rather, we believe that in view of the availability of the
liquid assets to the Estate and its beneficiaries, and in view of the structure of
the loan (10-year term with prepayment prohibited), the only reason the loan
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that the interest may not be repaid, and even if it is, the repayment has
no economic impact on the parties.573 The most likely scenario for paying the loan was that the FLP would distribute assets to the estate,
which would then repay those assets back to the FLP in payment of the
loan.574
Some I.R.S. agents have indicated informally that claiming an interest deduction on a Graegin loan for borrowing from a family limited
partnership will draw close scrutiny as to whether § 2036 applies to include the partnership assets in the estate (without any discount).
When the estate receives an extension to pay estate tax under
§ 6161, the interest is deductible generally only when it is actually paid.
In Revenue Ruling 80-250,575 the I.R.S. gave two reasons for refusing to
allow an “up-front deduction” for the interest.576 First, an estate can
accelerate payment of the deferred tax. Second, the interest rate of the
deferred amount fluctuates, which makes it impossible to accurately estimate the projected interest expense.577 In Estate of Graegin v. Comtransaction was entered into was to obtain an ‘upfront’ estate tax deduction for
the interest expense (an expense, which, as discussed below, is largely illusory.)
Id. at 5-6.
573 Id.
574 The limitation of the deduction for amounts actually paid “ensures that the expense has a real economic impact on the amount ultimately passing to the estate beneficiaries.” Id. at 6. In this case the interest payments have no economic effect on the
beneficiaries. If the estate has any funds for making payments, the estate would make
the payments to the FLP to pay the interest, which would proportionately increase the
value of the beneficiaries’ interests in the FLP. More likely, the FLP will distribute assets
to the estate, which will then repay those assets back to the FLP in payment of the loan:
Since the parties have virtually identical interests in the Estate and the partnership, there is no change in the relative net worth of these parties as a result of
the loan transaction. Rather, other than the favorable tax treatment resulting
from the transaction, it is difficult to see what benefit will be derived from this
circular transfer of funds.
Id. at 7. The I.R.S. attempted to further support this argument by analogizing to income
tax cases, where the courts declined to allow an income tax deduction for interest under
similar circumstances involving circular transfers for making payments on purported loan
transactions. Id.
575 Rev. Rul. 80-250, 1980-2 C.B. 278.
576 The Ruling actually involved interest payments on a § 6166 payout rather than an
extension under § 6161. The law has since changed so that interest on a § 6166 extension
is not deductible, but the interest rate is only 45% of the normal I.R.S. rate on underpayments (effectively allowing the benefit of a deduction at what was then a 55% marginal
rate). However, the Ruling still gives the I.R.S.’s reasons for not allowing an “upfront”
deduction for interest payments on payment extensions. See id.
577 Various courts agreed with the I.R.S.’s concerns, and refused to allow an upfront
deduction of the estimated interest because of the fluctuating interest rate and the possibility of prepayment (or forced acceleration) of the deferred payments. See e.g., Estate
of Harrison v. Comm’r, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 1306 (1987); Estate of Spillar v. Comm’r, 50
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missioner,578 however, the Tax Court in a memorandum decision
allowed an estate to deduct projected interest on a loan that was obtained to avoid the sale of stock in a closely-held corporation.579
The court reasoned that the amount of the interest was sufficiently
ascertainable to be currently deductible because of the fixed term of the
note and because of the substantial prepayment penalty provisions in
the note.580 The court observed that it was “disturbed by the fact that
the note requires only a single payment of principal and interest,”581 but
determined that such a repayment term was not unreasonable given the
decedent’s post-mortem asset arrangement. The court observed that it
was “mindful of the potential for abuse presented by the facts in this
case,”582 but found the executor’s testimony regarding his intention with
respect to repayment of the note credible. The court specifically
pointed to the fact that there was an outside shareholder who would
complain if the loan was not timely paid.583
The I.R.S. has approved the upfront deduction of interest in several
Graegin loan situations.584 The I.R.S.’s position in the letter rulings that
all interest that would have been owed for the entire loan term must be
paid upon default of the note may present usury problems in some
states. An alternative planning possibility may be to have the lender
waive the right to accelerate the note in the event of default.585 Other
I.R.S. rulings involving Graegin loans have refused to allow the interest
deduction.586
Most of the cases involving Graegin loans have allowed the upfront interest deduction, in situations where the estate could establish a
reason for the borrowing other than to generate the estate tax deducT.C.M. (CCH) 1285 (1985); Estate of Bailly v. Comm’r, 81 T.C. 246, modified, 81 T.C.
949 (1983).
578 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 387 (1988); See generally Louis S. Harrison, Borrowing to Pay
Estate Tax, TR. & EST., May 2009, at 46.
579 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 387.
580 Id.
581 Id.
582 Id.
583 Id.
584 See, e.g., PLR 200020011 (May 19, 2000) (allowing a current deduction for the
projected interest payments after the loan is amended to provide that it cannot be prepaid and that upon default all interest that would have been owed throughout the loan
term must be paid at the time of default); PLR 199952039 (Dec. 29, 1999) (ten year note
providing for annual interest payments with a balloon principal payment at the end of ten
years); PLR 199903038 (Jan. 22, 1999).
585 That way, if there is a default, the terms of the note would continue to apply, and
interest would continue to run to the end of the term of the loan.
586 E.g., TAM 200513028 (Apr. 1, 2005) (refusing to allow any interest deduction for
amounts borrowed from a family limited partnership to pay estate taxes); See supra notes
570-574 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of TAM 200513028.
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tion, and courts are reluctant to second guess the business judgment of
the executor.587 A few cases have also disallowed interest deductions in
Graegin loan situations, where the estate could not demonstrate the necessity for the borrowing over the life of the loan.588 I.R.S. officials
have stated informally that the I.R.S. is continuing to look for vehicles
to contest Graegin loans, particularly in situations involving family limited partnerships. The I.R.S.’s concern is that a deduction will be allowed but the interest in fact will not have to be paid over the entire
term of the note.
The economics of this up-front deduction can be staggering. For
example, assume a $10 million taxable estate. Assume the marginal estate tax bracket is 40%.589 If sufficient lifetime gifts have been made so
that the estate is in a 40% bracket, the estate would owe $4.0 million in
estate taxes. However, assume the estate borrows $1.434 million [this
amount is calculated in an interrelated calculation] from a closely-held
company under a 15 year note, at 12.0% interest, with a balloon payment at the end of the 15 year period. The accumulated interest payment due at the end of the 15 years would be $6.415 million. Under the
Graegin analysis, the interest expense would be currently deductible,
yielding a taxable estate of $10 - $6.415 or $3.585 million, which would
result in a federal estate tax (at a 40% rate) of $1.434 million. The
$6.415 million of interest would be paid to the company (which in turn,
is owned primarily by family members.) The overall result is a very considerable estate tax savings. The estate tax that is due 9 months after
587 E.g., Estate of Duncan v. Comm’r, 102 T.C.M. (CCH) 421 (2011); Estate of
Gilman v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (RIA) 2004-286 (2004) (estate borrowed funds to pay (i)
federal and state estate taxes, (ii) compensation to executors [who were also employees
of the estate’s closely held business and the will specified that they were not to receive
executor’s commissions but should continue to receive compensation from the business],
and (iii) miscellaneous expenses; court concluded that loan was necessary because of estate’s illiquidity and allowed interest deduction through date the notes were due); Estate
of Murphy v. United States, 104 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-7703 (W.D. Ark. 2009); Keller v.
United States, 104 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-6015 (S.D. Tex. 2009) ($114 million borrowed after
death from FLP on a 9-year note). Cf. McKee v. Comm’r, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) 324 (1996)
(court refused to disallow interest deduction even though estate could have qualified for
§ 6166 election to defer payment of estate tax, concluding that it would not “second guess
the business judgments of the executors.”).
588 E.g., Estate of Black v. Comm’r, 133 T.C. 340 (2009); Estate of Lasarzig v.
Comm’r, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 448 (1999) (court observed that no prior cases had allowed
such deduction in a situation in which a taxpayer “seeks an extended delay (up to 20
years) so that a nonparty (family trusts of beneficiaries) can benefit from improved market conditions that may or may not occur.”).
589 The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 changed the estate tax rate to 40% for
the portion of taxable estates in excess of the estate tax applicable exclusion amount.
I.R.C. § 2001(c). This rate will not change without further legislative action.
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the date of death is reduced from $4.0 million to a little under $1.5
million.
The interest income would be subject to income tax over the 15year period, and the I.R.S. will take the position that the interest on
loans to pay taxes is nondeductible personal interest. However, many
families are willing to pay income taxes over the payment period if they
can reduce the estate taxes that are due nine months after the date of
death. Be aware that if a QTIP trust or funded revocable trust is the
borrower rather than a probate estate, the I.R.S. may argue that, under
§ 2503(b), only interest actually paid within the estate tax statute of limitations period may be deducted.
The § 2053 final regulations do not seem to impact Graegin loans at
all. However, the Treasury Priority Guidance Plans for 2009-2014 include a project to address when present value concepts should be applied to claims and administration expenses (including, for example,
attorneys’ fees, Tax Court litigation expenses, etc.).590 Graegin notes
are also in the scope of that project.

590 Dep’t of the Treasury, 2013-2014 Priority Guidance Plan at 16 (August 9, 2013),
www.irs.gov/uac/Priority-Guidance-Plan (“Guidance under § 2053 regarding personal
guarantees and the application of present value concepts in determining the deductible
amount of expenses and claims against the estate”).

